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Executive Summary
Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, fossil fuel price increases have 
contributed to considerable increases in wholesale 
and consumer prices for electricity in the UK. Other 
commodity price rises, supply chain constraints, market 
dynamics and a range of other factors have increased 
construction costs in both renewable energy and gas-fired 
developments. As we look to the future, estimates of the 
costs of building new nuclear and carbon capture and 
storage plants in the UK have also increased. 
Whilst fuel prices have always been volatile, many of 
the increases in costs and prices were not anticipated 
and stand in sharp contrast to a widely shared view that 
costs tend to fall over time, particularly for emerging 
technologies. A substantial literature indicates that 
innovation in the form of ‘technological learning’ 
reduces costs and that policy supporting the deployment 
of technologies helps this learning to occur. Yet it is 
clear that learning effects may not always emerge as 
anticipated, and/or can be overwhelmed by other factors.
The importance of accurate generation cost projections 
has increased as a result of the government’s proposals 
for Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which will shift key 
aspects of power sector investment choices away from 
private companies and back towards the government, for 
example through the setting of current and future strike 
prices for different technologies. It is now even more 
important for policy makers to understand the strengths 
and weaknesses of cost estimates and forecasts.
This report considers the role and importance of 
electricity cost estimates and the methodologies 
employed to forecast future costs. It examines the 
conceptual and empirical basis for the expectation 
that costs will reduce over time, explains the main cost 
forecasting methodologies, and analyses their strengths, 
limitations and difficulties. It considers six case study 
technologies in order to derive both technology specific 
and generic conclusions about the tools and techniques 
used to project future electricity generation costs. 
Learning rates and 
engineering assessment
There is a rich and evolving international literature on 
the sources of cost reduction in all technologies, and 
how best to estimate future cost-trends. The principal 
approaches can be characterised as ‘engineering 
assessment’, including parametric modelling, and the use 
of ‘learning’ or ‘experience’ curves. The two approaches 
are complementary and offer different sources of insight, 
as well as different limitations and potential for error. 
Engineering-based approaches offer advantages for early 
stage technologies with very limited market exposure, 
since the absence of historical cost and deployment 
data militates against the use of experience curves. 
The potential to consider sources of cost reduction 
‘parametrically’ – that is to break down the costs of a 
technology into a set of component parameters – also 
allows for sensitivity to key cost changes to be assessed. 
Engineering assessments may also help the analyst to 
identify discontinuities or innovations that learning 
curves cannot anticipate. 
Learning curves chart the relationship between market 
growth and cost reduction, an empirical phenomenon 
that has been identified in numerous technologies and 
sectors of the economy. The literature both applies 
learning curves to particular technologies and discusses 
their usefulness and limitations. The complexities 
associated with learning curves include: whether learning 
rates vary through time and as technologies mature; 
the presence of ‘cost floors’; the difficulties associated 
with projecting deployment; divergent costs and prices; 
system boundary issues; alternative sources of learning 
(such as learning by researching). 
Analysts are seeking to improve the predictive value of 
learning curve analysis and interrogating the other factors 
that drive cost reduction. Understanding of learning 
as a phenomenon is becoming more sophisticated. 
The literature pays considerably less attention to the 
2  
Perhaps the key challenge 
is in representing and 
communicating uncertainty 
– what is known, not known 
and unsure in an uncertain 
world – to decision-makers 
seeking certainty.
methodological issues associated with engineering 
assessment, but does not challenge its usefulness. 
Overall, it is clear that engineering and learning/market-
based approaches are best seen as partners in the quest 
to better understand cost reduction potential. Both offer 
valuable insights, but their limitations need to be properly 
appreciated by users and by those making decisions based 
upon the analysis that uses them. 
Understanding cost trends better: 
the technology case studies
A wide range of factors affect cost and price changes. 
These are additional to the limitations of learning/
engineering-based techniques for assessing cost reduction 
potential. The report investigates these through a set of 
six case studies: onshore wind, offshore wind, nuclear, 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) and solar photovoltaics (PV). 
The case studies reveal a widely divergent picture of cost 
trends between the principal technologies reviewed for 
this report. The trend for PV has been most resolutely 
downward, albeit from the highest base. Wind 
technologies and CCGT have also seen consistent and 
substantial cost reductions, although the cost of both 
turned upwards, for different reasons, during the mid 
and late 2000s. The offshore wind case study provides a 
variety of insights both methodological and empirical. 
In this instance exogenous factors over-rode learning, 
but the potential for learning in the early stages was also 
overstated and factors endogenous to the roll out (such 
as moving to deeper water) were not always fully factored 
into early cost projections.  The literature on nuclear 
provides a great deal of insight into why costs have tended 
to rise rather than fall, at least in the European and US 
context. Analysis of CCS costs remains largely theoretical 
at the time of writing, though the literature demonstrates 
increasing attention to detailed plant design and a trend 
towards costs rising as detail increases. 
One size does not fit all. Technology specifics are paramount 
to cost reduction prospects. Forecasters need to be alert to 
the specific characteristics and thematic distinctions of 
the different technologies and their particular physical, 
commercial, and regulatory environments. For this reason 
the use of ‘proxy’ learning imported from other sectors 
(even similar ones) needs to be treated with caution. The 
review also suggests that technologies which are modular, 
have scope for mass production, and have scope for 
technological innovation, are more likely to achieve on-
going cost reductions. Technologies which are inherently 
complex, need to realise significant project-level 
economies and require substantial complex regulation, 
will find cost reductions more difficult to realise. 
Overarching conclusions 
The review shows that the cost of electricity generation can fall 
through time and as deployment rises. The review revealed 
considerable empirical evidence of cost reduction, in many 
technologies. It also revealed a detailed and sophisticated 
discourse related to the use of learning curves. 
Fuel and commodity prices can have large impacts. Largely 
unanticipated by most costs forecasters, escalations 
in the prices of both fuels and essential raw materials 
contributed greatly to disparities between cost projections 
and outcomes during the 2000s. These overwhelmed 
downward cost trends previously seen in several 
technologies and anticipated in others.
In the short-term costs may rise before they can fall. Cost 
reductions from learning can be overwhelmed in the 
short-term by supply chain bottlenecks, build delays 
and ‘teething trouble’, for example lower than expected 
reliability at first. There is historical precedent for 
technologies deployed in the power sector to demonstrate 
cost increases during early commercialisation before 
supply chains and learning from experience are firmly 
established.   
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Market growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
learning and cost reduction. The review reveals the multi-
dimensional nature of both projecting future costs and 
creating the conditions for costs to fall. The literature 
highlights the learning potential of spill-overs from 
research, indicating that continued attention to RD&D 
is an essential accompaniment to market enablement. 
Regulatory constraints also need to be addressed and 
policy may also be able to facilitate cost reduction 
through supporting the skills base and ensuring effective 
sequencing of projects. 
It is important to acknowledge and communicate the 
assumptions and uncertainty inherent to cost projections. 
Cost reduction projections are difficult and challenging, 
so analysts and policy makers should not be surprised if 
forecasts turn out to be wrong. However, projections do 
need to make uncertainties and assumptions clear. In 
particular there is a need to make a distinction between 
different types of uncertainty, and recognise that some 
categories of uncertainties cannot be resolved:
•	 Some of the uncertainties revealed by the case studies are 
exogenous, inherently unpredictable and may exhibit high 
volatility.  These risks are difficult to anticipate, quantify 
and predict rather than being impossible to imagine. 
They are ‘known unknowns’ and may be investigated 
and mitigated by the use of numerical ranges and 
scenario analysis. However, some ‘sideswipes’ may 
be inevitable, and can overwhelm cost projections 
even in the best of analytical worlds, albeit perhaps 
temporarily. 
•	 Other cost drivers are endogenous, more ‘known’ and 
therefore lend themselves more readily to future projection. 
It is, for example, reasonable to expect cost reductions 
over time to accrue from returns to adoption such 
as learning effects, ongoing innovation, scale effects, 
and standardisation. It is also possible to anticipate 
and manage factors such as short-term bottlenecks 
and supply chain constraints. This has important 
implications for policy design such as time horizons 
and sequencing.
Despite uncertainties, recent studies of energy technology 
costs show improved ‘appraisal realism’. The scope of cost 
estimates (for example what is and what is not included) 
and the assumptions regarding other key variables (such 
as the discount rate) tend to be well documented in recent 
analyses. Many recent studies explicitly take account of a 
variety of factors able to drive costs in the wrong direction. 
Nonetheless, many contemporary forecasts anticipate a 
return to cost reductions over the forthcoming years and 
decades even where costs/estimates of costs have risen. 
In part this reflects an expectation that factors such as 
supply chain constraints will ease and underlying learning 
effects will lead to cost reduction through capital cost 
reduction and efficiency/performance improvement.
Overall, this review reveals a large dataset on technology 
costs (past, present and future) and a rich and complex 
literature that discusses the factors that affect cost 
trends over time. Our understanding of cost reduction 
forecasting is undoubtedly improving with time, in 
part through learning from recent significant failures to 
anticipate changes to cost trends.  
We know with confidence that costs can fall, and that 
given the right conditions ‘learning’ can make this 
happen. The role of policy in driving cost reduction is 
very apparent in several of the case studies. However, it 
is less straightforward to be confident about the extent 
to which costs will fall in a particular period in time, and 
policy can have multiple impacts, for example regulatory 
complexity can also militate against cost reduction. Cost 
reduction projections are difficult and challenging and 
often proved wrong. 
Perhaps the key challenge is in representing and 
communicating uncertainty – what is known, not known 
and unsure in an uncertain world – to decision-makers 
seeking certainty.
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1. Introduction –  
Context, relevance and 
approach to this report
8  
1
Context 
In Britain both the price of electricity and the projected 
costs of electricity production from new power stations 
have been subject to increases and volatility in recent 
years. Since the mid-2000s, fossil fuel price increases 
have led to considerable increases in the wholesale and 
consumer prices for electricity in the UK and in many 
other countries. Whilst in the period since 2008 gas 
and power prices have fallen again in the US as a result 
of shale gas expansion, prices have risen in European 
and Asian markets (DECC 2012c, Johnsson and Chediak 
2012, Bolton 2013, IEA 2013). In addition in recent years a 
range of factors including commodity price rises, supply 
chain constraints and market dynamics have increased 
the construction costs of many types of power station 
(Greenacre et al. 2010, IEA 2010a, Mott MacDonald 2010). 
Chapter 2 reviews recent estimates of costs.
Whilst fuel prices have always been volatile, many of 
these cost increases stand in sharp contrast to a widely 
shared view that costs tend to fall over time, particularly 
for emerging technologies (IEA 2000, Greenacre et al. 
2010).  Many energy system scenarios are predicated 
on innovation and ‘learning effects’ that lead to cost 
reductions as new technologies are developed and 
deployed. Historically, this aligns well with experience; 
cost reductions over time for most technologies are well 
documented. Yet the recent gap between expectation and 
reality gives rise to important questions about how and 
why costs rose when they were expected to fall and how 
confident we can be in analyses that continue to predict 
cost reductions over time. This has particular relevance 
at a time when many of the UK’s older power stations are 
scheduled to close and the government has ambitious 
plans to decarbonise the electricity sector. The future costs 
of new nuclear, renewable energy and fossil fired plants 
with and without carbon capture are of fundamental 
importance to policymakers and investors alike. 
This report
This report considers the role and importance of cost 
estimates for energy policy and the electricity generation 
industry and the methodologies employed to forecast 
future costs. It examines the theoretical reasons behind 
the expectation that costs will reduce over time, explains 
the processes and mechanisms that underpin the 
main cost forecasting methodologies, and analyses the 
strengths, limitations and difficulties with the techniques 
used to make judgements about cost reductions over time. 
In order to analyse further the accuracy of cost 
forecasting and the robustness of the forecasting 
methodologies, the report draws upon six case studies, 
produced by UKERC to support this report, each of which 
focuses on a different generating technology. The case 
study working papers are available on the UKERC website 
(www.ukerc.ac.uk)1. Each case study compares past 
expectations of cost trajectories with actual out-turns 
and changes in cost estimates over time and analyses the 
main drivers of cost increases or decreases.
These drivers vary in character – some being quite 
technology-specific, others more policy-oriented or 
micro- or macro-economic in nature. They comprise a 
heterogeneous assortment of forces that impinge on costs 
trajectories and/or on the estimation and forecasting of 
costs, and we have chosen to refer to them as ‘themes’. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we distinguish between themes of a 
‘methodological’, ‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ nature. 
Relevance
Power generation costs and cost forecast methodologies 
are of considerable importance for several reasons. The 
range of stakeholders and interested parties is wide and 
the discourse around costs of considerable public and 
political interest. Costs and cost forecasting are important 
to the utilities, policy makers, investors, the academic 
community, and of course, electricity consumers. 
In addition, the issue of power generation costs – in 
particular the evolution of costs for different technologies 
and the anticipated outlook for those costs in the 
future – is of fundamental importance to strategies for 
reducing emissions of the pollutant gases responsible 
for climate change. For example, the models used in the 
Stern Review (2006) and in scenario modelling exercises 
such as UKERC’s 2050 Energy Project (Anandarajah et al. 
2009), rely upon numerous judgements about the future 
costs of energy technologies. These scenarios suggest 
that the transition to low-carbon energy systems will 
feature decarbonisation of the electricity generation 
sector to a very great degree, first because it currently 
accounts for a significant share of carbon emissions, 
and second because electrification of heat and transport 
is expected to help to provide a cost effective means to 
decarbonise these sectors (CCC 2010). It is difficult to 
envisage a decarbonised energy system that does not 
include a substantial move to low carbon sources of 
electricity. However, the scale of expansion of nuclear 
power, renewable energy and carbon capture and storage 
in many modelling exercises is in large part predicated 
on the expectation that their costs will fall over time. If 
the judgements made about cost reductions prove to be 
wrong, the role of power generation may become less 
prominent and/or it may prove to be more expensive to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
In the shorter term, the UK has committed to meeting 15% 
of its final energy consumption from renewable sources by 
2020 in order to comply with the EU Renewables Directive 
(EC 2009). Again, the choice of technologies to meet the 
target are influenced by cost projections (Greenacre et al. 
2010). Finally, the role and accuracy of generation cost 
1www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page_ref_id=2863
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projections has increased in policy importance as a result 
of the government’s proposals for Electricity Market 
Reform (EMR) (HM Government 2012). EMR will shift key 
aspects of power sector investment choices away from 
private companies and back towards the government. 
Government will be responsible for setting Contracts 
for Difference strike prices and determining the level of 
capacity desired through the Capacity Mechanism (Ibid.), 
and have recently published their proposed strike prices 
for a range of renewable generation technologies (DECC 
2013a). It is now even more important for policy makers 
to understand the strengths and weaknesses of cost 
estimates and forecasts. With long lead times associated 
with building plants such as nuclear power stations, long 
lives of many of the assets in question and the long-
term nature of the choices made now all increase the 
importance of cost estimation methodologies that are 
robust and trustworthy. This report examines the extent 
to which they are.
1.1 Methodology
1.1.1 TPA approach
The report is authored by analysts at Imperial College 
working for the Technology and Policy Assessment (TPA) 
function of the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). 
The TPA function was set up to address key issues and 
controversies in the energy field and aims to provide 
authoritative inputs to decision-making processes in 
this arena, using an approach which learns from the 
practice of systematic review. This aspires to provide a 
more convincing evidence base for policymakers and 
practitioners, avoid duplication of research, encourage 
higher research standards and identify research gaps. 
This evidence-based approach is common in areas such 
as education, criminal justice and healthcare. UKERC’s 
TPA function has developed an approach that suits energy 
policy questions (Sorrell 2007). 
The goal is to achieve high standards of rigour and 
transparency. However, energy policy gives rise to a 
number of difficulties for prospective systematic review 
practitioners and the approach is not common in energy. 
We have therefore set up a process that is inspired by the 
evidence-based approach, but that is not bound to any 
narrowly defined method or techniques (Ibid.)2.
1.1.2 Assessment sequence
This assessment follows a generalised approach 
developed for all TPA work. The TPA has identified a 
series of steps that need to be undertaken in each of its 
assessments. These steps, derived from the practice of 
systematic review in non-energy policy analysis, give rise 
to the process for this study, outlined in Figure 1.1 below.
Figure 1.1: Typical process for TPA studies
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2See also ‘About the TPA’ at www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/TPABackground&structure=TPA+Overview
10  
1.1.3 Systematic review and expert elicitation
The evidence and data used in this report are sourced 
from a targeted review of the academic and ‘grey’ 
literature most directly relevant to the subject matter 
of each chapter (and of each case study in the case of 
Chapter 4). The evidence and data for Chapter 3, which 
focuses on forecast methodologies, was sourced from a 
systematic search of the available academic literature. In 
addition, the project team consulted with an expert group 
convened to help with the research and review the draft 
report. See Annex for details of the expert group members.
The systematic review for Chapter 3 started with a set 
of key words that provided the basis for the creation of 
specific search strings using Boolean terminology. The 
challenge was to keep the number of search strings to 
a manageable level without losing relevant papers from 
the review process. The project team therefore selected 
those combinations of terms deemed to provide the 
appropriate coverage and the systematic search revealed 
approximately 1,150 evidence hits. However, over 400 of 
these were duplicates across the databases and removal 
of these reduced the results total to under 750. This 
number was then further reduced to approximately 450 
by removal of any hits that, judging from their title or 
abstract, were immediately obvious as being of little or no 
relevance. The remaining total was further reduced via a 
process of closer inspection to approximately 200 pieces 
of evidence that were then rated for relevance (see Annex 
for definition). In the writing of Chapter 3, the majority of 
the evidence used is rated 1 or 2 with only very limited 
contextual use made of evidence rated 3 and 4.
The approach to the technology case studies was to 
conduct a targeted systematic review of the evidence base 
for the cost trajectories of each technology. Across the six 
case studies, the project team collated over two and half 
thousand data points and a detailed analysis of this data 
can be found in the working papers referred to above3.
1.2 Report structure
The structure of this report is as follows:
•	 Chapter 2 examines the importance and differing 
roles of cost estimates, forecasts and analysis in 
the electricity generation industry. It examines why 
and how costs matter, in particular with reference 
to government policy making, before going on to 
investigate their various forms and specific uses.
•	 Chapter 3 considers the reasons the cost of a product 
or process is expected to go down over time and then 
goes on to examine experience curves and engineering 
assessment, the principal methodologies used to 
make forecasts and projections of future costs in 
power generation. The chapter considers the strengths, 
limitations, caveats and refinements of each approach.
•	 Chapter 4 summarises and discusses the findings of 
six case-studies which examine cost estimates and 
future costs forecasts of different electricity generation 
technologies. The chapter examines what these case-
studies tell us about past expectations of future cost 
trajectories and the drivers that have contributed to 
the shape of the technologies’ projected and actual 
cost trajectories. The six technologies examined are: 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT); coal and gas-fired 
carbon capture and storage (CCS); nuclear; offshore 
wind; onshore wind; solar photovoltaics (PV).
•	 Chapter 5 draws out key themes from Chapter 2, 
3 and 4 in order to provide high level analysis and 
conclusions, including the implications of cost 
estimation and future forecasting as they relate to 
energy policy making.
3Available at www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page_ref_id=2863
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2. The use and role of 
electricity cost estimates
2
12  
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the importance and differing roles 
of cost estimates and forecasts in energy policy and the 
electricity generation industry.  Firstly, it examines the 
key role that cost estimates have had in both shaping 
policy goals and informing the design of policy to meet 
those goals, and also the degree of interdependency 
between these two processes. It then discusses the types 
of cost estimates that have featured most prominently 
in policy analyses to date and the possible limitations of 
such estimates for future analyses. The chapter goes on 
to present recent cost estimates/projections and examine 
the uncertainties surrounding cost estimates and the 
future trajectory of costs.
2.2 Cost estimates in 
policymaking – and impact 
of policy on costs
Estimates of electricity generation and/or capital costs 
– historic, contemporary, and future – are prevalent 
in analyses undertaken by academics, commercial 
consultancies and policymakers, all of which feed into 
energy policy. They are key inputs to cost-optimising 
energy system models such as MARKAL/TIMES4, used 
extensively to create scenarios of future energy systems 
(HM Government 2009, UKERC 2009, CCC 2010). Cost 
estimates have informed successive Energy White 
Papers and Reviews (DTI 2006, DTI 2007, DECC 2011), 
the supporting analysis for the Renewables Obligation 
(RO) (DTI 2002b, DTI/Ernst&Young 2007), the 2008 
Climate Change Act (HM Government 2008) and for the 
ongoing Electricity Market Reform process (DECC 2013b, 
DECC 2013c). They also feature prominently in range of 
assessments of low carbon and renewable energy such 
as the 2002 Energy Review (PIU 2002a), the Stern Review 
(Stern 2006), and the CCC Renewable Energy Review (CCC 
2011a). Cost data are also at the core of international 
publications such as the IEA’s World Energy Outlook and 
Energy Technology Perspectives series of reports (IEA 
2012a, IEA 2012b).
Future costs forecasts are heavily influenced by 
contemporary and historic costs data. Indeed, so called 
‘experience curves’ (or learning curves), which we discuss 
in more depth in Chapter 3, are an extrapolation of 
historical trends. Inevitably therefore, views of the likely 
future of energy costs are to a very considerable degree 
shaped by data from the past and present. For example, 
estimates of future costs (the DTI’s ‘resource cost curves’) 
played a central role in the design of the in defining both 
the level of the 2002 Renewables Obligation (RO) and the 
RO buy-out level (Gross et al. 2007). More recently, the 
Committee on Climate Change’s assessment of optimal 
decarbonisation strategies, which form part of its advice 
on the UK Carbon Budgets, is based on considerations 
of technology costs (along with carbon price, demand 
growth, and capital stock turnover), and the 2011 
assessment used cost forecasts to construct scenarios out 
to 2020 and 2030 (CCC 2011b).
Changes in UK government policy towards nuclear 
power also provide a salient example. The view set 
out in the 2002 Energy Review (PIU 2002a) was that the 
focus for energy policy should be energy efficiency and 
a substantial increase in electricity generation from 
renewables, with the option for new nuclear power ‘kept 
open’ but with ‘no current case for further government 
support’ – a view based in part on an assessment of the 
cost of new nuclear relative to other power generation 
technologies, together with an assessment of the potential 
for newer technologies to come down in cost through 
innovation and learning (PIU 2002a). However, analysis 
undertaken as part of the 2006 Energy Review compared 
the levelised cost of nuclear power and other electricity 
generation options and concluded that the economics of 
the technology had improved, to the extent that it was 
economic without subsidy, and that ‘new nuclear power 
stations would make a significant contribution to meeting 
our energy policy goals’ (DTI 2006). This was followed 
by a White Paper on Nuclear Power  (BERR 2008) which 
confirmed the UK Government’s view that, ‘nuclear power 
has a key role to play as part of the UK’s energy mix’.
There is therefore a direct and important link between 
cost data/analysis and government interventions with 
estimates of costs helping to set the direction and shape 
of policy. However, policy also helps shape costs. The 
World Energy Outlook, for example, emphasises the 
‘criticality of government policy action in influencing the 
energy landscape going forward’. It further suggests that 
the future of renewables, their costs and deployment, 
will be heavily reliant on strong government support (IEA 
2010b). The Stern Review makes a similar point, arguing 
that ‘the ambition of policy has an impact on estimates of 
cost’ (Stern 2006). Closely aligned to this is the importance 
of judgements and assessments that suggest costs will 
fall as a consequence of increasing deployment. If, as 
we explore in Chapter 3, technologies are subject to 
increasing returns to adoption, for example learning 
effects and economies of scale, then policies to expand 
deployment can help to reduce costs.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 outline the principal categories of 
cost used in policy analyses, review the range of recent 
assessments of cost for UK power generation technologies, 
and discuss the treatment of uncertainty with respect to 
cost estimation.
4MARKAL (MARKet ALlocation) is a least-cost optimisation model of energy use, which represents the entire energy system, 
from primary resources to demands for energy services, see (UKERC 2009) for a more detailed description. TIMES (The 
Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System) is the most recent evolution of MARKAL.
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2.3 Key measures of 
costs used in policy
General categories of cost
Economists distinguish between variable costs (VC, those 
costs that vary with respect to output) and fixed costs 
(FC, those costs that do not vary with respect to output), 
with total costs (TC) being the sum of fixed and variable 
costs. A further distinction is drawn between short-run 
marginal costs (SRMC, defined as the additional cost 
of generating a unit of electricity, over a time period 
in which some costs are fixed) and long-run marginal 
costs (LRMC, the additional cost of generating a unit 
of electricity, over a time period in which no costs are 
fixed). The corresponding definitions for average costs 
are short-run average costs (SRAC, total costs divided by 
units of electricity generated, over a time period in which 
some costs are fixed) and long-run average costs (LRAC, 
total costs divided by units of electricity generated, over a 
time period in which no costs are fixed). Strictly speaking, 
marginal cost is the derivative of total cost with respect 
to quantity but since fixed costs do not change with 
respect to quantity, then marginal cost can be defined as 
the derivative of variable cost with respect to quantity. 
It must also be recognised that in practice, power plant 
output will be varied in discrete units (such as MWh), 
not the infinitesimally small change implied by the 
derivative function (Stoft 2002, Rothwell and Gomez 2003, 
Weyman-Jones 2009). A useful alternative description of 
the concept of marginal cost is provided in Weyman-Jones 
(1986) in which it is described as ‘part of the information 
discovered by trying to find the least expensive way of 
meeting some future change in output’ (pg. 71-72).
As well as these economists’ definition of costs, there are 
other ways of categorising costs, based on the physical 
‘thing’ that they represent.  These include capital costs 
(the cost of building a power station), operational and 
maintenance costs (the costs incurred in running and 
servicing a power station, such as fuel and maintenance 
costs), transmission and distribution costs (the cost of 
delivering units of electricity to consumers), retailing costs 
(for example the cost of providing metering and billing), 
and decommissioning costs (the cost of dismantling 
a power station at the end of its life). There is also a 
particular variant of capital costs, known as ‘overnight 
costs’ which can be defined either as the capital costs of 
a notional power plant if it is assumed that no interest 
charges are incurred during construction (i.e. ‘overnight’), 
or alternatively as the present-value cost of a plant that 
would have to be paid as a single sum before the project 
begins, to pay completely for a plant’s construction (Stoft 
2002). As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 3 there can 
be variation between studies as to the extent to which the 
full range of cost factors are included within the scope of 
the system/technology in question.
A further differentiation should be made between 
accounting balance sheets and economic interpretations 
of costs. For example, a sunk cost (one that cannot be 
recovered) is still a cost to an accountant and will appear 
on a balance sheet until it is written off, but is of less 
importance to an economist because a sunk cost should 
not (in theory) bear upon subsequent decisions (Rothwell 
and Gomez 2003).
Each of these categories of cost have specific uses and 
applications, for example the short-run marginal cost 
which a power station owner faces will determine 
the electricity price at which they are prepared to run 
the plant and sell the output over a short term time 
horizon, but the long-run average cost (relative to long 
run electricity prices) is a more important influence on 
the decision to build a new power station, and also on 
whether the owner of an existing power station continues 
to operate their plant over the long term – or chooses to 
exit the market, sell the plant and do something else with 
their capital. 
Economists and utility planners have in the past used 
approaches such as ‘screening curves’ as a tool for 
preliminary comparison between electricity generation 
technology options. These curves plot annualised total 
cost per unit of capacity installed (e.g. kW or MW) as 
a function of plant load factor, and help ‘establish the 
envelope within which a supply option will be economic’, 
and so ‘serves to screen out options that cannot possibly 
be economic’(Koomey et al. 1989). Figure 2.1 on page 15 
shows an example screening curve for three technologies, 
demonstrating how the annual revenue required varies 
depending on the plant load factors (‘Capacity Factor’ 
on the diagram) – and crucially, that it varies differently 
between technologies. This is because the slope of the 
screening curve for a particular technology represents 
the variable costs of operating the plant, and the y-axis 
intercept represents the annualised fixed costs of the 
plant (Stoft 2002).
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Figure 2.1: Example screening curves for electricity 
generation technologies
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It is important not to confuse the average cost of using a 
unit of generation capacity, as shown on typical screening 
curves, with the average cost of a unit of electrical output. 
The latter is typically described as the (plant) lifetime 
levelised cost of energy, to which we now turn.
Levelised costs of energy (LCOE)
Although engineers, economists and accountants use a 
range of cost measures and categories, policymakers have 
historically focussed in particular on the levelised cost 
(LCOE), and to a lesser extent, capital cost (capex) because 
these were (and remain) particularly important cost 
measures from a societal perspective.
The LCOE calculation incorporates all the costs incurred 
during the life of a power station, including for example 
capex, O&M (operations and maintenance), fuel and 
decommissioning costs, and divides the discounted sum 
of those costs by the discounted lifetime output from the 
power station, resulting in a lifetime average (levelised) 
cost per unit of electricity from the power station. A 
widely used formulation of the LCOE calculation is shown 
below (IEA 2005)5.
Levelised Cost = 
∑[( It + Mt + Ft )( 1 + r )–t] 
∑[Et ( 1 + r )–t] 
(where: It = Investment costs in year t, Mt = O&M costs in 
year t, Ft = Fuel costs in year t, Et = Electricity generation in 
year t, r  = Discount rate)
Estimates of LCOE can provide a range functions, 
including (Gross et al. 2010):
•	 A high level comparison of generating technologies 
in terms of the relative performance and prospects of 
each;
•	 An assessment of cost effectiveness of the contribution 
of new technologies to various policy goals and 
whether there is a rationale for intervention (Cost 
Benefit Analysis, Welfare Assessments, etc.);
•	 An approximate view of the level of subsidy needed to 
promote individual technologies, or technology types;
•	 An assessment of the potential value of investments 
intended to promote innovation, for example creating 
markets to allow learning by doing, again using cost 
projections or technology ‘learning curves’ that link 
costs to market growth;
•	 Input to some economic models of the electricity 
system, as used for energy scenarios that can inform 
policy (see section 2.2 above).
Although widely used and cited, LCOE estimates have 
important limitations/drawbacks. One concern is that 
different studies may include/exclude key factors such as 
decommissioning costs, interest during construction, or 
insurance, and there can be disagreement about whether 
cost of capital should be common to all technologies or 
differentiated to reflect different levels of technological 
maturity and risk. Certainly all these factors, along with 
judgements about performance and capital cost will differ 
between studies.
The principal factors not captured in LCOE assessments 
can be broadly categorised as commercial factors, system 
factors and economic externalities. Some of these 
limitations are shared with other measures of cost, but we 
focus on LCOE limitations here because of its prevalence 
in the energy policy debate.
The commercial factors not captured by the calculation 
are as follows: plant lifetime may be longer than 
‘economic’ life; the unpredictability of fuel price (costs) 
and revenue volatility (electricity volume and prices); 
the implied cost of the irrevocability of investments; 
the impact of project size/scale/modularity; the option 
value that investment in a particular technology 
may give a utility (Awerbuch et al. 1996); the costs of 
5An alternative approach is the ‘annuity’ method which involves calculating the present value of the cost stream (giving a lump sum 
value), which is then converted to an Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC) using a standard annuity formula. Dividing the EAC by the average 
annual electrical output results in a levelised cost. Provided the discount rate used in calculating the present value of the total costs and 
the ‘levelisation’ rate used in the annuity formula are the same then the results will be the same as the IEA method (Gross et al. 2007).
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information gathering (i.e. the information required to 
inform an investment decision); future changes to: tax 
regimes, environmental legislation, government support 
mechanisms; corporate level taxes – both the absolute 
level and the details of the tax regime e.g. some tax rules 
allow the accelerated depreciation of assets – which may 
affect choices between capital intensive and less capital 
intensive technologies (IEA 1989); portfolio value, whereby 
investment in generating technologies whose costs do 
not co-vary with other technologies can reduce overall 
costs at any given level of risk (Awerbuch 2000). These 
limitations help to explain why levelised cost estimates 
do not necessarily give a good indication of what type of 
plants will actually be built – see Box 2.1.
The system factors not captured include: transmission 
costs and other network costs such as impact on system 
balancing and system security requirements; the impact on 
state/system level energy security; the degree of flexibility/
controllability of power station output and suitability 
for different operating modes e.g. baseload or balancing 
services, and relative impact of demand variation. 
The economic externalities which may not be reflected 
include: the value of government funded research 
programmes; any residual insurance responsibilities 
that fall to government; any un-priced externalities e.g. 
CO2 costs in the absence of a CO2 tax or CO2 cap/permits; 
external benefits such as the value of learning to future 
generations; and inter-temporal and inter-generational 
cost issues. 
Capital cost estimates (capex)
The discourse around energy policy frequently focuses 
upon capital costs (or capital expenditure, capex) – the 
costs of building (but not operating and running) new 
power stations. Obviously capex cannot capture the 
entirety of costs which will be incurred in building and 
operating a power plant during its economic life. The 
share of capex in total lifetime costs varies considerably 
between technologies; nuclear power and most renewable 
technologies having high capital costs and very low 
running costs and others such as gas-fired power stations 
having relatively low capital costs but high running 
(principally fuel) costs.
Capex on its own is of course an incomplete 
representation of the total cost of producing electricity, 
which is the reason that levelised costs are used more 
widely. Apart from neglecting fuel and other operation 
costs, which may dominate marginal and total costs, 
capex has no time dimension. Economists argue that 
this means that capex ‘provides useful information but 
only for the purpose of finding fixed costs’ and that ‘they 
cannot be compared with other costs until levelised’ (Stoft 
2002). Nevertheless, capex estimates play a very important 
role in policy analyses. This is particularly the case for 
nuclear and many renewable generation technologies 
where the capital cost can be the overriding determinant 
of cost out-turns (Greenacre et al. 2010, Harris et al. 
2012). Policymakers are also often concerned about the 
overall volume of investment required to deliver policy 
objectives, for example the UK Government estimate that 
approximately £75 billion of investment is required in 
electricity generation capacity by 2020 to meet its energy 
policy goals (DECC 2012b).
2.4 The range of LCOE estimates 
– past, present and future
2.4.1 Recent cost estimates and recognition of 
uncertainties
Figure 2.2 summarises the ranges of LCOE estimates 
reported in analyses commissioned by DECC and the CCC 
during the last two years, for projects with construction 
starting around the time the analyses were published 
(i.e. these are estimates of current costs, not forecasts for 
projects starting some years into the future).
Figure 2.2: Range of recent cost estimates  
for large-scale electricity generation in the UK
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LCOE estimates also feature strongly in the ongoing 
discussions around the level of support to be offered 
to low carbon generators (via the strike price set by 
the Contracts for Difference) under the Electricity 
Market Reform process (DECC 2011, DECC 2013a), and in 
technology specific cost reduction aspirations, such as the 
drive to reduce the cost of offshore wind (Offshore Wind 
Cost Reduction Task Force 2012, The Crown Estate 2012).
A number of recent analyses explicitly recognise the 
degree of uncertainty in their estimates (Mott MacDonald 
2011, Parsons Brinckerhoff 2011, Parsons Brinckerhoff 
2013). Indeed Parsons Brinkerhoff particularly emphasise 
the high degree of uncertainty in cost estimation and 
analysis, potential cost reductions from learning and the 
significant impact that the cost of capital (i.e. interest on 
debt and dividend payments for equity holders) has on 
the relative costs of different generating technologies. If a 
lower cost of capital is assumed this favours technologies 
that are relatively capital intensive and have long 
lifetimes, i.e. all low carbon technologies are favoured 
over unabated fossil fuel plant, while nuclear and most 
renewables are favoured over CCS and bioenergy. If, on 
the other hand, a higher cost of capital prevails then low 
carbon is penalised in favour of unabated fossil fuels.
Box 2.1 What to build and what to run? –  
investment decisions and the unit commitment problem
Investment in new power stations under liberalised markets is subject to a complex range of factors, few of which 
are captured in a simple comparison of levelised, capital or indeed many other categories of costs. Decisions on 
when and what to invest in will be based on their view of how their own actions will be responded to by their 
competitors, on their perception of the value of a particular investment as part of their generation portfolio, or 
the option value of waiting for more information (Bazilian and Roques 2008). As the authors explain in detail in a 
previous UKERC report (Gross et al. 2010, Gross et al. 2007) under many circumstances investors are likely to  prefer 
to invest in power generation technologies such as combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) even if other technologies 
such as renewables and nuclear power appear to have similar levelised costs. This is because CCGT plants are 
typically ‘price-makers’ which are able to pass fuel prices onto customers (and so largely removing fuel price 
and revenue risks) whereas high fixed costs nuclear and renewable plants are ‘price-takers’ which remain more 
exposed to revenue risk (Gross et al. 2010). The consequence is that policy which aims to deliver investment in high 
fixed cost technologies must do more than simply equalising levelised costs (net of support) across technologies. 
Furthermore, none of the cost categories described in this section will on their own identify what plants should 
actually be operated to satisfy system demand for a particular period. The answer to that question requires a 
solution to the ‘unit commitment problem’ i.e. given a particular mix of available generating plant (i.e. units), what 
is the actual mix that should be operated (i.e. committed) that will satisfy demand for a defined demand period at 
minimum cost? Note the word ‘unit’ here relates to a power station generating set, not units of electrical energy 
such as MWh. Solving the unit commitment problem is an optimisation process using data from all available 
generating plants on e.g. fuel cost curves, maintenance cost curves, unit start-up costs, unit ramping rate limits, 
unit capacity limits, and unit minimum up and down times (Sheble and Fahd 1994). 
These issues are further complicated because in liberalised markets such as the UK with no (or very limited) 
central despatch of generation it is not the system operator’s job to decide which plants will actually run. Instead, 
policymakers and regulators must try to design and structure a market which delivers investment in, and efficient 
dispatch of, a mix of actual generation capacity which approaches the theoretical least-cost solution to the unit 
commitment problem (Stoft 2002).
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In their 2011 report for DECC, Parsons Brinckerhoff 
are clear that ‘In using the estimates prepared by PB 
the inevitable uncertainties need to be recognised. 
Costs should be considered in the light of the AACE 
International Recommended Practice 18R-97’. A summary 
of that recommended practice is included in their 2011 
and 2013 reports, and an adapted version of the AACE cost 
estimate classifications matrix is shown in Table 2.1 below. 
It is implied in the Parsons Brinckerhoff report that their 
cost estimate ranges are in the ‘Class 5’category (i.e. those 
with the largest degree of uncertainty) with an expected 
accuracy range between minus 50% and plus 100% (with a 
potentially smaller range for more mature technologies). 
This degree of uncertainty results in part from the generic 
(rather than site-specific) nature of the estimates, and also 
that the AACE classifications are more usually applied to 
specific projects.
Figure 2.3 compares cost estimates for leading electricity 
supply options made in studies commissioned by the UK 
Government in 2011 (Arup 2011, Parsons Brinckerhoff 2011) 
with those made as part of the analysis underpinning 
the 2006 UK Energy White paper (DTI 2006). The 
comparison reinforces the point that cost estimates can 
vary considerably even over relatively short periods. For 
example, over the five years separating these two sets of 
estimates, estimated costs for CCGT had risen by nearly 
80%, nuclear by around 75%, and onshore wind by over 
40% (on an inflation adjusted basis, using the midpoint 
of the central ranges). There are a wide range of factors 
which have influenced these cost increases, including for 
example, gas and carbon prices in the case of CCGT, design 
changes in the case of nuclear, and also the fact that some 
of these technologies are at an early stage of development 
when there is inevitably a greater degree of uncertainty 
over costs and technology performance. These factors are 
discussed in the technology case studies in Chapter 4.
Table 2.1: AACE cost estimate classifications, adapted from AACE International (2005)
Estimate 
Class
Typical Use Typical Estimating Method Typical Expected  
Accuracy Range
Class 5 Concept Screening Capacity Factored, Parametric Models, 
Judgement, or Analogy
Low: -20% to -50% 
High: +30% to +100%
Class 4 Study or Feasibility Equipment Factored or Parametric Models Low: -15% to -30% 
High: +20% to +50%
Class 3 Budget Authorisation, or 
Control
Semi-Detailed Unit Costs with Assembly 
Level Line Items
Low: -10% to -20% 
High: +10% to +30%
Class 2 Control or Bid/Tender Detailed Unit Costs with Forced Detailed 
Take-Off
Low: -5% to -15% 
High: +5% to +20%
Class 1 Check Estimate or Bid/
Tender
Detailed Unit Costs with Detailed Take-Off Low: -3% to -10% 
High: +3% to +15%
6The cost analyses on which this chart is based typically calculate a range of levelised costs based on a central set of assumptions and an extended range 
based on wider variations in the input parameters. In Figure 2.3, the central assumptions are represented in the coloured blocks and extended range in 
the black lines extending from each block. The exceptions are the 2011 entries for onshore and offshore wind which reflect the low, medium and high 
estimate approach adopted in the Arup 2011 analysis.
7The historic contemporary estimates are shown in the left-hand data series and the forecasts are shown in the right-hand data series. Trend lines are 
shown as solid lines for contemporary estimates, and as dotted lines for the forecast data. Note that all values are converted and inflated to 2011 GBP 
using historic exchange rate data from the Bank of England spot exchange rate against £ sterling and annual average long run inflation data from the UK 
Office of National Statistics. The forecast data on the right-hand side of the chart shows the full range of the collated estimates, and therefore reflects the 
different input assumptions, forecasting techniques and sensitivities examined in the literature.
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Figure 2.4: Range of LCOE estimates, in-year mean and UK-specific forecasts 
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Source: (UKERC analysis)7
These observations highlight the difficulties facing policy 
makers where there is both a considerable degree of 
uncertainty over technology costs at the time that those 
estimates were made (represented by the wide ranges 
associated with each estimate), and uncertainty over how 
those costs will change over time (represented by the 
differences between the 2006 and 2011 estimates shown 
above). We return to this theme of uncertainty in Chapter 5.
2.4.2 The range of cost estimates past and future
As part of the technology case studies which are described 
in detail in Chapter 4, the project team collected cost 
estimate data which are used in Figure 2.4 below to plot 
the in-year mean of European estimates of contemporary 
LCOE from 1995 through to 2011, as well as the range of 
UK-specific LCOE forecasts from 2013 through to 2030 for 
four major electricity generation technologies. In addition, 
Figure 2.5 summarises the trajectory of contemporary 
capex estimates from the year 2000 onwards and 
presents the in-year mean capex value for each of the six 
technologies covered by the case studies.
Figure 2.4 shows that there is considerable variation 
in LCOE estimates over time for all the analysed 
technologies, and contrasts the direction of past variation 
over time with future forecasts. The clear trend for historic 
estimates for all of the technologies shown is one of rising 
costs from the early to mid-2000s onwards, with offshore 
wind and nuclear power apparently on significantly 
steeper upward trajectories than onshore wind and 
CCGT. Turning to forecasts, estimates for offshore wind 
in particular suggest a relatively steep reduction in costs 
over the next 10-15 years, followed by a levelling off, 
albeit still at a point higher than the lowest of the historic 
estimates. Forecasts for onshore wind and nuclear suggest 
that relatively smaller cost reductions are anticipated for 
these technologies. Forecasts for CCGT costs do not follow 
the same trajectory, although this may in part be linked 
to assumptions over future fuel prices and CO2 emissions 
costs rather than the underlying technology cost. We 
return to these issues in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
In general, forecasts tend to show a much smoother and 
more consistent, often downward trajectory, although 
there is still a considerable range of estimates within 
specific future years. Of course, estimates made in the 
past would inevitably be expected to change from one 
year to the next as technology costs responded to real 
techno-economic conditions, and we discuss the reasons 
why estimates of costs out into the future are often 
expected to fall in Chapter 3.
1995 2000 20102005 20202015 20302025
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Figure 2.5: Trajectory of in-year mean capex values 
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2.5 Conclusions on costs, 
policy and cost estimates
Electricity cost estimates are a critical input to policy 
analysis and have a strong influence over both the overall 
direction and goals of policy, and the design of policy 
to achieve those goals. Cost estimates and projections 
have played a central role in the policy formulation 
process, aiding in the identification of viable options and 
the assessment of the economic impact of a range of 
generation mixes. 
The prospects for cost reductions in low carbon 
technologies have played a key role in analyses of the 
affordability of achieving CO2 emissions reduction targets. 
More specifically, technology learning rates and the 
resultant cost reductions inform the conclusions that CO2 
emissions can be abated at relatively low cost and that 
policy is required to drive deployment so that those cost 
reductions can be realised.
This chapter has highlighted a degree of circularity in 
the relationship between cost estimates and policy, in 
that perceptions of current and future costs for electricity 
generation technologies can influence decisions over 
which technologies are considered appropriate for policy 
support (of whatever nature), and that such policy support 
can then drive deployment of those technologies, which 
in turn can help to reduce costs. To a degree at least it 
appears that projection of cost reduction potential may  
be a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
The limitations of the cost metrics commonly used 
in policy analyses such as the LCOE measure are in 
principle understood, and can be broadly categorised as 
limitations in extent (such as the inability to capture all 
economic externalities), limitations in method (such as 
determination of the appropriate discount rate or the 
assumed plant load factor), and limitations in applicability 
(such as the degree to which they are able to indicate how 
market participants will act). However, key issues remain 
over how these limitations can be addressed, and in 
determining the appropriate policy response.
It is also clear that considerable uncertainties remain, 
both over the accuracy of contemporary cost estimates 
and the future trajectory of costs. The theory that 
underpins much of the cost estimating and forecasting 
literature and analysis is considered in the following 
chapter. The enduring challenge for policymakers is 
how to develop approaches and mechanisms that are 
robust in the face of these uncertainties, and explicitly 
recognise that uncertainty over costs estimates seems 
likely to remain. Finally, policy must also recognise that 
the categories of costs which matter from a societal 
perspective and in the setting and achieving of broad 
policy goals are not the only costs that influence how 
market participants will actually behave – and in the UK’s 
liberalised electricity market it is important that policy 
addresses this challenge.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the reasons the costs of products 
or processes are expected to go down over time and then 
goes on to examine experience curves and engineering 
assessment, the principal methodologies used to make 
forecasts and projections of future costs in power 
generation. The chapter is based upon a systematic review 
of the literature covering both the evolution of the subject 
and the latest thinking. 
The discourse on cost reduction and learning effects has 
its roots in the theory and literature on increasing returns 
to adoption, theories of learning and models charting the 
relationship between market growth and costs (so called 
learning or experience curves) (Arrow 1962, Arthur 1994). 
From this arose a sub-set of studies focusing on cost 
reduction specifically in the energy arena. This literature 
is principally concerned with the costs of technologies 
and systems rather than related issues such as the cost 
of capital (cost of borrowing, perceptions of risk etc). 
However, as we discuss below, the relationship between 
costs, prices and a range of market and policy factors is 
complex. It is clear from the evidence reviewed that this 
is a discourse that has not yet been resolved, continues 
to evolve, and leaves much still to understand about the 
interaction of costs drivers, trajectories and forecasting.
3.2 Sources of cost reduction
The tendency for technologies to show increasing returns 
to adoption is a well-established tenet of the economics 
of innovation. The more a technology is taken up by 
users, the more it will be produced in greater volumes by 
more manufacturers, and thus the more likely that costs 
will go down and efficiencies will go up, leading to even 
further adoption, production, and deployment resulting 
in a ‘virtuous spiral’ of continued cost reductions. Arthur 
(1994) identified four major classes of increasing returns 
to adoption: network externalities, adaptive expectations, 
economies of scale and learning effects. 
Network externalities describe the effect that the use of a 
good or service by one person or entity has on the value 
of that product to others. Also described as co-ordination 
effects (Pierson 2000), these occur where technologies 
are linked and need to be compatible, or a system is 
required. When a network externality occurs, the value 
of a product or service increases as more people use it. 
The telephone is a classic example whereby the more 
people that own one, the more useful and valuable the 
technology becomes to each of them. Other examples 
include computer hardware and software, video tape or 
DVD formats, road vehicles and refuelling systems.
Adaptive expectations refers to the phenomenon whereby 
as a leading design emerges consumer uncertainty is 
reduced and more consumers are encouraged to adopt 
the leading design, further encouraging its adoption 
and hence feeding back into yet more widespread use. 
Adaptive expectations also apply to investors and in 
commercial enterprises.
Economies of scale can arise in the manufacturing of 
generation technologies from the reduction in average 
unit costs as fixed costs are spread over increasing 
production volumes, with the potential result being a 
virtuous spiral of further increases in demand and cost 
savings. They can also arise at a project/plant level. Cost 
savings can be delivered per MW installed and per MWh 
through increasing the total installed size of a power 
station and/or the major components. Examples of the 
latter include the scaling up of  UK coal-fired steam 
turbines during the 1960s and 1970s, albeit not without 
significant challenges (Hannah 1982), and wind turbines 
increasing in size from around 200kW or less in the 
1980s to the multi-MW scale (Arantegui et al. 2012). Both 
instances yielded considerable economies of scale.
Learning effects reflect product or system improvements 
and cost reductions as experience is gained in the 
development, production, deployment, and application 
of a technology. The main categories of learning effects 
typically cited in the literature are learning-by-researching, 
learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and learning-by-
interacting (Schaeffer et al. 2004).
Learning-by-researching (or by-searching) is essentially self-
explanatory. R&D activity tends to focus on what Schaeffer 
terms ‘know-why’ knowledge i.e. fundamental concepts 
and principles. For Junginger et. al (2008), it represents 
improvements related to the innovation process and the 
absorptive capacity of the firm, and is dominant not only 
in the invention stage but also during the diffusion and 
saturation stages.
The concept of learning-by-doing – the ‘know-how’ of 
knowledge – was first articulated by Theodore Wright in 
the 1930s who observed that the labour cost of producing 
an aircraft frame declined with the number of frames 
produced. This idea was formalised in a paper by Kenneth 
Arrow in 1962 which proposed that learning was the 
product of experience and of problem solving (Arrow 
1962). In effect, at the level of the firm there are actually 
two outputs, one of which is the product or service itself 
and the other is gradually accumulating experience 
(Isoard and Soria 2001). This so-called learning effect may 
be measured in terms of a reduction in the unit cost (or 
price) of a product as a function of experience gained from 
an increase in its cumulative capacity or output (Jamasb 
and Kohler 2007). 
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Learning-by-using refers to the gains in knowledge from 
use of the product by consumers. The user’s experience 
and feedback help to understand the performance 
and limitations of the product and to learn more 
about the users’ needs. It also allows firms to carry out 
modifications or to suggest them to the manufacturer 
(Junginger et al. 2008). 
Learning-by-interacting refers to the interactions between 
actors like research laboratories, industry, end-users 
and policy makers that can enhance the diffusion of 
knowledge (Junginger et al. 2008). In essence, learning-
by-interacting is about knowledge exchange regarding 
product or system problems and solutions. This 
should give rise to product or process innovations with 
consequent increases in efficiency and reductions in cost 
(Foxon 2003).
With numerous sources of scale economy, learning  
and innovation, the expectation of costs falling through 
time, particularly for new and emerging technologies,  
is certainly a reasonable starting proposition. How then  
to assess and quantify the potential for costs to fall?  
Two principal categories of methodologies are widely  
used to attempt to quantify this reduction and estimate 
future costs:
•	 Forecasting by means of technical engineering 
assessment, and
•	 Extrapolation from historical data by means of experience 
curves (often taken to be synonymous with learning 
curves, though, as explained below, some commentators 
now distinguish between the two terms).
Some commentators also use of quantitative tools such 
as parametric modelling (or parametric costing) (Mukora et 
al. 2009) and assess learning investments and needs using 
logistic curves (Pan and Köhler 2007). In the following 
sub-sections we explore the principal methodologies 
themselves and their advantages, limitations, and 
refinements.
3.3 Forecasting cost reduction 
– 1. Engineering Assessment
Engineering assessment disaggregates a technology 
system into its component parts and draws on 
engineering and scientific expertise for a detailed analysis 
of potential technical change and possible cost and 
efficiency improvements (Mukora et al. 2009). Typically, 
assessment of technologies places them on a spectrum 
that ranges from ‘emerging’ to ‘mature’ (Chapman and 
Gross 2001) with emerging ones considered to have the 
greatest potential for further development and cost 
reduction through innovation and returns to scale.
Our review of the literature revealed relatively little 
evidence that analyses the methodological issues 
associated with using engineering assessment for 
assessing electricity generation costs. However in 
most instances a technology system is disaggregated 
into subsystems and components to analyse specific 
contributions to, for example, total mass or cost (an 
overview is offered by Mukora et al. (2009)). The individual 
effects are then recombined for the whole system using 
weighting factors depending on the contribution of the 
effect. Part of the assessment may be to identify the 
main drivers of cost (e.g. labour, steel, other industrial 
commodities etc.) in order to build a composite cost index 
(Arup 2011). 
Engineering assessment is thus a two-stage process of 
first, assessing the current technical and engineering 
features and costs of a technology and then second, 
assessing the prospects for development of those features 
and their impact on future cost and efficiency. Analysis 
of future cost or performance often combines a degree of 
qualitative review, often based upon expert judgement, 
with quantitative evaluation based on experience in 
estimation and parametric modelling (see below). In some 
instances, an assessment may be done by categorising 
the technology and forecasting its technological progress 
by benchmarking similar or related technologies whose 
progress is known (Mukora et al. 2009). Nevertheless, even 
with these techniques, satisfactorily representing and 
forecasting technical change, especially for early-stage 
technologies, remains a significant challenge (Mukora et 
al. 2009).
3.3.1 Strengths, limitations and refinements  
of engineering assessment
Engineering assessment has the potential to provide 
a detailed and accurate analysis over a range of time 
periods. Such assessment can provide an understanding 
of the engineering and technical factors that drive cost 
reduction, help identify the scope for technical progress, 
and provide insights into how any limitations of current 
designs can be overcome (Mukora et al. 2009).
A key advantage of engineering assessment is that it need 
not rely on previous trends in cost reduction – trends 
that may not be repeatable, or are uncertain because 
market experience is limited. A related strength is the 
potentially greater ability of engineering assessment 
compared to experience curves to provide insight into 
possible discontinuities (i.e. step changes and transitions) 
in the trend of technological development trajectories 
and thus to anticipate and factor in radical, as opposed to 
incremental, change (Mukora et al. 2009).
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The main disadvantage is that engineering assessments 
based on expert opinion can differ, and may be open to 
interpretation and manipulation  or excessive optimism 
(Chapman and Gross 2001, Schaeffer et al. 2004). 
Assessments are also open to straightforward error, both 
in terms of how to parameterise the costs of a product or 
process and in terms of the data input for each parameter 
(Koonce et al. 2007).
For new technologies in particular, cost estimates 
may vary widely. Estimating costs in the early stages 
of technology development is inevitably difficult. For 
example, designs for a cost-reducing technology of the 
future may still be in conceptual form, providing little 
concrete data. Thus, factors affecting cost are likely to be 
uncertain, and proper evaluation may only be possible 
when a production design is finalised (Mukora et al. 2009). 
Parametric modelling
The engineering approach can be refined through the 
use of parametric cost modelling, a technique which 
is applicable to products or technologies in all stages 
of development, and which uses ‘cost estimation 
relationships’ to define links between a specified set of 
characteristics and cost (Mukora et al. 2009). This allows 
for the identification of relationships that reflect the 
functional, mathematical link between the characteristics 
of an item and its cost, which are in turn derived from 
past experience and from engineering expertise. With this 
approach, total cost is assessed based upon these defined 
physical and performance characteristics and their 
relationships to the costs of specific components. 
The strength of parametric modelling lies in its capacity 
for estimating and exploring the impact of broad design 
changes. However, its weaknesses, according to Mukora 
et al. (2009), are that it has limited relevance for longer-
term forecasting, that its emphasis is on incremental 
not radical change, and that results are dependent on 
accurately specifying the cost estimation relationships.
3.3.2 Conclusions on engineering assessment
Engineering assessment for cost forecasting purposes 
has several limitations and uncertainties. However, the 
approach does play an important role by disaggregating 
and analysing the technical and engineering factors 
underlying potential future cost reduction in energy 
technologies. Cost factors may be parametrically 
modelled, allowing sensitivity to key drivers or changes to 
be explored. Engineering assessment offers advantages in 
the early stages of technology deployment, where the lack 
of historical cost and deployment data militates against 
the use of experience curves (Greenacre et al. 2010). It also 
permits disaggregated assessment of sensitivity to change 
in key cost parameters.
3.4 Forecasting cost reduction 
– 2. Experience Curves
In its traditional form an experience curve expresses the 
relationship between the cost of a product or process 
and its cumulative production or deployment. The 
terms ‘experience curve’ and ‘learning curve’ are often 
taken to be interchangeable. However, a distinction is 
made by some commentators between learning curves 
which refer only to short run costs such as labour and 
materials, and experience curves which refer to all costs 
over the longer term and include the combined effects 
of learning, specialisation, investment and scale. This 
report follows the broader, longer term definition and 
thus for consistency uses the term ‘experience curve’ over 
‘learning curve’.
This relationship between cost and deployment may 
be historically descriptive (i.e. the experience curve 
describes what has already happened to actual costs 
and deployment in the past); alternatively, the curve 
may represent a projection into the future (where the 
curve relies upon assumed learning and deployment 
rates going forward). In the case of future projections, the 
cost trajectory is typically anticipated to be downwards, 
implying a beneficial causal relationship between 
capacity increases over time and the cost of production 
and deployment arising from such factors as learning 
by doing, advances from research, scale economies, and 
other returns to increasing adoption. However, as we shall 
see in later sub-sections, this relationship may be neither 
as simplistically causal nor as inevitably cost-beneficial as 
is typically conceived.
As noted, the experience or learning curve approach 
originated with Wright in the 1930s who observed not 
only that the labour cost of producing an aircraft frame 
declined with the number produced but that the rate 
of reduction remained constant with each doubling of 
cumulative production (Coulomb and Neuhoff 2006, 
Weiss et al. 2009). This idea was formalised in a paper by 
Kenneth Arrow in 1962 which proposed the notion that 
declining labour cost (an expression of the reduction 
in required manufacturing labour time) is a result of 
growing experience, and that the productivity of a firm 
increases as the cumulative output for the industry grows 
(Arrow 1962). Four years later, the Boston Consulting 
Group extended this concept of learning to the dynamics 
of total production costs as a function of cumulative 
production (including research, capital, administration 
and marketing, and not simply manufacturing labour 
costs). This is generally referred to as the experience curve 
approach (Junginger et al. 2008, Weiss et al. 2009). 
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The so-called ‘one-factor’ experience curve model 
operationalises the explanatory (independent) variable 
‘experience’ using as a proxy some cumulative measure 
of production or deployment. Changes in cost typically 
provide a measure of learning and technological 
improvement, and represents the dependent variable 
(Nemet 2006). The key characteristics of the traditional 
experience curve are that costs are assumed to reduce, 
rather than remain static or increase, and that, in theory 
at least, unit cost declines by an approximately constant 
percentage with each doubling of cumulative production 
or deployment (Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 2009). The 
relationship between cost and deployment is therefore 
(again in theory) a straight line when shown on a log-log 
scale (Schaeffer et al. 2004).
The central parameter in the experience curve model is 
the exponent defining the slope of a power function. This 
parameter is known as the learning coefficient and can 
be used to calculate the learning rate and its inverse, the 
progress ratio. Thus, if a cost has reduced from 100 to 80 
as production has doubled then the progress ratio equals 
80% and the learning rate is 20%. Note that the term 
‘progress ratio’ is used at least as often as ‘learning rate’ 
and this can lead to confusion since a higher (i.e. more 
cost-reducing) learning rate means a lower progress ratio. 
Conversely, a higher progress ratio means a slower cost 
reduction rate.
In order to use the experience curve model as a tool for 
estimating future cost reductions over a specified time 
period, two assumptions must be made: an assumption 
regarding the learning rate (or progress ratio) during 
the forecast period; and an assumption about the rate 
of future production or deployment of a product or 
technology. This latter assumption allows the x-axis of 
an experience curve graph to be converted from one 
depicting cumulative capacity to one showing time over 
some chosen future period. The experience curve can 
now be used to estimate reductions in cost over time and 
differing cost levels at specific moments in time8.
As noted, in the simple one-factor curve version of 
the experience curve, cumulative output as a proxy 
for experience is the only explanatory variable. In a 
two-factor curve, factors independent of market size, 
such as learning-by-researching, provide an additional 
explanatory variable (Junginger et al. 2008). We return to 
these issues below.
The question of whether economies of scale should be 
included in the ‘experience effect’ is open to debate. The 
relative roles of economies of scale vs. learning effects 
are discussed in a number of recent papers (Wilson 
and Grubler 2011, Grubler et al. 2012, Wilson 2012) and 
the interaction between scale, unit size, market growth 
rates and policy is both vexed and complicated. It is also 
likely to differ considerably between technologies, as 
we discuss in Chapter 4. Neij et al. (2003) suggests that 
the connection and overlap between the two is so great 
that it is difficult to separate them. However, learning 
by doing and researching are clearly distinct from scale 
effects and indeed from each other. Moreover, there are 
possible additional explanatory variables besides these 
and thus some commentators, such as Yu (2011), advocate 
the construction of multi-factor curves which attempt to 
factor in additional cost drivers such as input prices. We 
return to this below.
Many studies have used the concept of experience curves 
to assess the cost trajectories of energy generation 
technologies (Coulomb and Neuhoff 2006). Within the 
wind sector, for example, studies have focused both on 
different geographical systems, from global experience 
curves e.g. Junginger et al. (2005) to national ones (Neij et 
al. 2003, Greenacre et al. 2010) and also on different system 
levels, from the levelised cost of electricity (Ibenholt 2002, 
IEA 2000) to the capital costs of wind farms (Junginger et 
al. 2005, Klaassen et al. 2005), to the price of wind turbines 
(Neij et al. 2003).
A primary significance of the experience curve concept 
is that it implies that expensive new technologies may 
become cost competitive with incumbent ones once 
deployment of the technology has provided sufficient 
learning. There may be some evidence that the ‘gap’ 
between incumbent and emerging technologies may not 
fall if incumbent technologies experience cost reductions 
of their own (McVeigh et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the 
potential for learning has become one of the key rationales 
for government support for low carbon technologies and 
the so-called ‘buying down’ of costs (Gross et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, experience curves are also a key part of 
energy sector and macro-economic models that analyse 
the costs of adapting economies to low carbon futures 
(Coulomb and Neuhoff 2006). Experience curves are 
examined in more detail in the following section.
8As we discuss later, identification of the temporal starting point for the curve can be problematic for relatively immature technologies 
which may experience cost increases in the early years of deployment.
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Box 3.1 Learning rates in the energy sector
Overall, the literature on learning rates has led 
sometimes to the use of a general “rule of thumb” 
rate of 20% for the energy sector with the exception 
of nuclear power  (IEA 2000, McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer 2001, Jamasb and Kohler 2007). 
However, as one might expect, energy experience 
curves reflect a wide range of learning rate values. 
Kromer (2010) states a range of between less than 3% 
and over 35% cost reductions associated with each 
doubling of output. Kahouli-Brahmi (2008) suggests 
an even greater range of 1% to 41.5% for learning-
by-doing rates and observes that while mature 
technologies such as coal and oil show relatively low 
learning rates of 4% on average, renewable energy 
technologies tend to exhibit higher rates, with 
solar PV, for example, showing rates of around 20% 
(Albrecht 2007, Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 2009).
For many technologies, learning rates appear higher 
in earlier stages. Thus coal development in the US 
from 1948 to 1969 showed rapid learning in contrast 
to later evidence between 1960 and 1980 (Jamasb and 
Kohler 2007). Gas turbine data also show evidence 
of learning rate depreciation. Albrecht (2007) reports 
that for gas turbines the learning rate declined 
from 20% to much lower rates of around 5 to 10%, 
and finally towards more or less stabilised prices. 
The same, says Albrecht, is true for wind generated 
power.  However, this is not a view supported by 
Jamasb & Kohler (2007) who contend that wind 
energy has shown a wide range of learning rates 
with no obvious pattern across either locations or 
time periods (i.e. early versus late development 
stages). Solar PV in general has enjoyed faster rates 
of learning than other renewable technologies 
(Jamasb and Kohler 2007).
3.4.1 Uses and strengths of experience curves 
Experience curves are tools for describing, analysing 
and extrapolating the cost trends of processes and 
technologies. As such, they have been used extensively 
for planning at the corporate level and also as a tool for 
energy policy making at the governmental level (Ferioli 
and Van Der Zwaan 2009). In theory, as shown by Figure 
3.1, they can be used to indicate the likely deployment 
level and therefore investment needed to make a 
technology competitive (Junginger et al. 2008, Ferioli and 
Van Der Zwaan 2009); though an experience curve does 
not forecast when the technology will break-even unless 
assumptions are made regarding deployment rates (IEA 
2000). In addition, they can help in the allocation of scarce 
resources for innovation (Jamasb 2007), and provide a 
method for evaluating both the cost effectiveness of public 
policies to support new technologies and for weighing 
public technology investment against environmental 
damage costs (Nemet 2007). 
Commentators such as Nemet (2006) and Neij (2008) 
identify a number of uses and advantages for experience 
curves in the energy arena. Firstly, they illustrate the 
approximate rate of historic cost reduction for different 
types of technologies. Secondly, the introduction of 
experience curves into energy models makes it easier to 
integrate technology change into energy-system analysis 
and scenario planning. This can help indicate the level 
of investment required to ‘buy down’ the cost curve, and 
argues Neij (2008), it shows the benefits to society of early 
investment in emerging technologies. Thirdly, experience 
curves illustrate the need for an initial market in order 
to cut costs. An initial market provides opportunities for 
learning which should, in turn, lead to cost reductions. 
Such markets may be developed through early adopters, 
niche markets, or policy measures that support market 
expansion (Gross et al. 2012). 
Experience curves provide an appealing model for 
several reasons (Nemet 2006). First, studies of the origin 
of technical improvements provide a narrative that 
is consistent with the idea that firms learn from past 
experience. Second, the availability of the two empirical 
time series required to build an experience curve – cost 
data and production/ deployment data – facilitates testing 
of the model. As a result, a large body of empirical evidence 
has emerged to support the model (although Nemet 
cautions that data quality and uncertainty tend to be 
infrequently assessed even though they can have a large 
impact on results). Third, experience curve studies point 
to the generally high goodness-of-fit of power functions 
to empirical data over several years, or even decades, as 
validation of the model. Fourth, the dynamic aspect of the 
experience curve model – that the rate of improvement 
adjusts to changes in the growth of production – makes 
the model superior to forecasts that treat change purely 
as a function of time. Finally, the reduction of the 
complex process of innovation to a single parameter, the 
learning rate, facilitates its inclusion in energy supply and 
computable general equilibrium models.
One important validation of the experience curve model 
is provided by Alberth’s (2008) study of energy experience 
curves, where results indicated that the one-actor curve 
could be a useful forecasting model when forecasting 
errors were considered in their log format. It should 
however be noted that Alberth’s case studies were 
confined to only three technologies – CCGT, Solar PV, and 
Ethanol – and the last year of data was from 2004, i.e. 
before the significant cost increases experienced since 
the middle of the last decade. The fact therefore remains 
that extrapolating cost reductions over long-time frames 
and large assumed capacity expansions, whilst potentially 
providing valuable insight, requires caution (Greenacre et 
al. 2010). 
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3.4.2 Caveats and limitations of  
experience curves
Though the majority of commentators are broadly 
positive about the use of experience curves a variety of 
criticisms and caveats exist regarding their use, both in 
general and specific to the energy sector; indeed a few of 
the views are essentially sceptical. 
Hall and Howell (1985), for example, undertook a critique 
of manufacturing/industrial experience curves and 
the benefits of learning-by-doing and argued that at 
the individual production plant level such learning is 
exhausted relatively early though, there may be continued 
learning at company level. It also examined other issues: 
the evidence that there is a common slope (learning rate) 
to experience curves; their usefulness for forecasting 
prices; and possible reasons for a spurious correlation 
between accumulated output and average cost. Hall and 
Howell concluded that experience curves appear in large 
part to reflect economies of scale (see also below on scale 
as an explanatory variable), and that they are of little 
practical value in forecasting or decision making. 
Whilst this view is not representative of the bulk of 
the literature revealed through our review, it is worth 
bearing in mind the caution from Mukora et al. (2009) that 
experience curves show how costs may reduce over time, 
but provide no explanation of the reasons behind the cost 
reduction beyond its relationship (in the case of one-
factor curves) to cumulative output. In essence, learning 
assessments chart outcomes but do not assess causation. 
Furthermore, it is also worth recalling the statistician’s 
adage that ‘correlation is not causation’ i.e. there is no 
absolute imperative that cost reduction necessarily occurs 
following increased deployment or cumulative output – it 
could be coincidental, the result of other factors such as 
lower input costs or favourable currency movements.
In the sections below we examine further some of 
the main limitations and caveats regarding the use of 
experience curves. 
Variable learning rates
Some analysts have questioned the assumption that 
learning rates remain constant over time given that a 
historical experience curve depicts the combined effect of 
many factors that are likely to have fluctuated over time 
and cumulative production. Only after many doublings of 
production, is there the possibility of discerning a clear 
trend (Mukora et al. 2009).
Figure 3.1: Break-even point and learning investments for PV modules with a progress ratio of 80%. 
The shaded area indicates remaining learning investments to reach the break-even point. The figure  
also shows changes in the break-even point for progress ratios of 78% and 82%  
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In the longer term the trend may be subject to fluctuation 
depending on the period examined and the stages of 
development a technology is passing through (Kromer 
2010). In effect, it is argued that there is no absolute or 
unique learning rate for a given technology (Jamasb and 
Kohler 2007, Yu et al. 2011), that the learning rate may 
change over time depending on the data set considered 
(Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 2009), and that the outcomes 
of scenario analyses such as the timing of future cost 
reductions is sensitive to small changes in learning rates 
(Nemet 2006). 
Many commentators argue that costs tend to fall relatively 
swiftly during the innovation/ R&D phase and that in the 
absence of a subsequent radical discontinuity the learning 
rate will change to a lower level (i.e. lower cost reductions) 
when a technology enters the more mature phase of 
the commercial market (Junginger et al. 2008, Ferioli and 
Van Der Zwaan 2009). Moreover, in the early years of 
deployment, successive doublings of cumulative capacity 
are likely to be more easily achieved than in later, more 
mature stages, which could consequently make a better 
(i.e. higher) learning rate easier to achieve in the earlier 
compared to later years. 
However, Soderholm and Sundqvist (2007) argue that one 
might expect to obtain lower learning rates in a full time 
series sample (including the earliest years) compared to a 
partial time series which only includes more recent years. 
This is because as a technology matures the degree of 
competition in the input factor markets becomes stronger 
and as a result prices fall - hence the relatively higher 
cost reduction rate for a partial, more recent data set 
(Söderholm and Sundqvist 2007). 
Recent experience suggests that in fact competitive 
pressures can move costs in ways that are hard to predict, 
a point we return to in later chapters. Whilst the degree 
of competition to provide input factors to firms may 
well increase with greater deployment, the degree of 
competition to secure and consume those input factors is 
also likely to increase. There is therefore the potential (at 
least in the short term) for a supply chain squeeze, as was 
evident with PV silicon prices in the mid-2000s, onshore 
wind turbines in Germany during 1995-2001, and in the 
UK offshore wind sector (Junginger et al. 2008, Greenacre et 
al. 2010). 
Thus, it is evident that learning rates are subject to 
considerable uncertainty, can be overwhelmed by other 
factors, can change depending on the period examined, 
and can do so for reasons which may be unclear or 
difficult to predict. 
Absence of cost floors in experience curves
Some commentators caution that experience curve 
studies which do not include a cost floor in their 
extrapolated forecasts could result in excessively high 
cost reduction estimates (Alberth 2008). For all products 
or technologies a production or capacity limit is likely to 
exist due to market constraints.
If the market saturates, new capacity is only needed for 
the replacement of old, which limits the opportunities 
for learning-by-doing and cost reduction is likely to slow 
significantly or stop (Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 2009). 
Additionally, energy technologies in particular may be 
constrained by the availability of natural resources and 
when resource constraints are reached the costs of the 
technology are likely to rise (Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 
2009). Some studies of renewable energy technologies 
have addressed this issue by imposing a floor to prevent 
the cost forecasts from becoming absurdly cheap (Kromer 
2010), although doing so does then raise the question of 
how such a floor should be determined.
Deployment assumptions
Experience curves typically reflect cost changes relative 
to cumulative output and deployment. In order for an 
experience curve to estimate future cost levels at given 
moments in time, assumptions must be made about 
deployment rates over time. Such assumptions are 
inevitably subject to uncertainty and will be inaccurate to a 
lesser or greater degree. Experience curves cannot forecast 
whether and when actual market diffusion will occur and 
by what amount, and inaccurate deployment estimates 
will inevitably lead to inaccuracy in the level and timing of 
possible future cost reductions (Junginger et al. 2008).
Costs, prices, currency conversion and inflation
Ideally cost data should be used to formulate experience 
curves but production costs as opposed to market prices 
are often not available for obvious commercial reasons. 
Consequently, it is not uncommon for price data to be 
used instead when establishing historical learning rates 
and progress ratios. This contributes to the uncertainty in 
experience curves and makes it important to clarify the 
relationship between cost and price (IEA 2000, Kromer 
2010).
Price data may be adapted to achieve an estimate of cost 
by removing a nominal percentage of normal profits. 
However, actual profit levels will tend to fluctuate as 
market and competition conditions vary. In addition, 
different phases of a technology or product’s progress in 
the market may see the ratio of cost to profit vary quite 
significantly (Junginger et al. 2008). Currency conversions 
and corrections for inflation can also introduce errors 
into experience curve analysis, especially when analysing 
data from a country and period with a wide fluctuation 
in currency conversion rates and/or a high inflation rate 
(Schaeffer et al. 2004).
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Inadequate, inappropriate, and absent data
Experience curves are based on historical cost (or price) 
data, but obtaining suitable and accurate data may be 
difficult (Sharp and Price 1990). As already discussed, for 
energy technologies that are still in an emergent phase, 
market experience and therefore data are inevitably 
limited. An example is provided by Mukora et al.(2009), 
commenting on the learning investment required to buy 
down costs in the nascent marine energy sector:
•	 Estimating the investment required to break even 
with conventional energy is highly sensitive to the 
initial costs chosen. A higher initial cost will increase 
the learning investment, number of deployments and 
time required to meet the break-even target. A robust 
estimation of initial cost is therefore essential.
•	 Choosing the level of cumulative capacity at which cost 
reduction begins is also important. Rather than cost 
reduction occurring from when the first prototypes are 
produced, it is likely that costs will remain constant or 
rise during the first phase of deployments. For example, 
in Denmark, significant cost reduction in wind power 
did not occur until a cumulative installed capacity of 
over 100MW had been achieved.
•	 At present there is limited evidence on the long-term 
learning rate for the technology. An analogy or proxy 
is sometimes made with established sector learning 
rates but this introduces considerable uncertainty and 
possible error.
A good example of the analogy problem was the 
formulation of experience curves to estimate future costs 
of UK offshore wind energy (see, for example, Chapman 
and Gross (2001)). Mukora et al. (2009) contend that having 
suitable data over sufficiently long time periods is a key 
issue for the use of experience curves. However, in the case 
of UK offshore wind, at least until the mid-2000s there was 
little primary data from which to construct such curves 
since the sector was still in relative infancy. One result 
of this was that early assessments of the future costs of 
offshore wind utilised learning rates borrowed from the 
onshore wind sector (Greenacre et al. 2010) despite the 
wide variation in onshore wind learning rates (McDonald 
and Schrattenholzer 2001) and the differences in costs 
breakdown between the onshore and offshore sectors (ODE 
Limited 2007, Blanco 2009, Feng et al. 2010). This is explored 
in more detail in the offshore wind case study.
Disproportionate influence of early trends 
Data from pre- and early commercial phases in technology 
development may be uncertain and/or unrepresentative 
of subsequent trends and this can exercise significant and 
possibly disproportionate influence over experience curve 
trend analysis (Schaeffer et al. 2004). For many advanced 
technologies early cost estimates based on laboratory-
scale projects and pilot plants are typically lower than the 
costs subsequently realised for early full-scale commercial 
plants. The reasons for such a cost increase, says Kromer 
(2010), are usually due to shortfalls in performance and 
reliability resulting from lack of experience, design flaws, 
or from unforeseen problems emerging during full-scale 
construction and commissioning. 
System boundaries
The choice of system boundary may also make a 
difference to the value of a learning rate. Learning rates 
and experience curves originated at the corporate level 
but the system boundary has since been expanded to take 
in entire sectors, at a national, regional or global level, 
and the learning rates of each may vary. For example, 
whilst PV experience curves have almost exclusively been 
devised for globally produced modules, for wind turbines 
the majority of studies covers country-specific installed 
capacities (Junginger et al. 2008). 
This could be of importance when learning rates based 
in e.g. a national system are used in global energy 
models. While country-specific experience curves may be 
suited to evaluate past local policy measures, they may 
not adequately measure the actual global rate of cost 
reduction of a technology at present (Neij et al. 2003). In 
addition, variations in physical conditions such as site 
location, and the choice of specific technology included 
within an experience curve system boundary, may also be 
important. 
Input costs
Whilst historical experience curves data will include 
the effects of fluctuations in input costs such as raw 
materials, a number of studies, including for example 
Junginger (2008) and Greenacre (2010), note that 
experience curves used to extrapolate estimates of future 
costs cannot forecast future variability in input costs. 
This issue is particularly relevant to the experience of 
the major UK generating technologies in recent years 
where potential learning effects and other sources of cost 
reduction have been overwhelmed by ‘exogenous shocks’, 
especially in the form of commodity and fuel feedstock 
price increases. We return to this issue in Chapters 4 & 5 
and the associated case studies. 
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3.4.3 Additional observations & issues for the 
experience curve paradigm
In addition to the potential limitations of experience 
curves, the literature also makes a number of observations 
that are nevertheless important to consider in an analysis 
of the experience curve paradigm. The most significant 
issues identified in the literature are as follows:
Compound systems
Energy generation technologies are compound in nature. 
Each technology is composed of multiple elements and 
hence its learning system is an aggregation of different 
sub-systems including product manufacture and 
generation performance (Neij et al. 2003, Junginger et al. 
2008). These sub-systems are each affected by different 
learning and cost-reduction factors but an aggregated 
experience curve reflecting the system in total ignores 
information on sub-systems and their potential for 
evolution and cost reduction (Nemet 2006). For example, 
a wind turbine includes blades, generator, nacelle, tower 
and foundation. At this disaggregated level, each element 
has its own experience curve. Another learning system 
includes site acquisition and preparation, installation, 
and connection infrastructure. A further system relates 
to wind capture and generation including availability and 
efficiency (Ferioli and Van Der Zwaan 2009). Similarly in 
photovoltaic systems cost reductions in modules may 
occur more rapidly than those for installation or balance 
of systems components such as invertors. 
In theory then, different learning systems could - 
and perhaps should - be disaggregated into multiple 
experience curves to give a more detailed and accurate 
picture of the trends involved. Often however, they are not, 
in great part because of problems of data collection, both 
in terms of work load and accessibility (Nemet 2006).
Application of experience curves to modular  
versus large-scale technologies
Based on empirical data, it appears that learning rates and 
the goodness-of-fit of experience curves depend on the 
technology considered. A more modular technology such 
as PV follows the historical trend closely - as does onshore 
wind -  while larger scale plants (coal, gas and offshore 
wind) show greater fluctuations compared to the trend 
(Junginger et al. 2008). 
Small-scale, modular PV has typically displayed a learning 
rate of about 20%. However with increasing generating 
plant size, learning rates seem to reduce and become less 
cost-beneficial. For example, (prior to the cost increases 
of recent years) onshore wind displayed learning rates of 
up to 15%, offshore wind had rates of around 10%, and 
pulverized coal plants about 8% (Junginger et al. 2008). 
This supports observations by Neij (1997, 1999) that there 
is an important distinction between power installations 
that require extensive construction in the field, and 
installations that can be mass-produced by centralised 
factories i.e. modular technologies learn faster and 
have greater cost reduction potential than large plant 
technologies. In addition, suggests Junginger, the greater 
variability and worse learning rates of larger scale plant 
arise from their often highly specific, custom-built nature. 
We return to these possibilities in Chapters 4 and 5.
Assumption of spillovers
Part of the theory of experience curves is an assumption 
that each firm in an industry will benefit from the 
learning-by-doing and experience of all firms – i.e. 
knowledge ‘spillover’ between firms. A similar idea is 
that of potential spillover from related technologies and 
industries. Learning rates that incorporate spillovers 
within clusters of technologies have been estimated 
and included in energy models (Alberth 2008). However, 
the reality is that firms will typically try to defend their 
intellectual property and commercial advantage (Nemet 
2006). The assumption of significant benefits from 
spillovers may therefore be over-optimistic.
Modifications and extensions of the one-factor  
experience curve model
In order to address some of the limitations of the 
traditional experience curve, some attempts have been 
made to refine or improve upon the basic one-factor 
learning-by-doing model. Jensen (2004), for example, 
proposes that weighted averages for the input data be 
used in order to obtain a better model of technological 
development.
Meanwhile, Pan & Kohler (2007) suggest a logistic curve 
approach. Here, life cycle theory is adopted to explain 
technological changes and to integrate the growth rate 
and R&D investment into the experience curve model, in 
order to find an expression for the scale of technological 
change. This logistic curve model incorporates all phases 
of technology development as used in life cycle theory. It 
also describes the life span of energy technology in the 
long run. However, whilst the proposed logistic curve 
would include the growth rate and R&D investment as the 
driving variables, it would not include scale effects and 
changes in input prices since Pan & Kohler (2007) suggest 
that too little is known about them.
Arguably the most significant refinement suggested 
by several commentators is to use a covariate analysis 
model where the simple curve with only one explanatory 
variable is extended to include additional variables. 
As already noted, cost (or price) reduction has most 
typically been considered as a variable dependent only 
on cumulative production or deployment – the proxy for 
learning-by-doing. This is generally described as a ‘single 
or one-factor experience curve’ (SFEC). However, one of 
the most important criticisms of typical experience curve 
analysis has been the neglect of several parameters (i.e. 
other explanatory variables) that also impact on cost (Neij 
et al. 2003, Pan and Köhler 2007, Yu et al. 2011). Jamasb 
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(2007) argues that the consequence of this neglect and of 
reliance on simple learning-by-doing curves is to overstate 
the effect of cumulative production or deployment, 
especially for emerging technologies, and therefore to 
produce inaccurate estimates of learning rates. 
Some commentators therefore argue that each source  
of cost reduction must be analysed separately (Neij  
2008) and thus propose the inclusion of one or more 
additional explanatory variables to produce so-called  
‘two-factor’ and even ‘multi-factor’ experience curves 
(TFECs and MFECs). Yu (2011), for example, contends 
that using a TFEC incorporating learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-researching still does not satisfactorily 
explain cost reduction, and in addition, scale effects and 
input price effects should be incorporated into the model. 
Junginger (2006), on the other hand, cautions that whilst 
these approaches may yield a more accurate estimation 
of past and future cost reductions, it also requires 
detailed data, which may not be available. Nevertheless, 
the intention is that such two-factor or multi-factor 
experience curves would describe more of the  
systematic variation (Jensen 2004).
Here we consider each of the main additional explanatory 
variables in turn:
Learning-by-researching as an explanatory variable
The experience curve model has sometimes been 
extended to include “learning-by-researching” whereby 
R&D leads to technical progress and cost reduction. This 
learning effect may be accounted for in two-factor curves 
by incorporating cumulative R&D spending or the number 
of patents as proxies for the stock of knowledge (Jamasb 
and Kohler 2007, Kahouli-Brahmi 2008, Mukora et al. 2009). 
Learning-by-researching rates have been estimated for 
several energy technologies and, despite the variability, a 
causal relationship between R&D and cost reduction can 
be inferred (Kahouli-Brahmi 2008). In support of the idea 
of two-factor curves, Jamasb (2007) compares electricity 
generation learning-by-doing rates for single factor curves 
based only on cumulative output with learning-by-doing 
rates in two factor curves which also include learning-
by-research. The results, in Table 3.1 below, show that 
there are considerable learning-by-doing rate differences 
between single and two-factor curves, and that single-
factor learning curves overestimate the effect of learning-
by-doing in general and that of new and emerging 
technologies in particular (i.e. the significant effect of 
learning-by-researching is not taken into account).
Table 3.1 Learning by Doing Rates Using Two or Single-factor Curves
Technology Learning By Doing Rate – 
Two-Factor Curves
Learning by Doing Rate – 
Single-Factor Curves
Pulverized fuel supercritical coal 3.75% 4.8%
Coal conventional technology 13.39% 15.1%
Lignite conventional technology 5.67% 7.8%
Combined cycle gas turbines (1980-89) 2.20% 2.8%
Combined cycle gas turbines (1990-98) 0.65% 3.3%
Large hydro 1.96% 2.9%
Combined heat and power 0.23% 2.1%
Small hydro 0.48% 2.8%
Waste to electricity 41.5% 57.9%
Nuclear light water reactor 37.6% 53.2%
Wind - onshore 13.1% 15.7%
Solar thermal power 2.2% 22.5%
Wind – offshore 1.0% 8.3%
Source: (Jamasb and Kohler 2007)
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Indeed, in some cases, the effect of learning-by-research 
may be more significant than that of learning-by-
doing (Jamasb and Kohler 2007). Pan & Kohler (2007), 
for example, argue that in the case of wind power, the 
fundamental cost factor is the turbine and that this 
depends more on innovative design than cumulative 
deployment. This issue has possible policy implications 
in terms of the relative importance of policies to expand 
capacity and investment in R&D (Jamasb and Kohler 2007).
In their 2007 paper, Pan & Kohler go on to argue that the 
extended two-factor curve is an improvement on the 
conventional experience curve but acknowledge that this 
approach is not yet widely used. They suggest that this is 
because whilst the approach provides a potentially better 
fit for the innovation stage it cannot capture well the 
‘learning-by-continuous research’ that takes place in the 
later stages of deployment.  Further notes of caution come 
from Kobos (2006) who raises the concern that obtaining 
the R&D data required to construct two-factor curves may 
be difficult, as well as Ferioli and Zwaan (2009) who note 
that distinguishing the effects of R&D versus deployment 
can be problematic, and Mukora et al. (2009) who suggest 
that it is still too early to establish whether two-factor 
curves will provide a sound model.
Scale as an explanatory variable
Economies of scale, as distinct and separate from learning 
effects are another explanatory variable proposed for 
multi-factor experience curves (Sharp and Price 1990). 
Most studies treat scale effects as an inherent part of 
the experience curve and do not disaggregate it but its 
absence as a distinct factor may have an impact on the 
accuracy of learning rates (Söderholm and Sundqvist 
2007, Kahouli-Brahmi 2008). In earlier work Hall and 
Howell (1985), suggested that cost reductions may be just 
as closely correlated with the current scale of production 
as they are with accumulated output to date, which if 
correct, would suggest that cost reductions in the later 
years of a technology may be driven by economies of scale 
effects rather than long-term learning effects. 
Whether scale economies should be treated as distinct 
from or included in an aggregated  experience curve for 
energy cost purposes is still open to question since, in 
the energy arena, relatively few studies have attempted 
to separate learning effects from returns to scale effects, 
but see Isoard and Soria (2001) and Yu et al. (2011). Other 
notable exceptions include Söderholm and Sundqvist 
(2007) who argue that by not incorporating positive 
returns to scale in the field of nuclear generation, too large 
a share of cost reductions may be attributed to learning 
effects, and Nemet (2006) who stresses the contribution of 
economies of scale in manufacture to the cost reductions 
of PV modules. 
Influence of policy as an explanatory variable
Most experience curve studies assume the structure of 
the model is unaffected by policy changes that take place 
during the period being studied. However, Soderholm 
and Sundqvist (2007) propose that policy measures such 
as feed-in tariffs should be assessed to determine to 
what extent they are an ‘omitted variable’, suggesting 
for example that fixed feed-in tariffs may reduce the 
incentive for innovation (and therefore have an influence 
on the speed of cost reductions).
With regard to policy support manifested through publicly 
funded R&D activities, Junginger et al. (2008) suggest that 
there is no clear evidence that such policy can directly 
influence cost reductions, whereas they do acknowledge 
that policy aimed at driving deployment and market size 
can influence the trajectory of cost reductions. 
Competition as an explanatory variable
As noted earlier, Soderholm and Sundqvist (2007) argue 
that as a technology matures, competition in the input 
factor markets is likely to become stronger and therefore 
prices should fall as a result. Supporting this proposition, 
Greaker and Lund Sagen (2008) found that competition 
was the most significant factor in their study of the falling 
cost trend for LNG liquefaction plant.
Time as an explanatory variable
A paper by Ferioli and Zwaan (2009) argues that 
accounting for time itself would improve the 
understanding and use of experience curves, and 
that the time dimension may therefore need to be 
reintroduced into analyses of costs and future estimation. 
The argument is based on several points including: the 
observation that ‘experience’ as measured by cumulative 
production or deployment should not be the only 
explanatory variable; that a good fit of cost-capacity data 
does not necessarily imply a constant learning rate; and 
that learning rates may vary over time and are sometimes 
negatively affected by subsidies (as discussed previously, it 
is argued that they may distort incentives to innovate).
Influence of different explanatory variables  
at different stages
To conclude the above review of potential explanatory 
variables additional to cumulative output or deployment, 
we note the contention that different variables may take 
material effect at different stages in the developmental 
progress of a product or technology.
An example is provided by Yu’s (2011) research into solar 
PV technology development which favours a multi-
factor approach. Here, the results suggest that at the 
technology’s emerging stage, the learning-by-doing effect 
plays a minor role in cost reduction. Nor do economies 
of scale take place at this stage. The factors that have 
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driven the cost decline are input prices (primarily silicon) 
and other factors such as learning-by-researching and 
subsidies from government. At the diffusion stage, 
economies of scale start to play a minor role in cost 
reduction, as does learning-by-doing, whilst input prices 
and the other factors still play an important role. Finally, 
at the mature stage, learning-by-doing and the returns 
to scale effect instead of input prices and other factors 
contribute most to cost reduction.
Building on this idea, analysis by Kahouli-Brahmi (2009) 
indicates that:
•	 In the early stages, emerging technologies exhibit low 
learning rates associated with scale effects because 
diffusion barriers and uncertainty cause diseconomies 
of scale;
•	 Evolving technologies show high learning-by-doing and 
learning-by-researching rates because they respond 
quickly to capacity expansion and R&D activity;
•	 The conventional technologies, now in their mature 
phase, display low learning rates but increasing returns 
to scale. 
3.4.4 Principal conclusions on the use of 
learning rates
Reliable and disaggregated data
Learning rates need to be based on reliable data, 
preferably of cost not price if possible.  In addition, given 
that energy generation technologies are comprised 
of several main components or sub-systems, a more 
accurate picture is likely to emerge if the system is 
disaggregated to provide data for separate component 
experience curves. It appears that the use of ‘proxy’ data 
from different technologies, however analogous or similar 
they may appear, should also be treated with considerable 
caution. 
Use of error margins
In particular for long-term forecasts, even relatively 
minor variations in learning rates can lead to significantly 
deviating cost estimates. Junginger (2008) therefore 
recommends calculating error margins in learning rates in 
order to provide a range of future cost scenarios.
Span of cumulative output and duration of period 
To obtain a reliable extrapolation of future estimated 
costs, Ferioli (2009) suggests that cost data should span 
several orders of magnitude of cumulative output. 
Inadequate data series might not be enough to reveal 
important trends or discontinuities, or the presence 
of non-learning sub-components (which become an 
increasing share of total cost and ultimately lead 
compound system learning rates to decline). 
The issue of what constitutes a sufficient level of data can 
also be addressed in terms of time. In order to get learning 
and deployment rates for forecasting purposes, Schaeffer 
et al. (2004) argues that a period of at least ten years’ worth 
of historical data should be available. This is particularly 
applicable to cases where price data is being used not 
cost data in order that sufficient time is allowed for price 
trends to be reliably reflective of cost trends.
In addition, Schaeffer et al. (2004) recommends that 
attention should be paid to the effects of industry cost/
price cycles. Typically, a cycle alternates between periods 
of relative price stability and ‘shake-out’ periods of steep 
decline (or, more rarely, of increase). If the period on which 
a progress ratio is based includes an over-representation 
of one type of phase, then the resultant progress ratio 
could be too optimistic (if a price decline phase is over-
emphasised) or too pessimistic (if a stability phase is over-
emphasised).
Whilst Schaeffer et al. (2004) argues that the data period 
from which a learning rate is derived should not be 
too short, Neij (2008) proposes that the forecast period 
emanating from it should also not be too long. Neij notes 
that experience curves may be used to forecast cost 
development as much as 50 years ahead. However, Neij 
argues, this may not be appropriate since the experience 
curve is a trend analysis tool only suitable for the analysis 
of established technologies with forecasts of mid-time 
ranges under conditions of low uncertainty and for 
a series of incremental innovations. In addition, the 
Schaeffer et al. (2004) study of PV forecasts demonstrates 
that the further into the future an estimate is based, the 
more inaccurate it is likely to be.
Correct system boundaries
Analysing only parts of a learning system may provide 
misleading results and deviations in the learning rate 
(Junginger et al. 2008). The potential for cost reduction can 
be measured within different geographical boundaries 
– for example, at regional, national, European, or global 
scale. However, the rate and range of learning and 
cost reduction may depend on the extent to which 
a technological development is bound to a specific 
geographical area. Differing physical environments may 
also be important, as is the case with on and offshore 
wind such that the use of data in a ‘related’ sector (i.e. 
onshore wind) may prove misleading. 
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Acknowledgment of uncertainty and assessment  
of deviation from projections
According to Nemet (2009) two important requirements 
are indicated:
•	 Policy makers more explicitly consider uncertainty in 
cost projections 
•	 Better tools are needed to identify the significance of 
near-term deviations from cost projections.
Nemet proposes that given the considerable variation 
in rates of technological improvement over time, 
policy makers should consider learning as a stochastic 
process; that is, that aspects of the process will remain 
unpredictable. Thus, if policy makers are to rely on cost 
projections derived from experience curves, they should 
be explicit about the reliability of predictions and policy 
decisions should be made acknowledging the observed 
variation in learning rates.
In addition, Nemet  (2009) argues that devising ex 
ante methods to identify the significance of near-term 
deviations in cost and performance trends is essential. 
Trend deviations make policy more difficult. It can be hard 
to identify whether a deviation is due to a short-term 
supply squeeze or a longer term limit on cost reduction. 
One promising development, reports Nemet, is the 
inclusion of explicit treatment of learning uncertainty in 
modelling.
3.5 Overall conclusions
It is clear from the literature reviewed that whilst there 
are two principal methodologies for forecasting energy 
cost trajectories, the subject is nonetheless complex, 
the details often contested, and neither of the two 
approaches, their various refinements and modifications 
are without uncertainties and difficulties. Nevertheless, 
both approaches have demonstrated usefulness and 
indeed both are widely used. 
With regard to experience curves, Jamasb (2007) points 
out that the strongest reason for applying them is not 
that the various issues and drawbacks associated with 
them have been – or will be – resolved but rather that, 
caveats notwithstanding, the evidence for some degree 
of experience-based cost reduction is overwhelming. 
Thus “learning rates are valid but incomplete data, which 
need to be better explored, but not ignored, in economic 
analyses of technology” (Jamasb and Kohler 2007).
In the case of the early years of emerging technology 
deployment (i.e. in the absence of sufficient cost 
and capacity data) a greater reliance on engineering 
assessment would appear to be the more appropriate 
approach. Once a track record has been established 
– which is likely to take several years – then the use 
of experience curves becomes more appropriate. Yet 
engineering assessment is also subject to limitations and 
caveats abound.
Overall there is no tension between experience curves and 
engineering assessment. The approaches complement one 
another, but both must be utilised in full awareness of the 
limitations of the other.
Whilst learning assessment is in itself complex and fraught 
with difficulties, learning may be overwhelmed by other 
factors such as exogenous cost shocks. These exogenous 
factors and other reasons – both methodological and 
endogenous – for discrepancies between cost expectations 
and reality, are explored in more depth in Chapters 4 and 5 
and the associated case studies.
Experience curves and 
engineering assessment are 
complementary approaches 
for forecasting cost 
trajectories but each must 
be used in full awareness of 
the limitations of the other.
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case studies
4
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the findings of six case studies 
which examine the cost forecasts and ‘cost out-turns9’ 
of different electricity generation technologies, covering 
a variety of technological maturity, cost profiles and 
operating characteristics. The case studies are based on 
targeted systematic reviews of the evidence base for the 
cost trajectories of each technology, the results of which 
were documented in working papers that can be found on 
the UKERC web pages10.
The case studies covered nuclear power, combined cycle 
gas turbine (CCGT), coal and gas-fired carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), solar photovoltaics (PV), and onshore 
and offshore wind generation plant. Across the six case 
studies, the project team collated over two and half 
thousand data points and a detailed analysis of this data 
can be found in the working papers.
Data has been collected for historical cost estimates 
(i.e. estimates for notional plants built at the time the 
estimate was made) and cost forecasts (i.e. estimates for 
notional plants to be built at some point in the future). 
There are of course time dimensions to both these types 
of estimates. In the case of historical estimates the time 
dimension will reflect the year the estimate was made, 
and in the case of cost forecasts there are two time 
dimensions with the first dimension being the year the 
forecast is made, and the second being the point in the 
future that the forecast applies to. This allows us to derive 
insights into how views of future technology costs have 
evolved over time. The sections that follow summarise the 
evolution of cost forecasts by presenting estimates from 
pre- and post-2005.
Each of the technologies is examined in turn, briefly 
summarising the findings of the case studies and 
discussing the key issues and trends that the reviews 
identity. The overall findings and themes which emerge 
from the case studies are explored in detail in the 
Chapter 5.
4.2 Nuclear
Introduction
Approximately 75 academic articles and grey literature 
reports were reviewed for the nuclear case study 
(Greenacre 2012a). The analysis focuses predominantly on 
capital rather than levelised costs. In part, this is because 
there is more data on capex in the evidence reviewed, and 
also because capital costs account for the majority (60 to 
more than 75%) of the levelised costs of nuclear energy 
generation (MacKerron et al. 2006, Grimston 2012b). 
Forecasts of future nuclear costs have been derived 
mainly from engineering/technical assessment rather 
than from experience curves. This is perhaps unsurprising 
since much of the track record is characterised by rising 
and/or highly variable costs, rendering learning rates 
either negative or at least very uncertain. By contrast, 
engineering assessment of potential future cost trends is 
less strictly bound by past history. For contemporary cost 
out-turns, the evidence revealed in the review tends not 
to be confirmed data from utility companies or reactor 
vendors. Instead they are estimates from academic 
and governmental analysts and other nuclear industry 
observers. The reasons for this include commercial 
sensitivities and a relative lack of ‘real world’ projects 
in OECD countries in recent years from which to extract 
data. 
Cost forecasts
Figure 4.1 below presents a summary of worldwide capex 
future forecasts between the late 1980s and the early 
2040s for all reactor types. It shows the in-year average 
forecast costs for two groups, one consisting of forecasts 
made up to 2005, the other consisting of forecasts made 
from 2005 onwards. The year 2005 was chosen because 
the mid-2000s appears to have been a pivotal time 
when estimates of contemporary costs began to rise 
significantly from a plateau low.
9The term ‘cost out-turns’ is used here to describe values for a given technology which were intended to represent a view on what the actual current costs 
of that technology were, at the time the estimate was made. It is important to note that due to commercial sensitivities such values generally represent 
estimates based on the then current knowledge of generalised technology cost and characteristics, rather than data from specific projects.
10www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page_ref_id=2863
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Figure 4.1 demonstrates how nuclear capital costs have 
in the past been expected to fall over time, and how they 
are still expected to do so, albeit from a higher starting 
point averaging over £3.5m/MW in 2010. In the mid-2000s, 
cost forecasts for the relatively near future were revised 
significantly upwards to reflect a new reality of rising 
contemporary cost estimates, driven by design changes, 
commodity prices movements and a wide range of other 
factors. However, costs are still expected to fall in the 
longer term, though to a level at least £500,000/MW higher 
than expected by the earlier pre-2005 forecasts.
Turning to recent forecasts specific to the UK, there 
are divergent opinions regarding future capital costs. 
The more optimistic forecasts make the judgement 
that significant cost reductions will occur by the mid-
2020s, effectively through various forms of learning 
as technologies progress from ‘first of a kind’ to ‘nth 
of a kind’ (Mott MacDonald 2011).  For example, a 25% 
reduction in overnight costs from approximately £3.6m/
MW to £3m/MW by 2025, or even down to £2-2.5m/MW 
by 2020 and to £1.6-2.45m/MW in 2040 assuming that 
a currently assumed £0.7m/MW ‘congestion premium’ 
is eliminated (Mott MacDonald 2011). By contrast, more 
pessimistic observers tend to place greater emphasis 
on the historical experience of costs rising during 
construction (Grubler 2009).
Since capital costs are such a dominant component of 
total costs for nuclear power, analyses of levelised cost 
projections and forecasts are generally closely aligned 
with that of capital costs. Forecast reductions in levelised 
costs are therefore predicated principally on reductions 
in capital costs rather than substantial improvements in 
others areas such as increased plant lifetime or improved 
load factor. 
In the case of plant lifetime, this is because the 
discounting effect of the levelisation formula (see Chapter 
2) means that adding or subtracting output which will 
occur several decades in the future has a relatively 
small impact on levelised costs. For example, reducing 
the assumed plant load factor of 60 years used in Mott 
MacDonald (2010) to the 40 years used in Harris et al. 
(2012) increases levelised cost by less than 2%.
In principle, varying the assumed load factor of a nuclear 
plant can have a more significant impact than varying the 
plant lifetime, with an increase in assumed load factor 
from 80% to 90%, resulting in a decrease of up to 10% in 
levelised cost (IEA 2010a). However, the opportunity for 
future overall cost reductions from this area is limited 
because the load factors typically assumed for notional 
new plant already represent close to the best that have 
been achieved by the industry historically, and are 
approaching the practical maximum achievable once 
periods of unavailability for maintenance are allowed for 
(Mott MacDonald 2010, Harris et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, some analyses suggest that levelised costs 
will fall in the future, from a central figure for 2010 of 
around £95/MWh (Mott MacDonald 2010) to around £65/
MWh for a project with a notional mid-2020s completion 
date (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2011). Longer term reductions 
were envisaged in (Mott MacDonald 2011) which assumed 
a current levelised cost of £89/MWh reducing to £63/
MWh and £50/MWh for 2020 and 2040 respectively (using 
a central discount rate projection and assuming the 
removal of the congestion premium). Some analysts are 
not as optimistic, and raise concerns in particular over 
the potential for capital cost escalation during the pre-
construction and construction phases, which would lead 
to substantially higher levelised costs (Harris et al. 2012). 
What is clear from all the analyses is the paramount 
importance of achieving capital cost reductions if lower 
levelised costs are to be realised at some point in the 
future.
Cost out-turns
Here, we consider cost out-turns over the last four decades 
and how this data compares with what was projected. 
From the outset, the history of nuclear costs has been 
characterised by some significant disparities between 
expectations and reality. A paper by Cooper (2009) 
provided insight into the early years of commercialised 
nuclear power in the US, with the analysis suggesting 
that not only were both cost projections and out-turns 
increasing from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, but also 
that actual costs were increasing at a faster rate than 
projections. Hence, both capital cost containment and 
forecast accuracy deteriorated over the period.
Figure 4.2 presents worldwide contemporary capex 
estimates between 1972 and 2011, drawn from the sources 
identified by the case study. From the early 1970s costs 
rose gradually before a sharp escalation in the early 1980s 
which peaked around the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Comparing Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, for a period of time 
between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s forecasts 
were broadly correct in identifying an upward trend of 
contemporary costs followed by a downward trend.
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Figure 4.2: Range of estimated nuclear 
contemporary capital costs worldwide over last  
four decades
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Nevertheless, the forecasts significantly part company 
with estimated outcomes in two ways: i) against 
expectations, the contemporary cost trend turned sharply 
back up in the second half of the 2000s; and ii) throughout 
the period examined cost out-turns (as opposed to the 
shape of the trend) have been considerably higher than 
originally anticipated. 
Turning to out-turns during the last decade or so, the 
evidence shows that the estimated costs for nuclear 
new build between 2000 and 2010 have for the most part 
gone up, in some cases by more than 100% to over £4m/
MW.  In 2004 estimated capital costs for nuclear new build 
in the US were under £1m/MW and subsequent plants 
were expected to have even lower capital costs. However, 
by the second half of the decade, costs had increased 
considerably with one 2007 report estimating cost out-
turns of between £1.8m/MW and £2m/MW for a new 
nuclear plant (Grimston 2012b). Meanwhile, also in 2007, 
Florida Power and Light estimated the total cost of one of 
its proposed project as being between £2.75m/MW and 
£4m/MW.
In Europe, the Olkiluoto project in Finland had been 
expected to cost under £1.8m/MW and to be completed 
in May 2009 but by 2010 was running three years behind 
schedule with projected final costs of £2.6m/MW. The 
project is still under construction at the time of writing 
(summer 2013). In France meanwhile, the costs of the 
Flamanville reactor were restated at £1.9m/MW in 
2008, up more than 17% from a year earlier (Grimston 
2012b)12. Between 2008 and 2010 the estimates of nuclear 
generation costs in the UK have risen by 40% (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff 2010).
Main cost drivers and themes emerging  
from Nuclear case study
In broad terms, nuclear costs rose until around 1990, 
seemingly declined until the early to mid-2000s, and 
then started to escalate again. Each of these periods is 
characterised by a variety of competing drivers, some 
forcing costs up, others down.
During the 1960s to 1980s, environmental & safety 
concerns fostered a regulatory climate in which the rules 
for nuclear design, build, and operation kept changing 
thereby causing project times to overrun and costs to 
escalate (see, for example, Cantor and Hewlett (1988), 
MacKerron (1992), Hultman et al. (2007), Neij (2008), Rai et 
al. (2010)).
Serious nuclear incidents and accidents during this 
period – the 1975 Browns Ferry and the 1979 Three Mile 
Island (TMI) incidents, and the 1986 Chernobyl accident 
– increased the uncertainty and upward pressure on 
nuclear costs (Grubler 2010, Grimston 2012b). NEA (2000) 
observes that US plants built before 1979 took an average 
of five years to build and license whilst those built post-
Three Mile Island averaged almost 12 years. In the latter 
cases, financing and other time-related cost escalations 
could represent as much as half the total cost (Spangler 
1983, NEA 2000). According to Cohen (1990), the increase 
in US construction time from 7 years in 1971 to 12 years 
in 1980, plus the increase in labour and materials costs, 
contributed to a quadrupling of capital costs.
From the 1980s, when the designs perceived as safe had 
become established, a more stable regulatory climate 
prevailed. Yet despite this, reactor design and related 
systems continued to become more complex and costs 
continued to escalate (Grubler 2010). Continuing design 
change due to commercial considerations as well as 
regulatory pressures, resulted in a lack of standardisation, 
over-complexity, and consequent diseconomies of scale 
(Cantor and Hewlett 1988, MacKerron 1992, Rai et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the ongoing changes and increasing complexity 
compromised the learning effects that were expected 
over time.
11Note that all the outlier data points above £6m/MW originate from a single source (Grubler 2009) and apply only to US reactors. It would appear that 
these cost estimates reflect especially long construction times giving rise to greater overnight and (especially) higher financing costs.
12Note that $ and € amounts have been converted from the original source to £ using bank of England historical exchange rates data.
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Other factors that drove up costs during the 1960s to 1980s 
were the rising costs of labour and the cost of capital. 
The economics of nuclear power were impacted by high 
interest rates prevailing at the time, especially when 
construction schedules were also subject to significant 
delays (Spangler 1983). In addition, the evidence reviewed 
suggests that appraisal optimism and deliberate cost 
under-estimation also contributed to the disparity 
between future cost forecasts and actual out-turns.
During the 1990s to mid-2000s, almost all the nuclear 
construction activity was occurring in South America, 
Eastern Europe and Asia rather than the developed 
countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. 
Regarding the drivers of cost reduction in the developing 
countries, Grimston (2012a) points to a combination of:
•	 lower input costs13, in part due to a slowing down of the 
world  economy; 
•	 less cost-forcing regulatory pressures; 
•	 a greater incidence of command-and-control type 
economies likely to ensure stable electricity prices 
which therefore lowered the risk premium on financing.
Construction times also played an important role. Tolley 
and Jones (2004) observe that the nuclear plants in 
construction since the early 1990s – mostly Asian – were 
built in shorter construction times than in the US and 
even in France, and with less cost variability. Up to the 
late 1970s when the last US plant began construction, the 
average construction time in the US was nearly ten years. 
For plants beginning construction between 1993 and 2001, 
the global average was just over five years. 
Significantly, the contemporary cost estimates originating 
from the developed countries were also coming down 
even though no actual construction was taking place. It is 
likely that these estimates of cost were being influenced 
in part by the numbers emerging from the lower cost 
environments where construction was actually taking 
place (Grimston 2012a).
For the period from the mid-2000s onwards, and 
notwithstanding the 2008/2009 financial crisis and 
ensuing recession, increased estimated costs can be 
attributed in large part to worldwide competition for 
resources and commodities (such as steel and cement) 
and for manufacturing capacity (Schlissel and Biewald 
2008, Grimston 2012b). Strong demand for generation 
plant has resulted in cost increases, supply chain 
issues and longer delivery times as manufacturers have 
struggled to meet demand. Nuclear plant operators have 
also been competing with oil, petrochemical and steel 
companies for access to resources (Grimston 2012b). Other 
possible cost drivers include skills shortages, greater price 
transparency for new nuclear build, and a more realistic 
estimation of costs in the light of the recent experiences 
in Finland and France.
Several dominant findings and themes emerge from the 
nuclear case study’s analysis of costs trajectories and of 
the comparisons between expectation and reality. These 
are summarised below. 
First, notwithstanding some dissent, it is evident that 
appraisal optimism has been a fairly consistent feature 
of nuclear costs analysis. Estimates have typically not 
reflected the range of uncertainties, and have used 
inadequate contingencies given nuclear’s history of 
regulatory instability, as well as technical and construction 
difficulties. In addition, the importance of location 
and technology specificity has been undervalued, with 
insufficient weight given to the challenges presented by a 
profusion of different reactor types and sizes (MacKerron 
1992, Rai et al. 2010).
Second, the global cost profile over the last five decades 
makes it difficult to justify the application of the 
experience curve method of future cost projection. Given 
the profile’s volatility, choosing a limited time frame in 
which to measure cost change against installed capacity 
would be arbitrary, but if nuclear energy’s entire history 
were chosen the learning rate would be highly uncertain 
but definitely negative.
The potential for learning effects to be overwhelmed by 
other cost drivers or even to be reversed and become 
‘negative’ has a range of explanations. The literature 
suggests two reasons for ‘negative learning’. First, reactor 
and project scale-up has led to disproportionately 
cost-increasing complexity and resultant increases in 
construction times and component and labour costs. 
This might perhaps be described as ‘unlearning-by-doing 
at too large and complicated a scale’. Secondly, despite 
build elsewhere in the world, long gaps between isolated 
individual country projects may result in ‘organisational 
forgetting’ or ‘knowledge depreciation’ thereby 
compromising project management. “If construction  
is sporadic, learning effects will suffer” (Tolley and  
Jones 2004).
Even if not negative, the learning effect can still be 
compromised or overwhelmed by a variety of cost-
increasing factors. Regulatory instability can force design 
changes and even back-fitting leading to higher overnight 
costs, construction delays, and additional financing 
charges. It can also exacerbate financier uncertainty and 
increase possible funding rates. 
In large part, the regulatory issues reflect the fact that 
nuclear power is in a different safety category than other 
generating technologies. The accidents at Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl demonstrate that nuclear energy 
is especially vulnerable to cost shocks when there are 
doubts about its safety. Indeed, Schneider et al. (2011) 
report that the rating agency Moody’s has estimated the 
Fukushima accident will likely result in a range of higher 
13The cost of labour is a major factor for nuclear projects, far outweighing the cost of the basic raw materials. Mott MacDonald 
(2011) estimated that only around 4-5% of total nuclear capex was attributable to the raw materials, whilst ‘two thirds of the capex 
is accounted for by labour, supervision and project management services’. This will clearly have important implications for projects 
undertaken in regions with relatively high labour costs. We return to the impact of labour costs in Chapter 5.
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costs as a result of increased scrutiny, more stringent 
safety procedures, and longer maintenance outages.
A further intrinsic aspect of nuclear energy is that it 
tends to be very large-scale and site-specific and cannot 
easily benefit from mass production economies of scale 
in the way that, for example, PV or wind turbines can. 
Economies of unit scale may well be offset by growing 
complexity, whilst opportunities to benefit from multiple 
unit construction at the same site may be infrequent.
Lack of economies of scale have been exacerbated by too 
little standardisation. Despite the relatively small number 
of basic reactor designs, numerous variants have been 
tried over the years, undermining learning opportunities 
and increasing the likelihood of construction and 
operating problems. Indeed, Tolley and Jones (2004) 
suggest that perhaps the greatest potential for cost 
reduction lies in utilising standardised designs and (if 
possible) constructing plants in series. 
The nuclear example also suggests that there can be 
occasions when excessively fast roll-out may compromise 
the ability to incorporate learning into successive units 
(MacKerron 1992, Rai et al. 2010). In addition, growth in 
deployment typically leads to increased competition for 
raw materials, components, and skills, and thus potential 
commodity squeezes and supply chain bottlenecks. In 
the case of nuclear, there are sometimes only one or 
two suppliers for critical parts and nuclear projects also 
have to compete globally with other major construction 
projects for key commodities (Schlissel and Biewald 2008, 
Grimston 2012b).
Specifically in the UK, Cogent’s (2010) report warned 
that a new build programme may have potentially seven 
reactors under construction at the same time during the 
early 2020s. During this same period India and China 
will, by themselves, be increasing current global nuclear 
construction rates by around 60%. This may well place 
further pressure on supply chains, increase construction 
costs and jeopardise timing plans. Again, we explore the 
theme of supply chain and market dynamics in greater 
detail in the following chapter.
4.3 Combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT)
Introduction
More than 50 pieces of evidence comprising both 
academic journal papers, as well as government and 
industry reports were reviewed for the CCGT case study 
(Castillo Castillo 2012). Cost forecasting has typically been 
the domain of energy research institutes, government 
analysts, and consultants. Engineering firms involved 
in CCGT construction appear to be cautious about 
forecasting and have instead tended only to provide 
non-attributable estimated cost out-turns. Cost out-turns 
are more abundant than forecasts within the literature 
reviewed (Ibid.).
An important feature of the data reported in the literature 
is that, despite the variability and dominance of fuel costs 
in the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE), forecasts and 
contemporary cost estimates are often not reported in 
comparable capital expenditure terms but as levelised 
costs. This makes it difficult to evaluate ‘learning’ effects 
such as improved efficiency or reduced construction costs 
independently from fuel price impacts (Ibid.).
Cost forecasts
Fuel is the dominant CCGT cost component and can 
constitute between 60% to 80% of the LCOE, and an even 
greater share in some cases (IEA 2007). Consequently, 
it is fuel costs that have shaped the two main trends in 
forecasts (IEA 2005, IEA 2007, Mott MacDonald 2010). The 
case study’s analysis of worldwide forecast data together 
with the trajectory of gas prices over the past 15 years 
identifies the end of 2005 as a transition point from 
relatively constant cost forecasts to much less  
optimistic ones.
Figure 4.3 shows the two trends and the markedly higher 
variability in post-2005 forecasts due to the widespread 
inclusion of (methodologically and geographically varied) 
gas price volatility calculations. For example, gas prices for 
the US and UK markets started increasing significantly at 
the turn of the century with particularly pronounced spike-
rises at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2008 to levels 
up to 600% the typical values of the 1990s (Alterman 2012).
Figure 4.3: Range of international forecasts  
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Figure 4.3 shows how pre-2005 forecasts proposed stable 
costs within the range of £25 - £41/MWh up to 2050 
suggesting that technical advances leading to efficiency 
gains, and any exogenous upward cost pressures would 
cancel each other out. By contrast, post-2005 forecasts 
feature a much wider spread and include significantly 
higher projections, for example up to £115/MWh by 2020, 
reflecting a more complex set of influencing factors and 
more varied assumptions associated with each factor 
(Castillo Castillo 2012). 
Gas (fuel) price increases are of course the principal 
driver of the increases in the estimates. However other 
factors are also noted in the literature. For instance, it 
is also argued that greenhouse gas emission abatement 
in European policy has reinforced the upward trend 
and introduced further uncertain variables (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff 2010). With respect to projections for 2050, 
assumptions over generation mix and load factors become 
significant considerations (Timera Energy 2011). 
Nevertheless, the potential still exists for endogenous cost 
reduction in CCGT plant. This is partly because of savings 
arising from construction modularity and also due to 
the relatively short lead times for new plant, which can 
lower finance costs by limiting the period of financial risk 
and uncertainty (Castillo Castillo 2012). Indeed, reduced 
project lifetimes may also help CCGT cost forecasters by 
mitigating some of the inevitable uncertainties associated 
with the passage of time – at least for shorter term 
projections if not the more distant ones.
Cost out-turns
Turning to cost out-turns, the case study notes that 
because of the lack of commercial data from contractors, 
it is often unclear how contractual terms, technical 
assumptions and ancillary or administrative costs have 
been incorporated. For this reason reported ‘actual’ 
costs should broadly be considered as estimates for the 
purposes of this report.
Data for worldwide cost out-turn estimates from the late 
1980s until the early 2010s are presented in Figure 4.4.
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A comparison of Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that early 
forecasts of approximately £40/MWh for actual costs 
at the turn of the century were in fact too conservative 
and underestimated the potential for costs to reduce 
to as little as £20/MWh by that time. However, it is also 
clear that forecasters did not foresee the extent of fossil 
fuel price increases experienced in the mid-2000s. For 
example, pre-2005 forecasts of levelised costs in 2010 
predicted a range between £20 and £40/MWh, but 
estimated cost out-turns in 2010 lay in a range between 
£20/MWh and approximately £80/MWh (excluding one 
outlier exceeding £120/MWh)14.
Main cost drivers and themes emerging  
from CCGT case study
The CCGT case study found a variety of cost drivers 
operating at different phases of the evolution of CCGT. 
This sub-section focuses on developments during the last 
three decades or so. 
During the 1980s the primary cost-increasing driver could 
be characterised as a lack of meaningful competition. 
This was compounded by on-going technological 
improvements that were seeking higher efficiencies 
but were also creating increasing complexity of plant 
(Cleason and Cornland 2002). In addition, more stringent 
environmental regulation (applicable to all fossil-fuelled 
technologies) was limiting the pace of cost reductions 
(Islas 1999). Meanwhile, the main cost-reducing driver 
counteracting these factors during this phase was the 
relatively low price of the gas itself (Alterman 2012).
14Carbon pricing and regulatory changes also put upwards pressure on costs.
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The low gas price continued into the 1990s and 
combined with several other cost-reducing drivers. First, 
technological improvements lead to efficiency gains 
(Islas 1999). Second, electricity market privatisation 
and liberalisation led to greater participation of private 
companies resulting in aggressive pricing for large CCGT 
contracts due to global competition among the leading 
suppliers (Watson 1997). Finally, shorter construction 
times, combined with the ability to deliver more 
standardised and replicable components, also offered 
the potential for cost reductions (Watson 1997, Islas 1999, 
Winskel 2002). 
Counteracting these cost-beneficial drivers were two 
cost-increasing factors. One was the technical problems 
requiring costly remedial action that resulted from 
too hasty delivery of incompletely tested CCGT plant 
(in order to secure the few contracts available in the 
market) (Watson 1997). The other driver was the increase 
in plant complexity and the use of more expensive, 
advanced materials. Horlock (2002) points out that as 
thermodynamic limits to efficiency gains are approached 
so are the limits to complexity, as virtually no one part of 
the system can be made more efficient without incurring 
efficiency penalties in another part.
In considering the literature’s expectations regarding 
future CCGT costs and its analysis of actual out-turns, the 
case study identifies four factors in particular:
i) Confidentiality and the type of data available
ii) Influence of fuel costs
iii) Fuel-dependent deployment and deployment-
dependent learning
iv) Policy and responses to macroeconomic and geo-
political forces
i) Confidentiality and the type of data available: A 
significant feature of the CCGT sector is the scarcity of 
data on actual generation costs. The methodological 
consequence of this is that many forecasts are derived 
from experience curves based on price data rather than 
cost (Junginger et al. 2008). Such curves have become 
generally accepted by analysts due to lack of actual 
plant operator data (Neij 2008). The main significance 
of using price data is that due to differences in cost and 
price trajectories, experience curves that are used to 
study short or specific time periods, particularly in early 
developmental stages, result in inaccurately reported 
learning rates (Neij 2008). We return to this issue of cost 
versus price data in Chapter 5.
ii) Influence of fuel costs: As already noted, the cost 
of CCGT power generation is most influenced by fuel 
feedstock costs. In the early 2000s, the fuel cost accounted 
for nearly 60% of generation costs in the UK (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff 2004) and considerably more in some 
countries (IEA 2005, IEA 2007). Future forecasting is thus 
considerably impacted by the volatility and uncertainty 
surrounding future gas prices. Chapter 5 considers the 
uncertainty of input costs in further detail.
iii) Fuel-dependent deployment and deployment-
dependent learning: Learning is in large part derived 
from deployment whilst cost reductions are in turn 
dependent not only on learning rates but also on rates of 
deployment. However, over past decades the deployment 
levels of CCGT have been subject to significant fluctuation. 
One example of this occurred with the introduction 
of regulatory restrictions on the use of natural gas for 
power generation on both sides of the Atlantic as a result 
of the oil crisis in 1973 (Winskel 2002). The effect of the 
restrictions was that CCGT plant construction virtually 
ground to a halt; in the US, for instance, only one utility 
CCGT plant was built between 1979 and 1986 (Smock 
1989). In fact, due to flexibility in the application of the 
gas turbine – extraction equipment and jet engines, for 
example – the technology has been able to survive periods 
of low demand in order to be deployed again later in 
CCGT plants (Watson 1997). Nevertheless, this example 
is a reminder of the challenges involved in forecasting 
future costs as a consequence of uncertain assumptions 
regarding future deployment.
iv) Policy and responses to macroeconomic and geo-
political forces: In addition to technical development, 
learning and cost reductions (often derived from 
increasing deployment as noted above) have tended to be 
strongly influenced by energy and industrial policy as well 
as by general market dynamics. However, the different 
directions taken by evolving government policies have 
made cost reductions increasingly difficult to forecast. 
The case study identifies several key influences (Castillo 
Castillo 2012).
First, the development of gas turbines was, from its early 
stages, the subject of intense government support of 
military applications; in the US alone, military spending 
to improve the turbojet amounted to $450 million per 
year between 1976 and 1986 (Williams and Larson 1988). 
Second, cross-sectoral applicability has been a crucial 
non-policy market factor. Gas turbine use in military and 
civil aeronautics, surface transport, the chemical industry, 
blast furnaces and transportation of oil and gas has been 
a vital feature of the continued development of the core 
technology (Islas 1999). As already noted, this helped 
technology advancement to be sustained even if some 
of the main providers of the technology did not survive 
(Watson 1997). Third, CCGT deployment has been broadly 
favoured by the political responses to three societal 
concerns originating in the 1970s: security of energy 
supply; local safety and international security (especially 
regarding nuclear waste, reactor safety, and proliferation 
risk); and avoidance of environmental damage (Islas 1999). 
Finally, the liberalisation of national electric markets 
since the 1990s enhanced the operating flexibility of 
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CCGT plant. In particular, price linkages between gas and 
electricity markets may offer the owners of gas plant 
value which is not captured by traditional cost assessment 
methods, as we discuss in Chapter 2. This, together with 
the relatively low capital costs of CCGT plants (making 
the technology attractive where the cost of capital is high 
and/or the market outlook is uncertain), also contributed 
to a preference for investment in CCGT plants in many 
electricity markets (Roques 2007).
The CCGT case study comes to several overall conclusions 
regarding CCGT costs and cost forecasting. It is apparent, 
particularly over the last four decades, that exogenous 
factors outside the direct control of the industry 
(especially natural gas prices) have overshadowed 
learning effects with actual cost out-turns tending 
to be higher than forecasted. As the CCGT case study 
emphasises, forecasts made further into the future for 
technologies that are highly exposed to exogenous factors 
are especially vulnerable to being proved wrong.
In recent decades, regulatory change and fuel cost 
volatility have had the most influence on cost, deployment 
levels, and comparative attractiveness of generating 
technology. Future forecasts will need to address these 
more robustly and also clearly recognise that CCGT 
technology is now mature and that efficiency levels are 
close to thermodynamic limits. Future possibilities of 
noteworthy design changes are linked to the transfer 
of the combined-cycle to the upcoming deployment 
of integrated (coal) gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 
(Timera Energy 2011). In addition, manufacturers are 
focusing on flexibility of operation, in response to 
increasing penetration of intermittent renewables 
(Siemens 2011). 
4.4 Carbon capture 
and storage (CCS)
Introduction
The case study (Jones 2012a) that supports this sub-
section on CCS drew upon approximately 50 academic 
articles and grey literature reports. These were used for 
both numerical data and thematic analysis purposes. In 
line with the other case studies, the focus was on levelised 
and capital costs as opposed to CO2 avoidance costs. 
However, the discourse on CCS also focuses on costs per 
unit of carbon abated, which has significant implications 
for the relative attractiveness of coal CCS and gas CCS. 
This sub-section differs from the other five in that there 
are no actual costs out-turn data for electricity generation 
with CCS because as yet there are no commercially 
operating plants (Global CCS Institute 2013). For this 
reason, all the data are by definition estimates.
Cost forecasts
Figure 4.5 presents seven forecasts of future gas CCS costs 
trajectories15. These projections are based primarily on 
experience curve analysis using assumed learning rates 
and rates of deployment, some based on the historical 
experience of flue gas desulphurisation (FGD). Some of 
the generic challenges of using ‘analogue’ technologies 
for experience curve analysis are identified in Chapter 
3, and discussed further in Chapter 5. We consider 
their relevance to CCS in a later part of this sub-section 
addressing cost drivers and themes.
Although different pieces of evidence project differing 
rates of cost reduction, the literature mostly suggests 
that the rate of learning will be relatively steady. The 
consensus, as indicated by the graph below, has been for 
gas CCS costs to decrease over time, and projections for 
other key CCS technologies (e.g. post-combustion and 
pre-combustion coal CCS) to demonstrate similar patterns 
(Jones 2012a). Nevertheless, Figure 4.5 also shows how, 
over the period from 2003 to 2011, the starting level for 
the projections has increased significantly from between 
£600,000/MW and £900,000/MW in 2003/2004 to between 
£1,100,000/MW and £1,600,000/MW in 2010/2011. This is a 
reflection of the substantial increase in evolving estimates 
of contemporary costs, an issue examined in further detail 
below (Martinsen et al. 2007, van den Broek et al. 2009).
15The forecasts from 2011 are explicitly for future commercial projects (i.e. not demonstration plants), as is the forecast from 2003. The remaining forecasts 
are either a mix of projected costs for demonstration plants initially, followed by commercial deployment, or the distinction is not explicitly made.
Figure 4.5: Range of forecast estimates of future 
capital costs of post-combustion gas CCS
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Contemporary cost estimates
This section focuses on estimates of contemporary CCS 
costs at the time that the evidence reported it (as opposed 
to estimated forecasts of CCS costs at some point in the 
future). Here, the literature examined in Jones (2012a) has 
used both experience curve analysis and several variants 
of technological and engineering assessment including 
Front-End Engineering and Design (FEED) studies and 
expert elicitation.
Figure 4.6 below shows estimated contemporary capital 
costs of both unabated gas plant and CCS-abated gas 
plant. Comparing Figures 4.5 and 4.6, it is clear that early 
forecasts from 2003 and 2004, for example for gas CCS 
capex in 2011, were excessively optimistic. Marsh et al. 
(2003) and Fluor (2004) projected capex of approximately 
£750,000/MW and £500,000/MW, respectively, in 2011, 
whereas the contemporary 2011 estimates in Figure 4.6 
lie in a range between approximately £950,000/MW and 
£1,650,000/MW (Jones 2012a).
Figure 4.6: Range of estimated capital costs for  
gas plant, both unabated and abated
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Figure 4.7 presents data between 2000 and 2011 for 
estimated contemporary levelised costs for different CCS 
technologies. The estimates include the cost of electricity 
generation as well as the cost of CCS CO2 abatement. 
Whilst the graph shows a wide variation in estimates 
within each year, it is evident that from the mid-2000s 
the overall trend has been up. In large part, this is due to 
escalation in the costs of the different generating plant, 
however the CCS portion of costs has been trending 
upwards as well (Jones 2012a). The later estimates would 
be expected to build upon earlier estimates and reflect the 
improved understanding and characterisation of the costs 
of the CCS technology suites. The reasons behind the cost 
increases are explored in the following section together 
with emerging themes.
Figure 4.7: Range of contemporary levelised cost 
estimates of CCS since 2000
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Main cost drivers and themes emerging  
from CCS case study
Expectations of future CCS cost reductions are based 
on several drivers including increased project size, 
technological innovation, process integration, reduced 
construction times, and the development of an efficient 
carbon transport and storage network (Al-Juaied and 
Whitmore 2009, IEA 2010a, Parsons Brinckerhoff 2011).
However, the potential for reductions may be limited by 
two key factors, both of which are also considered further 
in the next chapter. First, with the exception of IGCC, the 
generating plant technologies are already technically 
mature which limits the scope for further learning 
(Viebahn et al. 2007, Al-Juaied and Whitmore 2009). 
Second, like nuclear power, CCS has a hazardous waste to 
16To maintain the clarity of Figure 4.7, trends lines have been omitted, but the upward trajectory 
of cost estimates from the mid-2000s onwards is clear.
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dispose of and the nuclear experience over the last fifty 
years highlights the potential for costs to continue to go 
up not down, in particular due to regulatory and safety 
demands (Rai et al. 2010, Mott MacDonald 2011). Indeed, 
as we have seen in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, estimates of 
contemporary CCS costs have in any case been rising for 
several reasons which are explored below.
One of the primary drivers of escalating CCS cost 
estimates has been supply chain bottlenecks that have 
increased engineering, procurement, and construction 
(EPC) prices for both coal and gas power plant. 
Manufacturing capacity constraints have increased prices 
for plant components and caused delivery delays that 
have increased the cost of project finance (Chupka and 
Basheda 2007, Mott MacDonald 2010). More specifically, 
advanced supercritical coal plant has been especially 
vulnerable to supply chain bottlenecks and thus the effect 
on cost estimates for post-combustion coal CCS has been 
particularly pronounced. The theme of supply chain and 
market dynamics is discussed further in Chapter 5.
During the period from the early 2000s to 2008, a further 
important driver of rising cost estimates was the high cost 
of raw materials such as steel, cement and copper caused 
by strong global demand (Davison and Thambimuthu 
2009). As with supply chain bottlenecks, this led to 
increases in the cost of generating plant, rather than 
specifically to the CCS portion. Since the global financial 
crisis post-2008, commodity prices have reduced but this 
has been counteracted by increases in operating costs due 
to rising fuel feedstock prices (DoE/NETL 2010, IEA 2010a). 
Again, Chapter 5 considers in more detail the significant 
impact of high input costs.
CCS costs are of course subject to particular uncertainty 
because the technology is yet to be deployed at 
commercial scale anywhere. An additional driver of 
increased CCS cost estimates is an apparent tendency for 
early-stage engineering assessments to exhibit appraisal 
optimism, particularly in the form of over-simplified 
system design and of risk under-estimation (Jones 
2012a). Scrase and Watson (2009) suggest that appraisal 
optimism is motivated by either the natural enthusiasm 
of interested parties or by the incentive of securing 
public funding. In any case, once projects and their costs 
are later defined and budgeted in greater detail, cost 
estimates tend to be revised upwards. A case in point is 
the cost estimates for retrofitting CCS to one of the units 
at Longannet coal-fired power station where estimated 
overall capex increased by nearly 14% from initial cost 
assessments and allowances for risk and contingency 
costs increased by nearly 90% (ScottishPower CCS 
Consortium 2011). Other reports also note that upward 
revisions to the magnitude of risk premiums have been a 
driver of increased cost estimates (EPRI 2007, Osmundsen 
and Emhjellen 2010). Chapter 5 explores appraisal 
optimism and realism in more detail.
In addition to the escalation in CCS cost estimates over the 
last decade or so, one of the main findings of the CCS case 
study is the extent of variation in the estimates, a theme 
we also return to in Chapter 5. In part, this is due to what 
the case study terms ‘inherent variation’ caused by specific 
project design and finance terms and also by project 
location. The choice of generating and capture technologies 
substantially affects a project’s cost profile (Chen and Rubin 
2009) and factors such as cost of capital and management 
ability are also significant (Mott MacDonald 2010, Simbeck 
and Beecy 2011). Locational differences are important 
too, in particular the options for CO2 transportation and 
storage, and the availability or otherwise of cheap local fuel 
feedstock (WorleyParsons 2009).
The variation in CCS cost estimates is also due 
to imperfect knowledge and to unstandardised 
methodologies. The former is a cause of considerable 
uncertainty since it is not yet possible to verify estimates 
with empirical commercial-scale cost data (Shackley 
et al. 2009). Though many of the individual technology 
components are relatively mature, CCS as an integrated 
technology is still extremely immature resulting in 
substantial uncertainties over performance, economic 
life, and load factors (Chen and Rubin 2009, Giovanni and 
Richards 2010, Global CCS Institute 2011). In addition, 
future fuel prices are inevitably uncertain.
Unstandardised methodologies also contribute to 
variations in cost estimates. According to the Global 
CCS Institute (2011), the differing methodologies used 
for calculating CCS costs limits the comparability of 
different studies. For instance, many of the reports and 
papers reviewed for the CCS case study focused on CO2 
capture only and did not factor in transportation, storage 
and monitoring (Jones 2012a). Clearly, this can lead to 
misleading conclusions about the overall costs of CCS-
abated power generation. For this reason, the IEA has called 
for the establishment of a common framework for CCS cost 
estimation methodology and terminology (IEA 2011). 
In addition to the above concerns about estimation, 
further methodological issues relate to the forecasting 
of future CCS costs. The CCS case study emphasises 
the importance of recognising the limitations of the 
experience curve methodology. The technique of taking 
the learning rates of possibly analogous technologies 
such as flue gas desulphurisation and selective catalytic 
reduction and using them for CCS experience curves 
requires caution. Rai et al. (2010) emphasise the contingent 
nature of learning rates and argue that CCS cost 
reductions depend not only on technological development 
but also on deployment rates, the regulatory regime, and 
market structures. UK CCS CRTF (2013) also highlight how 
the approach taken to shared infrastructure development 
can bear upon costs. Rubin et al. (2007a) point out that 
there is precedent for power sector technologies during 
early commercialisation to experience cost increases not 
decreases. This suggests that actual cost out-turns for CCS 
could go up before they reduce. We return to these issues 
in the next chapter.
Presenting the Future: An assessment of future costs estimation methodologies 
in the electricity generation sector
45
Overall, several key findings are summarised by the CCS 
case study. First, there is a pressing need for a greater 
degree of commonality in the methodological approach 
to estimating costs to ensure, insofar as it is possible, that 
such estimates are comparable. Second, the application 
of experience curves requires caution. Third, more 
consideration of project risk and potential supply chain 
bottlenecks is needed. Fourth, distinguishing between 
those cost drivers affecting generating plant and those 
specifically affecting CCS technology is important. Finally, 
the case study emphasises the fact that currently CCS 
cost data are only estimates and not actual out-turns. 
As such, they are subject to significant uncertainties and 
this is likely to compound the inevitable uncertainties of 
forecasting future CCS costs.
4.5 Onshore wind
Introduction
The costs trajectory analysis for this onshore wind 
sub-section focuses on capex costs and on the levelised 
costs of energy (LCOE). The data for the onshore wind 
case study (Jones 2012b) was collected from more than 
40 sources covering a range of countries. Given the 
short history of commercial wind technologies, data for 
pre-1990 forecasts is very limited, so the focus here is 
predominantly on the 1990s onwards.
Cost forecasts
Cost expectations for the onshore wind sector during the 
1990s were for substantial reductions within a relatively 
short period of time. A study by Flavin and Lenssen 
(1990), for example, anticipated a reduction of levelised 
costs from over £80/MWh to under £50/MWh in a little 
over a decade. In 1993, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) forecast cost reductions from a similar level down 
to £40/MWh by the year 2000 (IEA 1993). Figure 4.8 also 
shows how the starting point for levelised cost forecast 
trajectories reduced considerably during the 1990s, down 
to approximately £40/MWh by the end of the decade 
(EWEA et al. 1999).
The methodologies underpinning these cost forecasts 
are varied, as are assumptions related to site specific 
factors such as wind speeds and load factors. The 
U.S. Department of Energy, for example, based its cost 
forecasts on technical and engineering assessment i.e. 
detailed projections of how onshore wind technology 
was expected to evolve (DoE and EPRI 1997). However, a 
more common forecasting approach, once the data was 
available, was to form future projections based on historic 
learning rates and experience curve extrapolation. For 
instance, the UK Government projected that onshore wind 
LCOE would fall to 75% of 1996 values by 2010 based on 
historic trends (DTI 2002b).
There is a considerable amount of attention to wind 
learning rates in the literature. For example, Neij (1999) 
suggested learning rates of between 4% and 7%, and 
EWEA et al. (1999) a learning rate of 15% until 2010, with 
the rate of cost reduction slowing after this period. 
Junginger et al. (2005) present a global learning rate of 
between 15% and 23%.
Figure 4.8: Range of levelised cost expectations  
for onshore wind
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The early to mid-2000s saw an escalation in onshore  
wind costs. Because of this, as shown in Figure 4.8,  
the trajectory starting points increased to between £60 
and £75/MWh. In addition, later forecasts tend to more 
explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty surrounding cost 
projections, and to address exogenous cost drivers such as 
commodity prices, whereas earlier forecasts often tended 
to focus more narrowly on technological development.
Recent cost projections anticipate modest cost reductions, 
again from a higher starting point. For instance, Milborrow 
(2011) suggests a 5-10% decrease by 2020, and a further, 
similar decrease by 2030. However, recent studies suggest 
that the potential for significant cost reductions from 
learning is likely to be limited, since onshore wind is 
now perceived to be a relatively mature technology (Mott 
MacDonald 2010, DECC 2012a). This is a theme that we 
return to in Chapter 5.
Cost out-turns
Turning to the reality of actual cost out-turns, Figure 4.9 
below presents capital cost figures from 1994 to 2011. 
Installed capex tends to be broadly similar worldwide 
and UK project costs are comparable with project costs 
elsewhere in Europe (Milborrow 2012, GL Garrad Hassan 
2010). Figure 4.9 shows how, on average and contrary 
to expectations, capex trended upwards from the early 
2000s onwards. Junginger et al. (2005), for example, had 
suggested capex of substantially under £500,000/MW by 
2010. In fact, actual capex out-turns in 2010 were in a 
wide range between approximately £1,000,000/MW and 
£2,500,000/MW.
The levelised cost out-turns of onshore wind are 
presented in Figure 4.10. Note that the trend is less 
clear than for capital costs, because levelised costs vary 
significantly depending on the wind resource available 
(Blanco, 2009). There is also a potential trade-off between 
capex and levelised costs because optimising turbine 
designs to achieve reductions in overall levelised costs 
by improved load factors may drive up per MW capital 
costs. The cost of energy halved during the 1990s (EC 
1999) and the graph shows that up until the early 2000s 
the expectations of cost reductions described above were 
broadly met, even if there was substantial variability 
in the actual amounts. However, from the early 2000s 
onwards, levelised costs began to escalate, diverging from 
earlier trajectory expectations. For example, according 
to five of the studies appearing in Figure 4.8 the costs of 
onshore wind energy in 2010 were expected to be between 
£30/MWh and £45/MWh. Figure 4.10 shows that 2010 
levelised costs turned out to lie in wide range between 
£40/MWh and £135/MWh.
Figure 4.9: Range of capital costs of onshore wind 1994 – 2011
2011 £m/MW
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Non-UK Non-UK
UK UK
Source: (Jones 2012b)
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Presenting the Future: An assessment of future costs estimation methodologies 
in the electricity generation sector
47
Despite the setbacks of the early 2000s, projections made 
in the later 2000s that costs would continue to increase for 
several years and then reduce only insubstantially, have 
been proved incorrect. The average price of wind turbines 
declined by around 20% from late 2008 to 2010 (Bolinger 
and Wiser 2011), and fell further in 2011 (Milborrow 2012). 
Whilst detailed analysis would need to allow for factors 
such as operations and maintenance costs and site 
specific factors, both the above graphs showing actual out-
turns suggest that a possible turning point may have now 
been reached with some signs of cost decreases occurring 
between 2010 and 2011. 
Main cost drivers and themes emerging from 
Onshore Wind case study
Prior to the early/mid-2000s exogenous factors such 
as raw material costs were rarely cited in discussions 
regarding onshore wind cost drivers. Instead, the literature 
focused predominantly on several endogenous drivers 
arising from within the sector itself. 
First, turbine upscaling resulted in significant cost 
reductions. In Denmark, for example, the average turbine 
size increased from 71 kW in 1985 to 523 kW in 1996 (EC 
1999). Numerous economies of scale exist in turbine and 
tower manufacture and installation costs (driving down 
capex), and in operation and maintenance costs (driving 
down levelised costs) (Bellarmine and Urquhart 1996, EC 
1999). Moreover, larger turbines mounted on taller towers 
tend to capture more wind which results in higher load 
factors and thus, again, lower LCOE (Lako 2002). 
Second, wind forecasting and turbine siting improved 
significantly. For example, the European Wind Atlas 
Methodology was developed to map wind resources in the 
1970s and 1980s. This has been cited as crucial to delivering 
productivity gains and reduced levelised costs because the 
correct location of each wind turbine is fundamental to the 
economics of a wind farm (Blanco 2009).
Technological learning and resulting improvements were 
a third driver of cost reductions during the 1980s and 
1990s. Turbine rotor efficiency increased from 35-40% in 
the early 1980s to 48% in the mid-1990s (Neij 1999). Drive-
trains were optimised, and improved understanding of 
how loads affect turbines led to lower usage of material 
(BTM Consult 2001). As capacity installed per year 
increased so the potential for economies of scale at the 
factory level increased (Bellarmine and Urquhart 1996). 
Economies of scale and learning effects are both themes 
that are explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.
From the mid-2000s, exogenous factors outside the 
influence of the industry either combined with, or 
overwhelmed, endogenous cost drivers with the result 
that capital and levelised costs went up again. Rising 
commodity prices contributed to the increase because 
wind turbines are relatively material-intensive (EWEA 
2009). Steel, copper, and cement are all key materials in 
wind turbine manufacturing, and although the prices 
of these commodities fell back towards the end of 2008, 
there is a time lag before this can feed through to capex 
costs (Wiser and Bolinger 2009).
Figure 4.10: Range of levelised costs of onshore wind since 1980
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Another important driver has been sterling-euro currency 
movements (Arup 2011). From the UK’s perspective, the 
weakening of sterling against the euro since mid-2008 
significantly elevated prices for UK projects, which have 
typically been dominated by European imports (GL Garrad 
Hassan 2010). An additional smaller exogenous driver of 
cost escalation has been energy prices due to the effect 
on the costs of manufacturing and transporting turbines 
(Bolinger and Wiser 2011). Being beyond the immediate 
domain of the wind industry, these exogenous factors 
were difficult to predict and tended not to be factored into 
the cost forecasts for this period. Chapter 5 analyses a 
range of such exogenous themes in greater detail.
Whilst technological learning and upscaling continued 
to exert downward pressure on costs, these factors were 
overwhelmed by both the exogenous factors discussed 
above together with an additional endogenous driver – 
supply chain constraint. This played an important role in 
increasing capital costs, particularly during 2007 and 2008, 
although the congestion premium has since reduced (Mott 
MacDonald 2010, Mott MacDonald 2011). Shortages were 
experienced for a range of components such as gearboxes, 
bearings, generators, hubs and main shafts (de Vries 
2008, Blanco 2009), and bottlenecks were compounded 
by difficulties in obtaining construction equipment (de 
Vries 2008, EWEA 2009). A key cause of such bottlenecks 
was the boom in demand for wind turbines in Europe 
and Asia, and particularly in North America due to the 
US Production Tax Credit (Blanco 2009, EWEA 2009, GL 
Garrad Hassan 2010). It is also important to note that (as 
in any industry) the extent to which turbine prices are 
fully reflective of underlying costs is a function of market 
dynamics and corporate strategy, particularly in the short-
term. We return to the themes of market dynamics and 
policy effects in the following chapter.
An important conclusion is that the relative accuracy of 
the forecasts for the period prior to the early 2000s was, 
in large measure, due to the central role of endogenous 
drivers in determining early onshore wind costs. By 
contrast, more recent years have seen both exogenous 
factors and supply chain and policy effects play a 
much bigger part in influencing cost trajectories. Both 
engineering assessment and experience curve analysis 
have a much more limited ability to accurately anticipate 
and account for these drivers.
Due to the failure to adequately anticipate the cost 
challenges of the last decade, revised approaches to 
estimating onshore wind costs are now evident in the 
literature. There appears to be a greater recognition of 
the uncertainties and contingencies of cost forecasts, 
and scenario analysis is being used to help anticipate 
the impacts of differing macroeconomic and exogenous 
possibilities. In other words, there is greater appreciation 
that wind costs are not just driven by technical 
improvements but also by global forces such as currency 
movements, commodity prices, and market dynamics. 
This ‘appraisal realism’ is another theme that we examine 
further in the Chapter 5.
4.6 Offshore wind
Introduction
The offshore wind case study draws heavily on the data 
and analyses of UKERC’s 2010 report on the costs of 
offshore wind in UK waters (Greenacre et al. 2010). UKERC 
reviewed approximately 350 pieces of evidence of which 
over 100 pieces were subsequently used in the report for 
data and analysis purposes. 
Cost forecasts
Early estimates of offshore wind cost trends were derived 
from engineering assessment, from what little cost out-
turns data were available in the infancy of offshore wind 
development, and also from experience curves adapted 
from the onshore experience (Greenacre 2012b). As a 
consequence, the literature from the late 1990s onwards 
reflected a widespread expectation that costs would fall 
as deployment expanded and the industry matured. The 
grounds for optimism appeared justifiable and informed 
UK government thinking in the early 2000s (Greenacre et 
al. 2010).
The general expectation that costs would reduce over time 
is demonstrated by Figure 4.11 which presents a summary 
of the capex value forecasts between 1990 and 2050, as 
reported in the literature. The relationship between capital 
and levelised costs is complex, affected by factors such as 
reliability, efficiency and site optimisation. Nevertheless, 
the data reported in Fig 4.11 shows how expectations of 
capital costs have changed; it shows the in-year average 
forecast costs for two groups, one consisting of those 
forecasts made up to 2005, and the other consisting of 
those forecasts made from 2005 onwards. The year 2005 
was chosen because the mid-2000s appears to have been a 
pivotal time when estimates of contemporary costs began 
to rise significantly from the lows of the early 2000s.
Whilst analysts consistently expected costs to fall over 
time, after 2005 forecast costs in the relatively near future 
rose as it became clear that capex had not fallen as 
originally anticipated. However, costs were still expected 
to fall in the longer term, returning to broadly the same 
level as earlier forecasts. 
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Cost out-turns
Figure 4.12 shows what actually happened to offshore 
wind capex over the two decades from 1990. By the 
second half of the 1990s, and continuing through the early 
2000s, offshore wind capex had fallen to approximately 
£1.5 million/MW. This was broadly in keeping with the 
small amount of forecast data shown in Figure 4.11 that 
is relevant to this period. However from the mid-2000s 
costs escalated sharply. Typical capex doubled from 
approximately £1.5 million/MW in 2005 to £3.0 million/
MW in 2009. Given that past expectations of future capital 
costs in 2009 were approximately £1.25 million/MW to £2.0 
million/MW, actual costs at that time exceeded previous 
expectations by between approximately 50% and 140%. 
Meanwhile, the estimated levelised cost of offshore wind 
generation in the UK rose from around £85/MWh in the 
mid-2000s to up to £150/MWh by 2010 (DTI 2006, Mott 
MacDonald 2010). More recently, Mott MacDonald in 2011 
estimated even higher energy generation costs at £169/
MWh though the capital costs remained similar at around 
£3.0 million/MW (in a range between £2.8 million and £3.4 
million/MW) (Mott MacDonald 2011). Similarly, the Arup 
(2011) report for DECC puts levelised costs at £174/MWh 
(large scale, medium scenario) though suggesting lower 
capital costs of approximately £2.75 million/MW. These 
estimates need to be seen in the light of the recently 
published draft strike price for offshore wind of £155/
MWh for 2014/15 (DECC 2013c), and industry ambitions to 
drive costs down to level substantially below this figure 
over the next decade (The Crown Estate 2012).
Figure 4.11: In-years means of offshore wind forecast capex, comparing pre and post 2005 estimates
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Figure 4.12: Range of offshore wind actual  
capex, 1990 to 2009
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Main cost drivers and themes emerging from 
Offshore Wind case study
There are a number of factors that lie behind the marked 
discrepancy between early expectations of future costs 
from the mid-2000s onwards versus actual cost out-
turns in the latter half of the decade. Before considering 
the drivers of cost escalation we first address some 
methodological issues that are also relevant to the 
discrepancy.
At least until the mid-2000s, there was little primary data 
from which to construct experience curves. Offshore wind 
was still in its infancy with only 13 offshore wind farms 
constructed worldwide between 1991 and 2004 totalling 
less than 550MW of installed capacity. Before the year 
2000, the UK had no offshore wind capacity at all and four 
years on there were only three completed wind farms 
totalling just 124 MW of installed capacity. Consequently, 
early forecasters borrowed and adapted learning rates 
and experience curves from the historically more mature 
onshore wind experience (Greenacre et al. 2010).
However the cost components, and the availability 
and resulting load factors of onshore and offshore 
generation are different and a comparison of the two 
is not like for like. Moreover, the literature exhibits a 
wide variation in learning rates for onshore wind and 
consequently many different experience curves for 
onshore wind power have been presented over the years 
e.g. Junginger et al. (2005), Neij (2008). Thus, whilst the 
borrowing of data from the onshore wind experience was 
an understandable response to the relative infancy of 
offshore wind development, the evidence suggests that 
experience curves were applied inappropriately and led 
to over-optimistic cost forecasting (Greenacre et al. 2010). 
In addition, whilst the literature revealed relatively few 
engineering assessments of future costs, again excessive 
optimism was also in evidence (Greenacre 2012b). Chapter 
5 examines the themes of technological and deployment 
immaturity and of appraisal optimism in further detail.
Turning to the cost drivers themselves, the forecasts of 
on-going cost reductions in the offshore wind sector 
were based on expectations of continued benefits from 
learning, unit upsizing, economies of scale, and mass 
deployment (all these are themes we return to in Chapter 
5). The reality, however, was that in the mid-2000s these 
drivers of cost reduction were overwhelmed by a number 
of opposing endogenous and exogenous drivers which 
caused upward pressure on costs.
Significant endogenous factors include an increase in 
turbine prices together with a supply squeeze in other 
components. Along with commodity price rises (addressed 
later), the rise in turbine prices was due in part to the cost 
of engineering/marinisation improvements in the face of 
poor generation availability experience (Greenacre et al. 
2010). In addition, notes Gordon (2006), by the mid-2000s 
rapid growth in the US onshore wind industry caused by 
the US Production Tax Credit (PTC) scheme was resulting 
in a global shortage of turbine components, delaying 
European offshore projects and forcing up prices.
By 2007, turbine supply was the dominant bottleneck 
with the UK offshore sector squeezed by onshore turbine 
demand from China, India, and elsewhere in Europe 
as well as the US. BVG Associates (2007) and Douglas-
Westwood (2008) reported that the combination of a 
strong market and constrained supply drove onshore 
turbine prices upwards by 30% between 2006 and 2008. 
Both national and extra-national policy effects are 
considered further in the following chapter, as are the 
themes of general market dynamics and competition.
Another potentially significant factor has been the lack 
of competition given the limited number of companies 
engaged in turbine manufacturing for the UK offshore 
wind industry (BWEA 2008, Carbon Trust 2008, Ernst & 
Young 2009, RAB 2009). The market has been dominated 
by Siemens and Vestas who together accounted for almost 
all of offshore turbines installed in the UK up to 2009 
(Ernst & Young 2009), and may have been in a position 
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to pass on high commodity and component costs to 
developers with relative ease17. In addition, the potential 
level of profit margin built into the price of turbines could 
have been obscuring the ‘true’ capital costs of offshore 
wind. The theme of price versus cost is also examined 
further in Chapter 5.
The offshore wind case study identifies two further 
endogenous cost drivers as being relevant. The first is 
the effect on costs of increasing depth and distance 
from shore in UK-specific offshore wind development. 
Collectively, and taking the average maximum depths 
and distances, UK Round 2 projects are nearly double 
the depth and more than double the distance of Round 1 
projects (4C Offshore Limited 2010, Greenacre 2012b). Such 
increases can have a significant impact on construction, 
installation, electrical infrastructure, and O&M costs. 
Depth is of course a primary factor in engineering 
design and foundation size during the construction and 
installation phase. Of particular relevance to UK Rounds 
2.5 and 3, The Carbon Trust found that foundation costs 
for sites in 40 to 60m of water were 160% greater than for 
sites in 0 to 20m of water (Carbon Trust 2008). Distance 
is a factor at the installation stage and also impacts on 
electrical infrastructure costs, in particular the amount 
of transmission cabling required (Ernst & Young 2009). 
Distance also increases O&M costs which in any case 
were impacted by inadequate marinisation of onshore-
designed turbines (ODE Limited 2007). However, it would 
appear that the effects of increasing depth and distance 
may have been under-estimated in early cost forecasts 
(Greenacre 2012b).
In addition, a consequence of the above considerations 
was one further endogenous cost driver – poor reliability 
and availability leading to disappointing load factors. The 
load factor of a wind farm is determined by two variables: 
wind conditions and the availability of turbines and 
related equipment. In theory, a major advantage offered by 
offshore wind is that wind speeds are generally higher and 
more stable than onshore sites. Indeed, Snyder and Kaiser 
(2009) suggest that moving onshore to offshore should lead 
to an increase in the load factor from roughly 25% to 40%. 
However, UK offshore farms have experienced higher than 
expected loss of generation – in particular from gearbox 
failure, generator failures, subsea cable damage, and 
operator access limitations (BVG Associates 2007). 
UK Round 1 projects experienced only 80.3% average 
availability18 and as a result, the annual average load 
factor for reporting UK Round 1 wind farms has been 
29.5% (Feng et al. 2010) – which is higher than the average 
value of 27.3% reported in 2007 for UK onshore wind farms 
but lower than the expected 35.0% for UK offshore and the 
reported capacity factors of at least 40% for some Danish 
offshore wind farms (Wind Stats 2009b, Wind Stats 2009a). 
Again, actual out-turns have disappointed compared to 
prior forecasts – in this case the poor availability record 
was perhaps not anticipated in the UK because early 
European offshore farms proved to be relatively reliable. 
For example, the average annual availability of Denmark’s 
well-established near-shore installation at Middelgrunden 
has been over 93% (Larsen et al. 2005).
In addition to the endogenous drivers and themes 
discussed above, the case study highlights three 
significant exogenous drivers of cost escalation: 
commodity prices; exchange rates; and the cost of finance.
Commodity prices rose significantly from the early 
2000s until 2008 when the effects of the global economic 
downturn began to be felt. In the offshore wind sector, 
the most significant commodities are copper and, in 
particular, steel which has typically accounted for around 
12% of total project cost (BWEA and Garrad Hassan 2009). 
From 2002 to 2007 the steel index experienced growth 
of 47% CAGR (compound annual growth rate) although 
in 2008 it fell by 58% returning to the long-term historic 
trend (Ernst & Young 2009). The increase in steel prices 
from the early 2000s was thus a likely contributing factor 
to turbine costs rising from £0.9 million to £1.5 million/
MW (67%) in five years (RAB 2009). Steel price rises played 
an even greater role in the escalating costs of foundations. 
Foundation structures are heavily reliant on steel and 
costs increased from around £250,000/MW to £700,000/
MW (a 180% increase) over the five years to 2009 (Ernst & 
Young 2009).
The Euro/Sterling exchange rate also contributed to 
the rise in costs borne by UK offshore wind developers. 
Around 80% of the value of a typical UK offshore wind 
farm is imported and has either been priced in Euros or 
priced in a currency tied to the Euro (Greenacre et al. 2010). 
O&M costs were also affected by the strength of the Euro. 
In addition, vessels and support services have been largely 
sourced from continental Europe, hence installation 
costs also rose (Ernst & Young, 2009). Since 2000, when 
the exchange rate was approximately €1 = £0.60, the Euro 
gradually increased in value against the pound, reaching 
almost one-to-one parity in December 2008. Consequently, 
until at least 2009 UK developers experienced continued 
increases in component costs because of the Euro’s 
gradual appreciation.
A third exogenous driver has been the increased cost 
of financial capital. In theory, if an offshore wind 
developer were to use project finance, then the increasing 
experience in construction and operation should gradually 
reduce the risk premium for offshore installations 
resulting in a decreasing cost of capital (Greenacre et 
al. 2010). However, utility developers, who have been 
responsible for the majority of capacity installed to date, 
17It is worth noting however that several other manufacturers are now entering the market (Heptonstall et al. 2012). 
18This is average percentage of time that turbines were available to generate electricity. Actual generation and load factor 
depends on wind speeds during the times when turbines are available to generate.
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instead typically used balance sheet financing (Ernst & 
Young 2009). The consequence of this was an increase 
in funding costs because of the 2007/2008 crisis in the 
global credit markets when the resultant rise in spreads 
for utility bonds from mid-2007 onwards led to a higher 
cost of corporate debt (Ernst & Young 2009). In future it is 
possible that a combination of increasing technological 
maturity, policy changes such as the Contracts for 
Difference envisaged in the UK’s Electricity Market Reform 
package and changes to project financing arrangements 
could reduce the costs of capital (The Crown Estate 2012, 
DECC 2013c).
In considering the cost factors explored above, some of 
them could not have been easily anticipated, if at all. 
Commodity price rises and the Euro/Sterling exchange 
rate are prime examples, as perhaps was the state of the 
turbine market from which offshore wind developers 
suffered both too much competition (for example, from 
competing onshore turbine demand in the US) and too 
little (only two offshore wind turbine manufacturers). 
Chapter 5 explores all of these themes in further detail.
Nevertheless, whilst hindsight is a privileged point of view, 
it is reasonable to suggest that some of the sources of 
error should have been better anticipated, more rigorously 
scrutinised, or more clearly factored into the forecasting 
analysis. The effect of harsh marine conditions and of 
increasing depth and distance might have been more 
thoroughly considered. In addition, the early application of 
experience curves using learning rates ‘borrowed’ from a 
related sector was arguably not questioned enough. Again, 
this is a theme that we return to in Chapter 5 given that it 
has implications for other technologies in the early stages 
of deployment such as novel PV technologies and, in 
particular, CCS where there is no costs track record as yet 
and so learning rates are sometimes being borrowed from 
associated technologies such as flue gas desulphurisation 
(see this report’s allied case study on CCS).
4.7 Solar photovoltaics
Introduction
The PV case study (Candelise 2012) draws upon over 70 
sources in total, of which approximately 40 provided 
cost data. The data analysis focuses on the capital costs 
and prices of PV modules and systems rather than 
on levelised costs since the latter vary considerably 
depending on system type and location specifics, 
especially climatic conditions and irradiation levels. For 
actual out-turns, the PV system data presented are actual 
capital costs and the module price data are actual prices. 
However, module costs data are estimated production 
costs drawn from the literature and from PV company 
estimates and forecasts.
Cost forecasts
Since the 1970s PV technology forecasts, based on  
both experience curves and engineering assessment, 
have anticipated decreases in costs. Nevertheless, both 
the magnitude of decrease and the timing vary within 
the literature, and expectations have not necessarily 
matched outcomes, often being either too optimistic or 
too pessimistic.
Table 4.1 below, adapted from Schaeffer et al. (2004), 
presents data from five studies conducted between 1978 
and 1996 which forecast future PV module costs via both 
engineering assessment and experience curve projection. 
The table shows that by the year 2000 module costs were 
expected to be anywhere between approximately $4 per 
Watt peak (Wp) and under $1/Wp. The data are compared 
with actual out-turns occurring in the year of projection in 
the following sub-section, but note both the wide range of 
estimates and also the marked discrepancy in each study 
between the engineering assessment and experience 
curves projections.
Table 4.1: Engineering assessment and experience curve projections of future PV module production 
costs adapted from (Schaeffer et al. 2004)
Study Year of study Year of projection Engineering 
assessment ($/Wp)
Experience curve 
($/Wp)
JBL86-31 target 1978 1986 1.63 0.86
JBL86-31 Cz 1985 1988 2.17 6.35
JBL86-31 Dentretic 1985 1992 1.02 2.80
EPRI 1986 1986 2000 1.50 0.79
MUSIC FM 1996 1996 2000 1.00 4.07
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Turning to more recent forecasts, a study made in 2007, 
using engineering assessment, expected module costs 
to be €1/Wp by 2013 whilst two longer range experience 
curve studies, published in 2005 and 2006 respectively, 
anticipated costs of US$1/Wp for crystalline silicon (c-Si) 
modules in 2023 and US$0.7/Wp for thin film modules 
in 2022 (Surek 2005, Trancik and Zweibel 2006, EU PV 
Technology Platform 2007).
Regarding the PV whole system cost (i.e. module plus 
balance of system (BOS) cost), the UK government has 
commissioned several studies in the last five years for UK 
only PV costs. For example, a 2008 study (Element Energy 
2008) projected costs in 2012 of £3.34/Wp and £3.12/Wp 
for small and large PV systems respectively. Longer term, 
the 2008 study anticipated small size system costs of 
£2.17/Wp by 2020. However, only four years later, Parsons 
Brinckerhoff estimated significantly reduced costs of 
£1.05/Wp for the same year and system size (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff, 2012). The following sub-section considers 
actual out-turns to date compared to earlier forecasts.
Cost out-turns
Figure 4.13 below shows how average PV module prices 
have decreased significantly since the mid-70s from 
nearly $40/Wp to approximately $2.25/Wp in 2012 
(Maycock 2011, Solarbuzz 2012).
Referring back to Table 4.1 above and the projections 
made, for example, for 1992 and 2000 it is evident that 
with one exception the forecasts proved to be optimistic 
given that average module prices were still around $4.5 
to $5.0/Wp in 2003. Whilst it is acknowledged that the 
comparison here is between cost forecasts and price out-
turns, nevertheless the discrepancy is generally too high 
to be simply attributed to mark-ups (Candelise 2012).
On the other hand, the 2007 engineering assessment 
referred to earlier anticipated module costs of €1/Wp by 
2013 and this is proving to be a more accurate projection 
with several studies showing c-Si and thin film module 
costs currently approaching this figure or even bettering it 
(Ebinger 2011, Fath 2011, First Solar 2011, Holzapfel 2011, 
IHS iSuppli 2011, IMS Research 2012, Solarbuzz 2012). 
Meanwhile, the above-mentioned 2005 and 2006 studies 
that forecast out to the 2020s are now looking much 
too pessimistic, at least as far as timing is concerned. 
Similarly, the 2008 PV whole system price forecast for 
2012 has also under-estimated the magnitude of recent 
reductions. Actual 2012 out-turns according to (Parsons 
Brinckerhoff 2012) for small and large system sizes in 
the UK were £2.54/Wp and £1.20/Wp respectively, being 
approximately 75% and 40% of the price out-turns 
projected just four years earlier.
In summary therefore, the history of future cost/price 
forecasting of PV modules and systems is generally 
characterised by over-estimation of future reductions 
in earlier years before 2000 and by under-estimation 
of reductions more recently. The following sub-section 
examines the predominant cost drivers and findings 
(described as ‘themes’) identified in the PV case study.
Main cost drivers and themes emerging  
from PV case study
The first major reduction in PV costs came in the 1970s 
when PV moved from space to terrestrial applications, 
with less stringent quality and reliability requirements 
and hence lowered costs. Since then, costs have continued 
to decrease (excepting the mid-2000s – see below), with 
learning rates typically in the 18-20% range.
Figure 4.13: PV module price historical trend
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At the module level, the main cost reduction drivers have 
been innovation, learning and returns to adoption in 
either the module device itself or in the manufacturing 
processes. Commercial module efficiency and power 
density are still increasing whilst silicon usage in c-Si 
devices and other production costs have been significantly 
reduced over time, due to innovation and learning in cell 
design, improvements in silicon wafer cutting, and because 
of other production efficiencies such as automation, 
standardisation, and high throughput, high yield processes. 
In addition, c-Si technology has benefited from knowledge 
spillovers from the already mature semiconductor industry.
One particularly significant event has been the temporary 
shortage of silicon experienced during the mid-2000s when 
PV module prices rose in the short-term before falling 
dramatically in 2009 from approximately $5/Wp to under 
half that three years later. This silicon shortage was, in 
large part, caused by demand pull policies (primarily feed-
in tariffs) implemented in key European countries such as 
Germany and Spain (Candelise 2012). The resultant increase 
in demand for PV modules caused silicon spot prices to 
go up from $50/kg to over $500/kg by 2008 (Flynn, 2009), 
increasing PV production costs and leading to an inversion 
in the historical trend of module price reduction. See also 
Chapter 5 where the effect of national policy on other 
countries is one of the themes examined in further detail. 
The consequence of the silicon bottleneck in the longer 
term, however, was increased innovation and efficiency 
together with more investment in silicon production and 
also a new wave of investment in thin film alternatives. 
Indeed, thin film PV modules are currently the cheapest 
to manufacture with one company producing at a cost of 
$0.74/Wp (First Solar 2011). 
Of particular importance to cost reduction has been 
both the modular nature of PV technology which affords 
manufacturing efficiencies and has allowed a diversity of 
applications and easy implementation, and also economies 
of scale with the last decade seeing a huge increase in 
production capacity and average plant size. In 2007 average 
c-Si plant output size was around 100MWp/yr but this has 
now increased to at least the 500-1000MWp/yr range (JA 
Solar 2012) whilst CdTe module manufacturer, First Solar 
(which was the first PV manufacturer to reduce production 
costs below the $1/Wp production cost threshold) has 
increased its production capacity from 25MW in 2005 to 
over 2GW in 2011 (First Solar 2011). 
Thus, scale economies, coupled with a dramatic expansion 
in the global PV market during recent years, have 
contributed greatly to the substantial drop in prices. In fact, 
evidence in 2012 suggests that modules may currently be 
selling at below production cost. This raises an uncertainty 
regarding the extent to which price reductions can be 
attributed to genuine cost reductions (e.g. from innovation 
and returns to adoption) or are the consequence of market 
dynamics (e.g. temporary pricing at lower than cost) and 
other factors such as easy access to cheap (subsidised) 
capital for Chinese manufacturers and competitive 
‘dumping’ strategies (Candelise 2012). Indeed, data issues 
regarding the use of price in experience curves as a proxy 
for production costs is one of the emerging themes that 
will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Another theme to emerge from the case study is the 
sensitivity of future forecasts to variations in system 
size, type, and location, and especially to variations in 
the learning and deployment rates used in constructing 
experience curves. Whilst the average PV learning rate 
appears to be around 20% even small changes can affect 
long-term estimates of cost reductions, the market 
expansion needed to reach a target cost, and the timing of 
such an achievement. For example, Trancik and Zweibel 
(2006) estimated that for a given learning rate thin film 
PV might cost $0.7/Wp in 2022, assuming a 30% capacity 
growth rate. In reality, the recent rapid capacity expansion 
means that $0.7/Wp is close to being achieved. 
A related theme is that experience curve analysis is 
ill-suited to anticipating discontinuities in the learning 
rate as a result of radical technological break-through. 
This is especially relevant to a technology like PV where 
there exists the potential for radical innovation and 
step-change. A further consideration to the above is that 
so far experience curves have been tended to be based 
on historical data for conventional c-Si technologies, 
whilst very limited or no data exists for other emerging 
PV technologies, such as thin film or excitonic devices. 
Experience curves cannot be constructed for these 
technologies yet (except in a highly illustrative fashion) 
because of the absence of reliable data over a sufficiently 
long time period (Candelise 2012). 
A theme that is shared by all the technologies reviewed in 
the case studies is the compound nature of the learning 
system. PV technology can be considered, at the very least, 
a two-part system consisting of the module and the BOS, 
each with its own cost drivers and learning rates. However, 
PV experience curves have mainly been developed for the 
module with relatively little quantitative evidence applied 
at the BOS level. This is in spite of the known differences 
in learning rates with some evidence indicating that 
inverters and installation labour costs exhibit learning rates 
of around 10% as opposed to the approximate 20% rate 
typically assumed for module costs (Schaeffer et al. 2004, 
IPCC 2011).
Finally, arguably the most important theme – again one 
shared by all the technologies reviewed – is the inevitable 
uncertainty and potential for error inherent in experience 
curve and engineering assessment forecasting. Referring 
again to the pre-2000 projections in Table 4.1, we have 
noted both the discrepancies between the two forecasting 
methodologies and also the over-optimism of both types 
of projection in comparison with actual out-turns once 
known.
Post-2000, neither experience curve nor engineering based 
studies were able to anticipate recent module cost/price 
reductions and consequently proved to be too pessimistic. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that forecasts 
have, for the most part, been consistently accurate about 
the general downward direction of the PV costs trajectory.
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5. Themes, findings, 
and overall conclusions
5
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the principal drivers of cost increase 
or decrease, drawing upon the analysis in Chapters 3 and 
4. These drivers vary considerably in character – some 
being quite technology-specific, others more policy-
oriented or micro- or macro-economic in nature. They 
comprise a heterogeneous assortment of forces that 
impinge on costs trajectories and/or on the estimation 
and forecasting of costs, and we have chosen to refer to 
them as ‘themes’.
Each of the themes has been identified in one or more 
of the case studies and in Chapter 3. Notwithstanding 
some inevitable overlap, each is categorised according to 
whether it is deemed to be ‘methodological’, ‘endogenous’ 
or ‘exogenous’ in nature. These terms are defined as 
follows:
•	 Methodological themes relate to issues arising from the 
collection, presentation, interpretation and comparison 
of cost data. 
•	 Endogenous themes examine cost issues as they relate 
to learning effects and innovation, scale effects and 
standardisation, and technological, commercial and 
regulatory conditions within the sphere of influence of 
relevant actors, both governmental and industry. 
•	 Exogenous themes address those cost issues that 
are largely beyond the ability of either the actors 
involved in a generating technology or policymakers 
more generally to influence, mitigate or in some cases 
predict. For example, general fluctuations in input costs 
- whether labour, components or raw commodities - 
due to macro-economic conditions such as a global 
economic downturn or boom, are considered to be 
largely outside the control of industry or an individual 
country’s policies and are therefore treated as 
exogenous.
The following sub-sections consider each thematic 
category in turn. The final sub-section offers high-level 
conclusions including implications for costs forecasting. 
5.2 Methodological themes
As noted, methodological themes relate to issues arising 
from the collection, presentation, interpretation and 
comparison of cost data. Several dominant themes of 
a methodological nature emerge from the case studies 
which support this report:
•	 Appraisal optimism
•	 Appraisal realism
•	 Technology and deployment immaturity
•	 Assumptions, system boundaries and extrapolations
•	 Price as a proxy for cost
•	 Compound learning systems
•	 Variability of estimates and forecasts
The above themes may broadly be characterised as 
describing issues either of accuracy in terms of forecasts 
versus actual outcomes, or of the variability and range 
of both forecasts and estimated outcomes at any given 
time. We first address issues of accuracy before concluding 
the methodological sub-section with a discussion of 
variability.
Appraisal optimism
It is evident from the case studies that cost forecasting 
has tended to exhibit periods of appraisal optimism 
where projections have under-estimated future cost 
outcomes. The literature suggests that in some cases 
this optimism has taken the form of a deliberate 
underestimation of costs in order to win policy support 
or to justify investments. It is argued that utilities may 
have had an interest in ‘low-balling’ costs as long as the 
estimates are non-binding, and that this has helped to 
get policy support (Cooper 2009). It has been suggested 
that in the 1960s power plant providers offered contracts 
with artificially low prices in order to penetrate markets. 
Only a few years later, cost estimates had risen by 80% 
(Kern 2011). Commentators on the nuclear industry have 
highlighted concerns about the strategic misuse of cost 
forecasts to garner policy support  (Grubler 2010).
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Similar observations have been offered with respect to the 
CCS sector, on the basis that attractive cost projections 
can help to secure public funding for demonstration 
projects (Scrase and Watson 2009). Strategic low bidding 
to secure NFFO contracts also occurred in the UK wind 
industry in the 1990s (Gross and Heptonstall 2010).
Alongside deliberate underestimation, natural optimism 
and stakeholder enthusiasm also play a role. Scrase and 
Watson (2009) note that early cost estimates of projects 
tend to be more optimistic than later estimates due to 
simplified system designs and to underestimating risks. 
Later, once projects are defined in greater detail and 
costs are more rigorously calculated, estimates tend to 
be revised upwards. This is illustrated, for example, by 
the costs study for retrofitting CCS at Longannet coal-
fired power station where estimated capex increased by 
13.6% from the initial Outline Solution (ScottishPower CCS 
Consortium 2011). 
Meanwhile in the nuclear industry, Cooper (2009) notes 
that in the early 1970s, cost analysis was the domain of 
the utility industry, the reactor vendors and government 
officials. There were few financial markets analysts and 
independent energy consultancies expressing scepticism 
and higher cost estimates. Similarly, MacKerron (1992) 
argued that much of the nuclear data made public 
came from official nuclear agencies which tended to be 
positive about nuclear power. Certain assumptions, such 
as discount rates, could be too forgiving, and again the 
forecasts tended not to be informed by historical costs but 
to assume that ‘past problems are always solved and new 
problems will not emerge’ (Ibid.), i.e. substantial appraisal 
optimism anticipating significant cost savings compared 
to previous projects.
Appraisal realism
Despite the problems described above, some of the case 
studies did also demonstrate instances where earlier 
optimism and inaccuracy has been mitigated more 
recently by a greater recognition of the realities of cost 
forecasting. 
As already noted, early cost estimates of CCS projects, for 
example, tend to be more optimistic than later estimates 
due to simplified system designs and underestimating 
risks. More recently, with projects being defined in greater 
detail, estimates have been revised upwards (Jones 
2012a). Indeed, there has been a move to factoring in 
significantly higher contingency figures than was the case 
in the early 2000s, to reflect first-of-a-kind costs (EPRI 
2007). For instance, a revised cost estimate of CCS retrofit 
of Kårstø gas-fired power station in Norway factors in 
substantially higher contingency reserves than the initial 
cost estimate; this is in recognition that CCS investments 
are ‘mega-projects’ with substantial risks of cost overruns 
(Osmundsen and Emhjellen 2010). 
Similar considerations are noted with respect to nuclear. 
According to Parsons Brinckerhoff (2010), one reason that 
nuclear generation cost estimates in the UK rose 40% 
between 2008 and 2010 was because preparation for new 
nuclear plant construction resulted in a clearer picture 
of costs. Tendering for plant internationally meant that 
up-to-date cost data were more widely available thus 
enabling more realistic estimates.
The case study for onshore wind observes that, in the 
second half of the last decade, revised approaches to 
estimating costs become evident in the literature due to 
the failure of experience curves to adequately anticipate 
the cost challenges faced. A greater recognition of the 
uncertainties and contingencies of cost forecasts has 
become apparent, and scenario analysis is being used to 
help anticipate the impacts of differing macroeconomic, 
exogenous possibilities. In other words, there has been a 
greater appreciation that wind costs are not just driven 
by technical improvements but also affected by uncertain 
exogenous forces such as currency and commodity prices 
(Jones 2012b). 
In contrast, forecasts were accurately realised during 
the 1980s to mid-2000s because experience curves can 
effectively predict endogenous change and analysis 
suggests that during this period the key cost drivers 
for onshore wind were indeed endogenous rather than 
exogenous (Jones 2012b).
Technology and deployment immaturity
The maturity of a generating technology and the extent of 
its deployment can be significant factors in the process of 
projecting future costs. For example, PV experience curves 
are based on historical data for conventional silicon 
technologies and limited (or no) market data exists for 
emerging PV technologies, such as thin film or excitonic 
devices. CCS technologies have no market experience at 
all (although various components of a CCS system do), 
and similar difficulties are associated with various marine 
technologies and other emerging options. 
The PV case study also highlights the inability of 
experience curve analysis to anticipate discontinuities 
or step-changes in the learning rate. This may make 
experience curves inadequate for predicting cost trends 
in discontinuous technology fields such as PV where 
technological breakthroughs are expected to occur when 
novel technologies reach commercialisation  (Candelise 
2012). 
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The case studies illustrate the risks associated with 
‘borrowing’ data from seemingly analogous instances. In 
the case of offshore wind, with little primary data from 
which to construct experience curves, early forecasters 
borrowed and adapted learning rates from the historically 
more mature onshore wind experience (Greenacre et al. 
2010). However the cost components, and the availability 
and resulting load factors of onshore and offshore 
generation are different and a comparison of the two is 
not like for like. Moreover, the literature exhibits a wide 
variation in learning rates for onshore wind (Greenacre 
et al. 2010) and many different experience curves for 
onshore wind power have been presented over the years 
(e.g. Junginger et al. (2005); Neij (2008)). Various exogenous 
factors also overwhelmed any learning (see below). 
Thus, whilst the borrowing of data from the onshore 
wind experience was an understandable response to 
the relative infancy of offshore development in the early 
2000s, the evidence suggests that experience curve based 
analyses did not provide an accurate projection of costs 
from the mid-2000s onwards.
This issue is of current relevance to CCS forecasting. Cost 
projections for post-combustion gas CCS are mostly based 
on experience curve analysis, including the application of 
historical experience curves for flue gas desulphurisation 
(FGD) and selective catalytic reduction (SCR) (Jones 2012a). 
This approach of applying the historical learning rates of 
apparently analogous technologies to CCS might initially 
be considered apt since they too are pollution abatement 
technologies operating in the power sector (Watson et 
al. 2012), although some commentators, for example Rai 
et al. (2010), highlight the contingent nature of learning 
rates. Until there is empirical utility-scale experience of 
CCS it is perhaps too early to confirm the robustness of 
theses analogies.
One response to the lack of market data for nascent 
technologies is that in the early stages technical and 
engineering assessment should perhaps be favoured 
over the use of experience curves. It should be noted 
however that techno-engineering assessment can also 
be liable to significant error. For example, nuclear cost 
projections have, from the outset, been derived mainly 
from engineering/ technical assessment rather than 
from experience curves (Greenacre 2012a). This has 
not prevented some substantial discrepancies between 
forecasts and outcomes. Similarly, in the offshore wind 
sector, whilst the literature reviewed reveals limited 
evidence of engineering assessment analysis, here too 
estimates of the future costs of offshore wind tended 
to prove optimistic compared to the reality (Greenacre 
et al. 2010). Meanwhile in the PV sector, engineering 
assessments have been over-optimistic in assessing future 
costs up to the early 2000s, and have then underestimated 
cost reductions in the last decade (Candelise 2012). 
Assumptions, system boundaries and 
extrapolations
It is clear from the evidence that costs projections can 
differ considerably depending on a variety of omitted or 
included factors, and the differing assumptions about 
them. Many of these assumptions, such as judgements 
concerning discount rates and O&M costs, are relevant to 
each technology. Others are specific to only one or some 
of them.
Extrapolating historical trends is essential to forecast 
methodologies but also carries significant risks. 
Extrapolated experience curves, for example, are 
dependent on the assumed learning rates which in 
turn are defined by the historical period chosen for 
learning rate/progress ratio measurement. Likewise, such 
extrapolations, when time-based, are also dependent 
on assumptions regarding rates of deployment 
since learning rates by themselves simply describe 
a relationship between cost reduction and installed 
capacity. However, deployment rates can be highly 
uncertain (Rubin et al. 2007b). 
The PV case study observes that the extent and timing 
of future cost reduction is very sensitive to the estimated 
learning rate, which in turn is also affected by the 
underlying data used (the period and scope covered). 
Even small changes in learning rate can affect long-
term estimates of cost reductions, the market expansion 
needed to reach a given target cost, and the potential 
timing for such an achievement. Similarly, varying 
forecasts of future market growth affect the estimated 
timing for achieving a cost reduction target (Candelise 
2012). For example, Trancik and Zweibel (2006) estimated 
that the cost of thin film PV could reduce to between $0.5/
Wp and $0.7/Wp by the period 2016 to 2022 (assuming 
market growth rates that ranged from 30% to 70%). In 
reality, 0.7$/Wp is already very close to being achieved 
by thin film, i.e. much earlier than estimated due to high 
market growth rates (above 70% in 2010 (Mints 2011)).
System boundary choices can lead to confusion over the 
comparability of estimates. This is a particular issue for 
‘network’ options such as CCS. The Global CCS Institute 
(2011) suggests that the differing methodologies used for 
calculating CCS costs limits the comparability of different 
studies. For instance, it is striking that many of the papers 
reviewed did not factor in costs for CO2 transportation, 
storage and monitoring, instead focusing on CO2 capture 
only. As Rubin et al. (2007b) highlight, this omission can 
lead to differing conclusions about the relative total cost 
of different CCS technologies.
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However, system boundary issues also affect renewables; 
for example, whether grid extension and upgrading, 
and additional system balancing requirements are 
included. A wide range of other factors can be treated 
differently in different studies. These include whether 
costs are ‘overnight’ (see Chapter 2) or include interest 
during construction, choice of discount rate, load factor 
assumptions, and how O&M costs are accounted for. 
Price as a proxy for cost
Another problem for market based analysis is that of cost 
data versus price data. Equipment suppliers and installers 
tend to guard their design, construction, and operations 
costs closely such that it can be problematic constructing 
a time series for actual manufacturing costs. As a result, 
market conditions can affect perceptions of cost over time, 
which may be misleading if for example the market allows 
suppliers to extract excess profits, or indeed if oversupply 
leads to equipment being sold below cost price.
For example in the PV sector, experience curves generally 
use module prices as a proxy for their production 
costs. However, module price movements have varied 
considerably as a result of demand/supply conditions 
(Candelise 2012). For instance, substantial demand and 
profit margins in the second half of the 2000s drove 
high levels of investment in the PV sector (Jager-Waldau 
2006, Jager-Waldau 2008). However by 2010, production 
overcapacity led to a dramatic drop in global module prices. 
A not dissimilar situation has also been evident in the 
offshore wind sector during the late 2000s where the 
turbine market was dominated by Siemens and Vestas. 
Together, these two suppliers accounted for 98% of 
offshore turbines installed in the UK up to 2009 (Ernst 
& Young 2009). They may thus have been in a position 
to pass on high commodity and component costs to 
developers with relative ease. Again, the potential profit 
built into the price of turbines could periodically obscure 
the ‘true’ capital and levelised costs of offshore wind.
Due to commercial confidentiality industry analysts 
have generally accepted the practice of using prices 
as appropriate (Neij 2008). The pitfalls of this practice 
have been elucidated amongst others by the analysis of 
the Boston Consulting Group (1972) which highlighted 
that differences may occur between cost and price 
development in various intervals but also that sustained 
price reduction can reflect a true cost reduction for 
already established products. In the case of CCGT, one of 
the most comprehensive reviews applied the experience 
curve methodology using price data, and concluded that 
part of the price trajectory reflected the pricing strategy of 
the main providers to gain access to markets (Cleason and 
Cornland 2002, Neij 2008).
Compound learning systems
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is debate in the literature 
about the disaggregation of learning from ‘system’ level 
into component parts. Typically, in the formulation 
of learning rates for experience curves, a generating 
technology is viewed as one system with a single learning 
rate. This is a useful simplification of a more complex 
reality – that each technology is a compound system 
possessing the potential to be broken down into multiple 
sub-systems operating under distinct conditions, each 
with their own learning rates and resultant experience 
curves. This applies to all the technologies but in what 
follows we use PV and CCS as cases in point.
PV experience curves have been mainly developed for PV 
module costs, yet PV should more accurately be addressed 
as a compound learning system, accounting also for 
learning trajectories and cost reductions at the BOS level, 
which refers to all other system components and cost.
The PV case study argues that learning rates based on 
historical module trends cannot be applied to PV system 
learning nor can system level cost reductions be attributed 
to the learning and cost reductions of individual system/
hardware components. Rather, they are the result of 
the combined effect of several factors. In fact, there is 
relatively limited quantitative evidence on the drivers 
of cost reductions at BOS level, as most cost reductions 
efforts (and most research literature) have concentrated 
on the module (Candelise 2012). This situation reflects the 
following difficulties:
•	 BOS costs differ for different PV applications, e.g. grid-
connected versus off-grid and also between different 
grid-connected applications such as roof mounted, 
ground mounted, building-integrated (BIPV);
•	 There are wide regional differences in system designs 
and in implementation and installation, which makes 
cross-country comparison difficult;
•	 PV system cost reductions are affected by distinct 
conditions such as country specific market 
developments, and policy and regulatory environments. 
Thus, learning rates experienced in one country cannot 
be simply transposed to another one with a different 
regulatory and market context.
For these reasons reliable input data over a sufficiently 
long time period are not readily available for BOS, thus 
limiting the use of experience curves as both descriptors 
of past trends and as a forecasting tool for system level 
costs (Candelise 2012). 
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Some additional issues emerge from the CCS study. Here, 
the learning system can at the very least be viewed as a 
binary one, involving the underlying coal or gas plant as 
well as the CCS technology itself. However, the generating 
plants to which CCS will be fitted (with the exception of 
IGCC) are already technically mature which limits the 
scope for further improvement (Viebahn et al. 2007, Al-
Juaied and Whitmore 2009).
On the other hand, as already noted, the CCS technology 
as yet has no commercial track record on which to base 
future cost projections. Additionally, the case study 
observes that many of the exogenous and endogenous 
factors for CCS apply primarily to generating plant, 
whereas the methodological factors tend to apply to 
CCS technologies. It is important to make explicit this 
distinction between cost drivers affecting generating 
plant (which can be quantified with greater certainty) 
and drivers affecting CCS technology itself (which are 
less certain). The literature does not always make this 
distinction clear (Jones 2012a).
Variability of estimates and forecasts 
In addition to the gaps between expectations of cost and 
subsequent reality, the case studies demonstrate that 
both projections and actual outcome data are in any 
case subject to substantial variability at any given time. 
This can be due to a variety of reasons which may be 
categorised as inherent variation, imperfect knowledge, 
and additional methodological issues.
Inherent variation refers to the drivers of cost variability 
arising from the specifics of a project, in particular the 
design of the generating technology and/or system 
employed, fuel price where applicable, contractual/
financing arrangements, management performance, and 
the location of the project. All these bring distinct effects 
which, for any given year, can result in cost differences 
between seemingly similar projects, both projected and 
actual.
With CCS, for example, the choice of capture technology 
– post-combustion, pre-combustion or oxyfuel – 
significantly affects the cost profile of projects, as does 
the capture efficiency and project size (Chen and Rubin 
2009). More broadly, the specific financing arrangements 
associated with the project are crucial. Factors such as the 
cost of capital and the ability of the project developer to 
manage outgoings are also significant (Mott MacDonald 
2010, Simbeck and Beecy 2011).
Locational differences can also significantly affect CCS 
costs, as they can PV and wind costs. With CCS for 
example, geographical location substantially affects 
the transportation and storage options available – for 
instance, whether there is potential to reduce transport 
network costs through clustering with other CCS 
installations (Jones 2012a). The presence of a CO2 transport 
infrastructure can also reduce risk and therefore cost of 
capital (UK CCS CRTF 2013).
Moreover, the cost and type of fuel also varies significantly 
depending on location; for instance, levelised cost 
estimates for gas CCS in Saudi Arabia are relatively low 
due to cheap local natural gas supplies (WorleyParsons 
2009). Other locationally-differentiated drivers of costs 
variation are labour rates (WorleyParsons 2009); legal costs 
such as acquiring permits and licences; and national 
policies such as carbon taxes. The local characteristics 
of each particular market can also affect the cost of 
financing.
As previously mentioned, the variability in PV system 
prices can be due to differences in markets, system size 
and types, and countries. Prices tend to be higher in 
residential markets compared to medium size commercial 
systems and large utility-scale systems. They also differ 
across PV system types, with BIPV systems, for example, 
being more expensive than standard roof top applications 
(Candelise 2012).
Module prices also vary quite widely and the PV case 
study notes that a monthly survey of retail prices 
demonstrates significant variability according to 
the module technology, the module model and the 
manufacturer, its quality as well as the country in which 
the product is purchased. For example in March 2012 
average retail module prices were respectively $2.29 /Wp 
in US and €2.17€/Wp in Europe, but the lowest retail price 
for a crystalline silicon solar module was $1.1/Wp (€0.81/
Wp) and the lowest thin film module price was $0.84/Wp 
(€0.62/Wp) (Solarbuzz 2012).
In studying the methodological variability in forecasts for 
CCGT two aspects can be discerned. First, after the fuel 
shock prices in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s, forecasters 
started assigning a higher priority to fuel cost variability 
from 2005 onwards (Castillo Castillo 2012). Second, 
forecasters have chosen different methods to cope with 
this variability, which range from probability density 
functions of fuel cost influencing factors, through to 
borrowing from forward-market price projections or even 
just expert opinion. This is evidenced by the strikingly 
higher variability in forecast costs amongst post-2005 
forecasts relative to pre-2005 ones.
The nuclear case study also highlights several 
considerations regarding inherent variability in the cost 
data (Thomas 1988, Tolley and Jones 2004, MacKerron et al. 
2006, Harris et al. 2012). These include:
•	 costs vary with reactor technologies and estimates 
for the same technology can also differ, depending for 
example on whether first-of-a-kind (FOAK) or nth-of-a-
kind (NOAK) is assumed;
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•	 capital costs and costs of generation are country, 
region and regulatory environment specific – there 
have been substantial differences of performance in 
different countries and in different utilities within the 
same country where regions face different input costs, 
especially labour;
•	 actual or assumed construction time is highly 
significant – delays affect both construction costs 
(especially labour) and, in particular, financing; and
•	 also important are productivity variance including 
operating experience and other factors affecting load 
factors (see for example Gross et al. (2007))
The other drivers of variation in cost projections  
and estimates appear to reflect not real-life differences, 
but rather imperfect knowledge and other methodological 
issues. 
Imperfect knowledge applies inevitably to costs 
projections since forecasting the future carries intrinsic 
uncertainty. This is exacerbated currently in the case 
of CCS because it is not yet possible to verify estimates 
with empirical commercial-scale cost data (Jones 2012a). 
Although many of the technology components are mature, 
CCS as an integrated technology is itself immature, 
leading to high levels of uncertainty about performance 
(Giovanni and Richards 2010). 
Imperfect knowledge can also apply to ‘actual’ cost 
outcomes. As we have seen, costs are not always 
transparent to outside observers and price is not 
necessarily a satisfactory proxy. For example, Harris et al. 
(2012) point out that reactor costs are difficult to estimate 
due to the variety of commercial terms associated with 
a vendor’s quote and because of the lack of transparency 
behind the majority of published estimates. Indeed, as 
noted in Chapter 4 much of the data available in the 
literature are estimates from academic and governmental 
analysts and other industry observers –  i.e. what are 
presented as cost outcomes are not genuinely ‘actual’ but 
are in fact estimated (Greenacre 2012a). 
There are a number of additional methodological issues 
not already discussed in this sub-section which can also 
contribute to the variation in cost data expressed at any 
given time:
•	 inconsistency in cost estimates due to the presentation 
of the year to which an estimate applies – with some 
reports focusing on the commissioning date, others the 
date of first capital investment (Jones 2012a);
•	 unclear price base for estimates with different 
estimates sometimes denominated in prices of 
different years (MacKerron et al. 2006);
•	 use of sensitivity and scenario analysis which produces 
numerical ranges categorised, for example, as ‘high’, 
‘middle’ and ‘low’ or ‘worst case’ versus ‘best case’ 
(applicable to some of the data for all of the case 
studies).
5.3 Endogenous themes
As noted, endogenous themes examine cost issues 
which lie within the sphere of influence of the sectoral 
actors, both governmental and private sector. The case 
studies reveal a diversity of endogenous themes with 
the potential to impact the capital and/or levelised cost 
trajectories of the generating technologies reviewed and 
which can therefore either support or adversely affect the 
accuracy of future costs forecasting. Often the themes 
have a variety of aspects or sub-themes, each of which 
is exemplified by one or more of the technologies. The 
endogenous themes can be categorised as follows:
•	 Learning effects
•	 Barriers to learning
•	 Economies of scale
•	 Standardisation
•	 Country and market environment
•	 Policy environment
•	 Regulatory environment
•	 Physical environment
Learning effects
As we explored in Chapter 3, costs are typically expected 
to go down over time, in large part due to increasing 
returns to adoption which include various types of 
learning effects, in particular learning-by-researching 
and learning-by-doing. Furthermore, those technologies 
considered being at less mature stages of development 
and deployment will generally be thought to have more 
substantial learning and cost reduction potential. Thus, 
unless learning occurs at least to the extent assumed in a 
forecast, projections about future costs are likely to prove 
inaccurate , irrespective of the other factors that also 
influence them.
The case studies provide a variety of examples of learning 
and consequent cost reduction. In the onshore wind 
sector, for instance, rotor efficiency of turbines increased 
from 35-40% in the early 1980s to 48% in the mid-1990s 
(Neij 1999). Drive-trains were optimised, and improved 
understanding of how loads affect turbines led to more 
accurate calculations of the physical limits of materials 
resulting in a lower weight (BTM Consult 2001).
Learning – through research, spillover, and manufacturing 
– has played a key role in the falling cost trajectories seen 
in the PV sector. For example, as a result of research at the 
device level, the c-Si technologies have seen significant 
increases in both cell efficiency and power density of the 
module and a reduction in silicon consumption per Wp. 
An increase in cell efficiency of 1% is able to reduce cell 
costs per Wp by 5-7%. In the last five years, commercial 
module efficiency has improved from 12-14% in 2007 to 
13-16% in 2011 for average crystalline silicon modules, 
and from 15-17% to around 20% for the best performing 
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modules (EU PV Technology Platform 2007, EU PV 
Technology Platform 2011, Green et al. 2012). 
In addition, silicon usage in PV cells has been reduced 
thanks to innovation (in large part stimulated by the 
silicon shortage in the mid-2000s) that has allowed 
thinner wafers and improving efficiencies in wafer cutting 
(i.e. reducing wastage of material). A further significant 
factor is that, over the last decade, module production 
processes have become more automated, gradually 
moving away from batch processes towards in-line, high 
throughput, high yield processing (Candelise 2012). 
Learning and cost reduction in manufacturing PV 
BOS components have been less substantial than for 
modules, because BOS components are common, mass-
produced electrical and mechanical components with 
mature markets outside the solar industry. Nonetheless, 
incremental innovation in some BOS components has led 
to lower manufacturing costs, in particular for inverters 
which have experienced a learning rate in the 10% range 
(as measured over the period 1995 to 2002) (Schaeffer et 
al. 2004). In the US, a similar trend has been found for 
declining labour costs relating to installed PV systems 
(IPCC 2011). And in the UK, the rapid convergence of UK 
system prices to those in more developed PV markets also 
suggests knowledge spillovers across countries i.e. new 
countries and PV markets learning from other countries’ 
experiences (Schaeffer et al. 2004).
Learning via spillover has been a feature of PV crystalline 
silicon technologies which have benefited from the 
experience of the already mature semiconductor industry 
(Candelise 2012). It has also been a feature of the CCGT 
sector. For example, during the EEC and US restrictions on 
the use of CCGT generation in the 1970s and 80s, technical 
learning continued because improvements in aero engine 
technology continued apace (Winskel 2002). Earlier, in the 
materials field, the use of supercharger turbines in the 
late 1950s led to a demand for materials with improved 
thermal and mechanical properties (Castillo Castillo 
2012). This, combined with the use of aeronautical turbo-
superchargers, resulted in the requirement for, and 
further development of, new alloys (Islas 1999) which have 
benefited CCGT technology. 
Indeed, differences in scale and the continuous operation 
requirements applicable to CCGT meant that, rather than 
overall design or functionality, it was mainly the advances 
in fluid dynamics, materials, techniques for calculation, 
experimentation and manufacturing that eventually 
benefited CCGT (Islas 1999). In terms of material science, 
evolution in crystallography took place over several 
decades and by the mid-1980s the crucial materials had 
evolved into new alloys suitable for superchargers. The 
evolution went from super alloys to directed super alloys 
and eventually to re-crystallised super alloys (Islas 1999). 
Learning effects in the CCGT sector continued during the 
1980s and much of the 90s, the principal characteristic 
being the impressive technical progress of the industrial 
gas turbine, in particular the achievement of major 
temperature and efficiency increases. For example, 
in the case of Siemens gas turbines, the turbine inlet 
temperatures rose from 990°C to almost 1250°C and the 
combined cycle efficiency from 45% to 55% (Islas 1999). 
Learning and innovation have continued since then such 
that combined cycle power plants currently achieve 
efficiencies approaching 60% (Castillo Castillo 2012).
Finally, even in the case of nuclear, where costs (at least in 
most OECD countries) have shown a greater tendency to 
increase than decrease, there is evidence of cost reduction 
from learning-by-doing. In France for example, one of 
the likely benefits of the standardisation of design that 
characterised much of the national nuclear programme 
was learning-by-repeated-doing and an avoidance of too 
much ‘reinventing the wheel’. It is suggested that this 
standardisation contributed to a reduction in capital costs 
of 10-15% (Grubler 2010).  
Problems with learning 
It is clear from the case studies reviewed in Chapter 4 and 
the wider review of learning in Chapter 3 that there is a 
large weight of empirical evidence that demonstrates that 
learning can occur. However, this does not demonstrate 
that it is inevitable. As we discuss in the third part of this 
chapter it can be overwhelmed. Moreover, the rate of 
learning varies between technologies and across time/
technological maturity. This has important implications 
for the accuracy of technology cost forecasting. 
The technical and production maturity of a generating 
technology and the extent of its deployment are 
critical to on-going learning. Thus it is argued that 
the more mature and developed the technology, the 
less opportunity and potential there exists for further 
learning and innovation. According to Mott MacDonald 
(2010), for example the scope for further endogenous 
learning in the onshore wind sector is recognised as being 
limited, since onshore wind is now perceived to be a 
relatively mature technology. Indeed, of the nine drivers 
of onshore wind cost considered in GL Garrad Hassan 
(2010), ‘scale, learning and innovation’ is assigned the 
lowest magnitude. Similarly, CCGT is a relatively mature 
technology which is approaching the boundaries of 
thermodynamically feasible efficiency gains. This maturity 
limits the scope for significant additional learning and 
by extension, the same applies to CCS in respect of the 
underlying gas or coal plant (with the exception of IGCC) 
(Viebahn et al. 2007, Al-Juaied and Whitmore 2009).
Whilst relatively immature technologies have considerable 
potential for learning and innovation, it can nonetheless 
take time to reap the benefits and for cost reductions to 
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be realised. Potentially, this applies especially to CCS and 
arguably still to offshore wind. As Rubin et al. (2007b) point 
out, there is historical precedent for technologies deployed 
in the power sector to demonstrate cost increases during 
early commercialisation, before costs fall. And as we 
discuss in the preceding sub-section, learning rates 
can change, extrapolations may be inaccurate and a 
generalised expectation of cost reduction or evidence 
of learning in a particular technology, is not always 
sufficient to make accurate cost forecasts within any 
particular time horizon. 
The nuclear case study shows that there are additional 
ways in which learning may be compromised or 
even reversed. In the 1970s and 80s, the rapid rate of 
deployment of nuclear plant and frequent changes in 
design hampered the industry’s ability to apply learning 
from earlier projects to later ones because projects 
were running simultaneously, albeit at different stages 
(MacKerron 1992, Rai et al. 2010).
Moreover, Neij (2008) points out that nuclear plants 
are individually designed and built according to local 
conditions which restricts the opportunities for cost 
reduction related to experience. Experience sharing 
and spillover have been limited by design diversity and 
customisation as well as being undermined by long lead 
times in planning, construction and commissioning 
periods (Thomas 1988). This was particularly the case 
in France when the industry introduced a new French 
design that did not easily allow learning spillovers in 
design or construction (Greenacre 2012a). It was also a 
feature of the US nuclear industry in the 1970s which, 
despite the unstable regulatory environment, saw a rapid 
growth rate in deployment characterised by competitive 
reactor pricing coupled with optimistic cost projections 
(MacKerron 1992, Rai et al. 2010). The result was that 
manufacturers frequently changed reactor designs, not 
only in response to regulatory pressures but also in order 
to offer customers increased generating capacities. In 
the US during this time, over 50 utilities began separate 
procurement programmes involving at least 6 vendors, 
20 architects/engineers, and 26 construction contractors. 
The result was 110 plants, most having unique design and 
operating characteristics (Rai et al. 2010). 
Over and above this, the sheer complexities of reactor 
design and construction in general may also have limited 
the pace of learning or possibly even reversed it (Grubler 
2009). Economies of scale, argues MacKerron (1992), 
have proved elusive because complexity has increased 
disproportionately as reactor capacity has grown. Indeed, 
MacKerron argues that the single most important cause of 
increases in capital costs during the period from the 1960s 
to the 1980s was the growing complexity of nuclear plants.
One further aspect to consider regarding the potential 
difficulties with learning is what may be termed 
‘knowledge obsolescence’ or ‘organisational forgetting’ 
where long lived technologies are commissioned on a 
multi-decadal cycle. Grubler (2010) argues that these 
problems exemplify how knowledge obsolescence 
has resulted from an extended period of no nuclear 
construction experience. Or, as Tolley and Jones (2004) puts 
it, “if construction is sporadic, learning effects will suffer”.
Economies of scale
Scale economies arising variously at the unit, 
manufacturing and deployment level contribute to capital 
and levelised cost reductions and together form part of 
the ‘returns to adoption’ that forecasters would expect to 
occur over time. 
In the wind sector, upscaling of unit size has been 
an important factor. Commenting on offshore wind, 
Milborrow (2003) anticipated cost reductions both from 
economies of unit scale as well as from technological 
improvements – a reasonable expectation given that 
onshore wind turbine upscaling had delivered substantial 
cost reductions throughout 1980s to mid-1990s. The 
average size of onshore wind turbines installed in 
Denmark, for example, increased from 71 kW in 1985 to 
523 kW in 1996 (EC 1999). The larger the machines the 
fewer are required for a given capacity. This brings savings 
in site costs (thus driving down capex) and in operation 
and maintenance costs (thus driving down levelised costs) 
(European Commission, 1999). Also larger turbines, with 
taller towers tend to capture more wind. This results in 
increased generation and thus lower LCOE (Lako 2002). 
Average installed onshore turbine size in the US rose 
from 0.9MW in 2001 to nearly 1.7MW in 2008 (EWEA 
2009, Bolinger and Wiser 2011) . Whilst this increased 
size led to increased wind turbine prices on a £/MW basis 
(since mass scales more rapidly than height, with towers 
needing to be wider to support the extra height) (Bolinger 
and Wiser 2011), the impact of increasing wind turbine 
costs on capex costs is mitigated to a certain extent by 
decreased balance of plant costs. Again, the effect on 
LCOE is further mitigated by the higher capacity factors of 
larger, taller turbines (Bolinger and Wiser 2011).
Economies of scale at the manufacturing level have 
been evident in the onshore wind sector (Bellarmine 
and Urquhart 1996) and especially so in the PV industry. 
Here, the size of module plants has played an important 
role in reducing costs, and the last decade has seen a 
dramatic increase in PV production capacity and average 
plant size. In 2007, average plant size was c.100MWp/y 
but this has increased to the 500-1000MWp/y range or 
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even more. Meanwhile, thin film PV is considered to have 
major potential for cost reductions assuming expected 
increases in production facility sizes (and efficiencies) 
are realised (Woodcock et al. 1997, Zweibel 2000, Chopra 
et al. 2004, Zweibel 2005, Hegedus 2006, EU PV Technology 
Platform 2007, EU PV Technology Platform 2011). Indeed, 
the capacities of thin film (CdTe) PV manufacturing 
facilities have already reached the MW range and thin film 
modules are currently the least expensive to manufacture. 
For instance, thin film modules have been produced at 
a cost of $0.74/Wp by First Solar, a company which has 
managed to increase production capacity from 25 MW in 
2005 to over 2 GW in 2011 (First Solar 2011).
PV, along with wind, can also benefit from economies of 
deployment scale, allowing certain fixed costs to be spread 
over greater project size. Moreover with CCS, it has been 
suggested that economies of scale in the deployment 
of CCS may be available from a clustered pipeline/
transportation network (Jones 2012a).
Nevertheless there is some evidence that economies 
of scale do not always deliver the cost reductions 
expected. So-called ‘mega-projects’ have a unit size and 
complexity that may carry intrinsic diseconomies of 
scale. For example in the mid-1960s, the nuclear industry 
scaled average reactor capacity up from 400-500 MW to 
about 800MW. Then, before these were even completed, 
developers began constructing 1100 MW capacity reactors. 
The logic was that economies of scale would bring costs 
down, but in reality the frequently changing designs 
precluded the standardisation that might otherwise have 
led to economies of scale and replication (MacKerron 
1992, Rai et al. 2010). As we have seen, it also led to 
diseconomies of scale arising from increased complexity, 
lower morale and productivity (due to lengthening 
construction horizons), and greater demands on 
management (Cantor and Hewlett 1988). 
One of the potential results of project complexity 
or design change is to prolong lead times and cause 
substantial delay. For example, NEA (2000) observes that 
US nuclear plants built before 1979 took an average of five 
years to build and license whilst those built post-Three 
Mile Island averaged almost 12 years. In the latter cases, 
financing and other time-related cost escalations could 
represent as much as half the total cost (Spangler 1983, 
NEA 2000).
According to Cohen (1990), US construction times 
increased from 7 years in 1971 to 12 years in 1980 which, 
combined with the increase in labour and materials 
costs, contributed to a quadrupling of capex. Meanwhile, 
Thomas (1988) notes a clear statistical trend in Germany 
between 1967 and 1977 towards longer construction 
periods and higher costs. The predominant explanation 
is the interaction of regulatory and technical factors, 
especially reactor type. Similarly, Grubler (2010) argues 
that in France the move towards a new French reactor 
design in the 1980s caused lengthening construction 
times and consequent cost escalations.
The experience of non-OECD nuclear build during the 
1990s provides a striking contrast. Tolley and Jones (2004) 
observed that the plants in construction since the early 
1990s - mostly Asian - were built more quickly than in 
the US and in France, and with less cost variability. Up to 
the late 1970s when the last US plant began construction, 
the average construction time in the US was (according 
to Tolley and Jones) nearly ten years. For plants beginning 
construction between 1993 and 2001 (i.e. in non-OECD 
countries), the global average was just over five years 
and the nuclear case study shows that during this period 
estimates of contemporary costs were falling significantly.
Economies of scale, argues MacKerron (1992), have proved 
elusive because complexity in particular has increased 
disproportionately as reactor capacity has grown. In 
addition, the large-scale, often one-off nature of nuclear 
power plants makes it much more difficult to achieve 
the lower costs associated with manufacturing many 
(smaller scale) units of the same type, as in the case of 
PV (Koomey and Hultman 2007). However the impact 
of such diseconomies may be lessened in cases where 
multiple reactors are built simultaneously on the same 
site (Greenacre 2012a).
The diseconomies problem experienced in the nuclear 
sector may be a special case though it remains to be 
seen whether coal- or CCGT-CCS will encounter the 
same difficulties. It is also worth noting that there is an 
important difference in evolution between CCGT and 
coal-fired and nuclear generation. The latter two tend to 
embody historical values typical of very large-scale plant 
such as security of fuel supply, protection of the domestic 
industry, pursuit of scale economies.
In contrast, CCGT was developed within a different 
international industry context. It is associated with 
different values such as low capital intensity, far shorter 
lead-times, competitiveness in small units (Winskel 2002). 
In fact, the absence of significant economies of scale in gas 
turbines makes it possible to use smaller-scale modular 
units without their competitive position being undermined 
by larger scale plants (Islas 1999).  The implication of this 
is that the growing complexity of coal and nuclear power 
plants, which has introduced “great rigidity into electricity 
systems and serious diseconomies affecting production 
costs” (Hirsh 1989), does not apply to CCGT. 
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To summarise, it would seem that the degree of 
opportunity for different forms of scale economy is highly 
technology-specific, historically bounded and cannot 
simply be assumed across the board. As with learning 
effects, scale effects can lead to cost reductions, but 
extrapolation needs to be undertaken with considerable 
care. 
Standardisation or customisation
A theme closely related to the issue of scale economies is 
that of standardisation (and its converse, customisation). 
PV module manufacturing, of course, has benefited greatly 
from standardisation but so too has BOS component 
manufacture. Here, higher volumes of production, 
economies of scale, and a shift of system assembly from 
the field to the factory have all helped to reduce cost 
(Candelise 2012).
The earlier years of nuclear experience, on the other 
hand, illustrates the downside of a relative lack 
of standardisation. Frequently changing reactor 
designs (predominantly due to competition strategies 
and response to regulation) have precluded the 
standardisation that might otherwise have led to 
economies of scale and replication (MacKerron 1992, 
Rai et al. 2010). In France, Grubler (2010) attributes the 
worst of the cost escalation to a gradual erosion of 
standardisation and instead trying to upsize and modify 
the nuclear reactor design late on in the programme. 
This involved replacing the 900-1300 MW Pressurised 
Water Reactor (PWR) designs that had been relied upon 
for the majority of the programme with 1500 MW N4 
reactors. The result was an endogenously-driven “negative 
learning process” due to inadequate standardisation and 
additional learning and FOAK costs. Moreover, Neij (2008) 
points out that nuclear plants are individually designed 
and built according to local conditions which restricts the 
opportunities for cost reduction related to standardised 
experience. Experience sharing and spillover have thus 
been limited by design diversity and customisation 
(Thomas 1988). 
By contrast, the downwards cost trajectory for nuclear 
build in the 1990s and early 2000s results in part from 
increasing standardisation. For example, until late in 
France’s programme the deployment of nuclear power 
relied on only three standard designs which were 
reproduced at different locations to enable cost savings 
(Grubler 2010). Globally, there has been a growing 
dominance of the light water reactor (LWR) design, and 
especially the pressurised water reactor (PWR) variant. 
Worldwide (excluding the then Soviet Union), of the 
more than 100 reactors under construction  in 1986 and 
therefore completed in the 1990s, 80% were LWRs and this 
pattern of increasing standardisation has since continued 
(Kern 2011).
Supply chain and market dynamics
Market supply and demand conditions are also a key 
endogenous theme albeit one with exogenous aspects as 
well. The case studies demonstrate that in circumstances 
where this puts upward pressure on costs we can make a 
distinction between supply chain bottlenecks and market 
competition issues.
Bottlenecks are the result of demand growth and a 
lack of adequate supply response, whether with regard 
to materials, components, specific skills or labour. 
Competition issues arise when there are only a limited 
number of companies in a particular market thus allowing 
the potential exercise of oligopolistic power. 
Regarding this latter point, in the case of UK offshore wind 
we have already noted the possible impact on competition 
given the limited number of companies engaged in 
turbine manufacturing for the offshore industry (BWEA 
2008, Carbon Trust 2008, Ernst & Young 2009, RAB 2009).
A related factor is that offshore turbines so far occupy a 
small niche relative to onshore turbine markets and it 
is understandable that a ‘niche premium’ would in any 
case attach to the offshore market (Greenacre et al. 2010). 
A not dissimilar situation currently exists in the nuclear 
industry where there are only two companies – Japan 
Steel Works and Creusot Forge in France – that have the 
forging capacity to create the largest components for 
nuclear plants (Grimston 2012b).
Turning to supply chain bottlenecks, several of the case 
studies examine the effects of input constraints giving rise 
to a so-called congestion premium. For example, in the 
mid- to late 2000s, supply chain constraints in the onshore 
wind industry contributed to escalating capex prices 
although the congestion premium has since reduced 
(Mott MacDonald 2010, Mott MacDonald 2011).
Shortages were experienced for a range of components 
such as bearings, generators, hubs and main shafts (de 
Vries 2008) and the problem was particularly pronounced 
for gearboxes (Blanco 2009). Bottlenecks were experienced 
by both turbine manufacturers and sub-contractors, and 
were compounded by difficulties in obtaining construction 
equipment (de Vries 2008, EWEA 2009).
A key cause of such bottlenecks was the boom in demand 
for wind turbines in North America particularly due to the 
US Production Tax Credit (PTC), and also in Europe and 
Asia (Blanco 2009, EWEA 2009, GL Garrad Hassan 2010). As 
such, there was insufficient turbine production to meet 
this strong demand (IEA 2006). In addition, Bolinger and 
Wiser (2011) suggest that tight supply and the rapid pace 
of deployment also had the effect of causing short-term 
increases in labour costs as the supply of available labour 
struggled to keep up with demand.
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Competition in the onshore sector had a knock-
on effect on the offshore sector, delaying European 
projects and forcing up prices Gordon (2006). Indeed, 
Douglas-Westwood Limited (2008) reported that the 
combination of a strong market and constrained supply 
drove onshore turbine prices upwards by 30% between 
2006 and 2008. Offshore turbines are usually marinised 
versions of onshore ones and by 2007 turbine supply was 
the dominant bottleneck. The UK offshore sector was 
squeezed by onshore turbine demand from China, India, 
and elsewhere in Europe as well as by a US market fuelled 
by the PTC (BVG Associates 2007), and the situation may 
have been exacerbated by the oligopolistic nature of the 
UK offshore turbine market (see earlier comment in this 
sub-section). 
In the nuclear industry, strong demand for generation 
plant over recent years has resulted in supply chain 
issues, longer delivery times, and cost increases 
as manufacturers have struggled to meet demand. 
Nuclear plant operators have also been competing 
with oil, petrochemical and steel companies for access 
to resources. Thus, as with the two competing wind 
industries, both competition from within the sector and 
with associated industries has been a cost escalator and 
is likely to further increase costs and delays if worldwide 
nuclear activity expands (Grimston 2012b). 
In the CCGT sector supply chain bottlenecks over 
recent years have significantly increased engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) prices. Full order 
books for vendors and manufacturing capacity constraints 
have increased prices for plant components (Mott 
MacDonald 2010), and caused delivery delays that have 
increased project financing costs (Chupka and Basheda 
2007). Granted, these bottlenecks have affected the price 
of the underlying generating plant rather than that of CCS 
technology itself, nonetheless this market congestion has 
led to an increase in overall price estimates for CCS-fitted 
power plants. In particular, since advanced supercritical 
coal plants have been particularly vulnerable to supply 
chain bottlenecks, the effect on post-combustion coal CCS 
projections has been especially pronounced. Indeed, Mott 
MacDonald ( 2010) suggested a congestion premium of 
almost 17% on top of estimated 2010 capex. 
Turning to PV, as with the US PTC’s effect on the wind 
industry, so too national policies have impacted the PV 
sector. In the mid-2000s, demand pull policies – primarily 
Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) were implemented in key European 
countries such as Germany and Spain. The resultant 
sudden increase in demand for PV modules caused a 
serious supply chain bottleneck in the form of a silicon 
feedstock shortage (Candelise 2012). This caused silicon 
spot prices to go up from $50/kg to over $500/kg in 2008 
(Flynn 2009), increasing PV production costs and leading 
to an inversion in the historical module price reduction 
trends. 
However, there has been a dramatic drop in prices in the 
last two years. In response to the supply shortage, new 
investments in feedstock production (as well as increased 
R&D efforts) led to production capacity expansion which 
eventually created oversupply in the silicon feedstock 
market. This has pushed silicon prices downwards (spot 
prices were around $35/kg in late 2011 (Campbell 2012, 
Iken 2012)) and has been a driver of the dramatic module 
price drop experienced in the last couple of years whereby 
average c-Si module prices have fallen by more than 45% 
from mid-2010 to March 2012 (Solarbuzz 2012).
Supply chain bottlenecks may not only be confined to 
key components and resources. As the nuclear case 
study demonstrates, specific skills shortages have on 
occasion helped to push up costs as well. We treat this 
as an endogenous factor since it is arguably within 
the powers of the vendors and utilities to address the 
problem through more training. In the 1970s, the growth 
in reactor orders created a skills shortage in the US 
(Thomas 1988). More recently a skilled labour shortage 
worldwide has again been a factor in causing cost 
estimates for major construction projects to rise. In North 
America, for example, skills shortages in both nuclear 
design and construction personnel have been expected 
to delay construction schedules and drive up projected 
costs (Ahearne 2011; Grimston 2012b). Meanwhile, in 
the UK, skills shortages have been highlighted for some 
time. A 2006 report from the UK Trade and Industry 
Select Committee suggested that new build programmes 
worldwide, particularly in Asia, would result in the 
relatively small UK market facing stiff competition for 
skills from other countries (HoC 2006). At the EU level, it 
has been estimated that demand for skilled labour will 
increase by up to 170% by 2018 if all planned new nuclear 
builds were to be built (Kruse et al. 2010).
Similarly, in the onshore wind sector the necessity to 
have a dedicated supply chain for each new and larger 
turbine power rating had the effect of causing short-term 
increases in labour costs as the supply of labour struggled 
to keep up with demand (Bolinger and Wiser 2011). 
This shortage of labour in the onshore wind sector was 
exacerbated by the rapid rate of deployment, something 
that the case studies show can have conflicting effects.
In the medium to longer term, greater deployment 
should lead to lower costs. In the shorter term however, 
it can lead to temporary upward pressure on costs as 
was the case in the PV sector, and also in the nuclear 
industry during the 1970s and 1980s when the rapid rate 
of deployment put considerable pressure on contractors 
who until then had little experience in the business 
(MacKerron 1992, Rai et al. 2010). Thus, technology roll-
out runs the risk that excessive rapidity and scale of 
deployment may result in supply chain bottlenecks and 
a consequent congestion premium. The CCS case study 
cautions that this is a phenomenon that is sometimes 
overlooked by future costs forecasters.
Presenting the Future: An assessment of future costs estimation methodologies 
in the electricity generation sector
67
Regulatory environment
Regulatory conditions are potentially relevant to costs 
and cost forecasting for all the generating technologies 
but have been particularly applicable in the wind sectors 
(in the UK) and especially in the nuclear industry. In the 
future, they are likely to be highly relevant to CCS as well.
In both the on and offshore wind sectors, for example, 
planning consent issues in the UK have proved 
problematic. By the early 2000s the planning process for 
UK onshore wind projects was emerging as a major factor 
limiting the rate of deployment. The difficulties and costs 
experienced by many onshore developers in gaining 
planning permission stemmed from concerns amongst 
local communities about the impact of wind turbine siting 
(PIU 2002b). Moreover, one of the effects of this was to 
stimulate the move offshore as it became clear that the 
offshore option offered the potential for greater public 
acceptability, chiefly because of the lower visual impact 
(PIU 2002a). This in turn meant that it would be possible 
to build much larger turbines than might be acceptable on 
land (DTI 2002a). 
However, regulatory burden also then impacted UK 
offshore development. Consent delays affected UK 
Rounds 1 and 2 such that the typical timeline for a large 
UK project is estimated to be between seven and nine 
years, in large part due to the complexity of the planning 
process. This has put pressure on project finance and 
recoupment, and has also placed strain on the supply 
chain since lengthy delays undermine confidence 
(Greenacre et al. 2010).
Problems in the wind sectors have nevertheless been 
dwarfed by the regulatory burdens experienced by the 
nuclear industry. Over several decades, many analysts 
and commentators have observed that the escalation in 
costs from the start of commercial reactor construction 
in the mid-1960s through to the late 1980s in large 
measure stems from the endogenous effects of an 
unstable, changing regulatory environment (see, for 
example, Cantor and Hewlett (1988); Hultman et al. (2007); 
Neij (2008); Rai et al. (2010). This has been especially 
apparent in the US to which much of the evidence and 
cost data refers. In large part, this reflects the fact that, 
due to concerns about accident and waste disposal 
(and also proliferation), nuclear power is in a different 
safety category than other generating technologies (CCS 
notwithstanding, which is addressed below).
By the late 1960s nuclear safety and waste disposal was 
the subject of increasing public focus and had become a 
predominant theme for the environmental movement (Rai 
et al. 2010). Direct action, political lobbying and the use 
of legal action introduced major delays into projects and 
interrupted operations (Grimston 2012b). In large part this 
fostered an unstable regulatory climate in which the rules 
kept changing in apparently arbitrary ways (MacKerron 
1992). Public and political opposition to nuclear power 
continued to grow through the 1970s and 1980s and 
whilst there was already an underlying pressure for 
more stringent regulation, a number of crises increased 
the uncertainty and upward pressure on nuclear costs 
(Grubler 2010, Grimston 2012b). In the US, these were the 
1975 Browns Ferry incident and the 1979 Three Mile Island 
accident, and later in the Ukraine, the 1986 Chernobyl 
explosion. 
The consequence of all this was the repeated call for 
design changes, with regulators demanding more safety 
features in such areas as fire protection and seismic 
criteria (NEA 2000). In many cases these had to be back-
fitted after construction had already begun causing 
additional material, equipment and labour costs, together 
with significant delays, which added to the costs of 
finance (Tolley and Jones 2004, Rai et al. 2010, Grimston 
2012b). According to Tolley and Jones (2004), regulation 
was responsible for a 69.2% increase in capital costs from 
1967 to 1974 and may have resulted in approximately a 
15% per annum increase in plant costs during the 1970s 
and 1980s (with the caveat that other effects may have 
been contributing as well). 
A contrasting example of the effects of regulation is 
provided by the declining costs experience between 1990 
and the mid-2000s when nuclear project activity dried up 
in the west but was taken up in a number of non-OECD 
countries. Along with lower input costs, the likely drivers 
behind these cost reductions included a less stringent, 
cost-forcing regulatory environment in Eastern Europe 
and Asia which also resulted in significantly shorter 
project durations. In addition, these non-OECD countries 
showed a greater incidence of command-and-control type 
economies which were likely to ensure stable electricity 
prices and therefore lowered the risk premium on capital 
financing (Grimston 2012a).
Regarding the estimation of future costs, it is not difficult in 
principle for forecasters to acknowledge the importance of 
the regulatory environment on costs. However, envisaging 
exactly how the effects might play out over-time and how 
they should be quantified is much more difficult. 
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Policy environment 
Government policy can have both positive and (at 
least temporary) detrimental effects on a generating 
technology’s deployment and cost trajectory. In the UK 
for example, both on and offshore wind deployment has 
benefited from the introduction in 2002 of the Renewables 
Obligation, a certificate trading scheme that places a 
mandatory requirement on electricity suppliers to source 
an increasing proportion of electricity from renewables 
(see for example (DTI 2007)).
In the CCGT sector, the privatisation of the UK’s electricity 
supply industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s was 
a critical driver of the so-called ‘dash for gas’ which 
contributed to deployment, learning, and resultant 
cost reductions (Castillo Castillo 2012). By contrast, 
the policies that restricted the use of natural gas for 
power generation had a significant negative impact on 
deployment rates and contributed  to the decoupling 
of the efficiency improvement trajectory from that of 
generation costs. The temporarily restrictive policies were, 
in Europe, the Directive 75/404/EEC on the restriction of 
the use of natural gas in power stations, and, in the US, 
the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978. The 
former was removed in 1991 and the latter in 1987, see 
Castillo Castillo (2012).
Meanwhile, the PV sector has benefited from policy 
incentives implemented in key countries such that 
worldwide installed capacity has grown from 1.4GW 
in 2000 to over 67GW in 2011 (EPIA 2012). This policy-
driven market growth has triggered significant module 
price reductions, with especially dramatic price drops 
in the last couple of years. In Germany, policy support 
was introduced in the mid-2000s via Feed-in Tariff (FiT) 
schemes in conjunction with ‘soft loan’ schemes to 
stimulate demand. Similarly, Italy first implemented 
FiTs in 2006 and started experiencing a major market 
expansion in 2008 to become the world’s largest PV 
market in 2011. In the UK the recent introduction of 
a FiT scheme has stimulated its PV market leading 
to a substantial increase in installed capacity since 
its implementation in April 2010. The result has been 
considerable reductions in UK system costs  
(Candelise 2012).
The downside of such policies is the risk of creating a 
supply chain bottleneck with a consequent congestion 
premium. For example, the sudden increase in demand 
for PV modules due to demand pull policies created an 
acute silicon feedstock shortage, increasing production 
costs and leading to an inversion in the historical trend of 
module price reduction (Candelise 2012). See also earlier 
sub-section on ‘supply chain and market dynamics’. 
As with the overall regulatory environment, the challenge 
for costs forecasters is to envisage how the effects of 
policy intervention might play out over time, and to 
estimate both the quantitative impact of policy on costs 
and the likely duration of potential bottlenecks.
5.4 Exogenous themes
As noted, exogenous themes address those cost issues 
that are largely beyond the ability of either the actors 
involved in a generating technology or policymakers 
more generally to influence or mitigate them. The six 
case studies consider a variety of exogenous themes 
with the potential to impact capital and/or levelised cost 
trajectories and which therefore tend to adversely affect 
the accuracy of future costs forecasting. We categorise 
these exogenous themes as follows:
•	 Commodity prices 
•	 Labour costs
•	 Interest rates & financing costs
•	 Exchange rates
•	 Exogenous policy effects
Commodity prices
In the period from the mid-2000s until around 2010, rising 
commodity prices pushed up the capital and levelised 
costs of all the generating technologies with the exception 
of solar PV. Largely unanticipated by costs forecasters 
prior to this period, the cost escalation of essential raw 
materials contributed greatly to disparities between 
earlier cost projections and actual outcomes.
In both wind sectors, increases in steel, copper, and 
cement prices have been one of the principal drivers of 
rising costs. For onshore wind turbines, the steel used in 
towers, gearboxes and rotors, constitutes around c.65-80% 
of total turbine mass (Blanco 2009, Bolinger and Wiser 
2011) whilst copper is used in generators and cables, and 
cement is used in onshore foundations (Blanco 2009). In 
the offshore sector, steel typically accounts for around 
12% of total project cost (BWEA and Garrad Hassan 2009). 
From 2002 to 2007 the global steel index experienced 
growth of 47% CAGR (Ernst & Young 2009) and as a result 
the increase in steel prices was a contributing factor to 
offshore turbine and tower costs rising from £0.9 million 
to £1.5 million/MW (a 67% increase) in five years (RAB 
2009). Steel price rises played an even greater role in the 
escalating costs of foundations which increased from 
around £250,000 to £700,000/MW (a 180% increase) over 
the five years to 2009 (Ernst & Young 2009). The cost of 
other relevant commodities, such as copper and cement, 
also increased and analysis by The Carbon Trust in 2008 
suggested that if commodity and materials prices were 
to return to 2003 levels, overall offshore wind power costs 
would have fallen by 11% (Carbon Trust 2008).
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Similarly, commodity price volatility has impacted nuclear 
capex, CCGT capex, and also the cost projections for 
CCS (though largely because of the increased costs of 
constructing coal- and gas-fired power plants rather than 
specifically CCS technology) (Davison and Thambimuthu 
2009, Harris et al. 2012). The different generating 
technologies are, of course, not only competing with each 
other for raw materials such as steel and cement but also 
with other industries. In addition to the direct cost effects, 
power plant constructors may have also had to suffer 
delivery delays which pushes up indirect costs such as 
financing (Grimston 2012b). 
Since the economic downturn, commodity prices have 
declined (DoE/NETL, 2010). In 2008, the steel index fell 
by 58% returning to the long-term historic trend, and 
the commodity prices index fell by 5% CAGR, although 
it remained substantially above the historical trend line 
(Ernst & Young 2009). Nevertheless, despite the price 
declines, there is a time lag before they feed through to 
benefit capex costs (Wiser and Bolinger 2009). For fossil 
fuel technologies, fuel price fluctuations also have a 
substantial impact on costs. 
The levelised costs of CCGT and the estimates for coal 
and gas CCS are highly sensitive to fuel prices (Mott 
MacDonald 2010).With CCGT, levelised costs depend 
very heavily on the trajectory of gas prices, moreover 
underlying gas prices from different sources can vary 
considerably even for the same year (Castillo Castillo 
2012). Levelised cost estimates for CCS are also contingent 
upon future gas or coal prices (Davison and Thambimuthu 
2009). The case studies indicate that fuel price escalations 
were not anticipated prior to their emergence in the early 
2000s. They represent a particularly profound confounding 
variable in analysis of the future cost of energy from CCGT 
plant, with or without CCS. 
Labour costs
Fluctuations in general labour costs (as opposed to specific 
endogenous skills shortages) can also contribute to the 
challenge of accurate forecasting. A case in point is the 
nuclear industry where increases in labour costs were 
one of the factors that caused capex to quadruple in the 
US between 1971 and 1980 (Cohen 1990). In the period 
1976 to 1988, nuclear costs increased at an average rate 
of 13.6% per annum compounded whilst labour costs 
increased 18.7% and materials costs only 7.7% (Cohen 
1990). Conversely, during the 1990s and early 2000s when 
nuclear costs were falling, a significant cause of this was 
lower input costs – especially labour costs – due in part to 
a slowing down of the world economy and also the shift 
of nuclear construction to the cheaper labour markets of 
Asia and eastern Europe (Grimston 2012a).
It is also possible that labour costs across countries 
may not be fully factored into analysis of trends. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s, for example, nuclear cost 
projections in OECD countries were falling along with 
the estimated outcomes from non-OECD countries. 
Assumptions about costs within the developed countries 
where little or no construction was occurring were likely 
being influenced by the numbers emerging from the 
lower cost environments where construction was actually 
taking place (Grimston 2012a). Tolley and Jones (2004), for 
example, pointed to the experience in Asia as offering 
a “basis for optimism regarding future construction” in 
the US, especially with regard to reduced construction 
times. And in the UK, as late as 2006, when nuclear cost 
estimates had already started to rise again, Mackerron 
(2006) reported that recent UK-applicable estimates 
appear to have derived from studies designed to apply to 
other countries.
Interest rates and cost of finance 
Macroeconomic factors effecting background rates 
of interest on loans and other forms of finance can 
affect project costs quite significantly, particularly if 
construction times are long. Of course, policy can help 
reduce risks and hence the cost of capital, but our focus 
here is not on project/energy specific risk adjusted rates 
of return but on the wider macroeconomic context. Whilst 
interest rate volatility is applicable to a greater or lesser 
extent for all the technologies, it particularly affects larger 
scale projects with long completion horizons, where 
financing costs during construction greatly affect total 
capital costs. According to Tolley and Jones (2004), by the 
time a new plant comes on line, total capital cost can be 
25% to 80% greater than the overnight costs, depending on 
interest rates and length of construction period. 
To illustrate, Spangler (1983) reported that the economics 
of nuclear power were impacted by the high interest 
rates prevailing during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
especially when construction schedules were also subject 
to significant delays. In 1976/77 US Federal prime rates 
ranged between approximately 6% and 8% per annum. 
By 1980/81 rates had hit a record high of around 21% and 
in 1983 were still 11% or more (FedPrimeRate.com 2012). 
During most of that decade rates remained relatively 
high such that MacKerron (1992) considered interest 
rates to be a highly important exogenous factor affecting 
costs. Furthermore, after the 1979 Three Mile Island 
accident, financial markets reduced the bond ratings of 
US utilities. This meant that their borrowing costs rose, 
thereby increasing the interest during construction (IDC) 
component of total cost (Thomas 1988). Thomas presumed 
that nuclear project financiers elsewhere in the world also 
took note thus impacting financing costs worldwide. 
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Similarly, the offshore wind case study notes that the 
cost of finance has been an exogenous driver of the rising 
costs trajectory. In theory, if offshore wind developers 
use project finance then the increasing experience in 
construction and operation should gradually reduce 
the risk premium for offshore development resulting 
in a decreasing cost of capital (Greenacre et al. 2010). 
However, utility developers, who have been responsible 
for the majority of capacity installed to date, have instead 
typically used balance sheet financing (Ernst & Young 
2009). The problem with this has been that spreads for 
utility bonds from mid-2007 onwards rose markedly 
because of the crisis in the global credit markets resulting 
in a higher cost of corporate debt (Ernst & Young 2009). 
Again, as with many of the endogenous and all of the 
exogenous themes, financing costs are very challenging to 
forecast even though they are of fundamental importance. 
That said, the current interest rate environment makes 
the situation somewhat easier, at least for short to 
medium term projections. Rates may stay approximately 
the same or they may rise, but it is difficult to envisage 
how they can go much lower.
Exchange rate 
From the UK’s perspective specifically, the fluctuation 
in the value of Sterling versus other currencies – the 
Euro especially – is an exogenous theme which has 
been particularly relevant in the wind sector in the 
period immediately prior to the writing of this report. 
For onshore wind, the weakening of Sterling against the 
Euro during the 2000s significantly elevated prices for 
UK projects, which have typically been dominated by 
European imports (GL Garrad Hassan 2010). Indeed, some 
commentators view currency movements as one of the 
most significant drivers of increasing onshore wind costs 
in the late 2000s (Arup 2011, Bolinger and Wiser 2011). 
The Euro/Sterling exchange rate also contributed 
significantly to the rise in costs borne by UK offshore 
wind developers. Around 80% of the value of a typical UK 
offshore wind farm is imported and has either been priced 
in Euros or priced in a currency tied to the Euro (Greenacre 
et al. 2010). Since 2000 when the exchange rate was 
approximately €1 = £0.60, the Euro gradually increased in 
value against Sterling, reaching almost one-to-one parity 
in December 2008. Consequently, until 2009 UK developers 
experienced continued increases in component costs 
because of the Euro’s gradual appreciation. In addition, 
vessels and support services have been largely sourced 
from continental Europe, hence installation costs also 
rose, and O&M costs have also been adversely affected 
(Ernst & Young 2009). 
Both on and offshore cases also illustrate how positive 
cost effects from one driver may be counteracted and 
outweighed by another. Consequently, whilst prices for 
commodities have fallen since 2008 as a result of the 
global downturn any positive effect on UK costs has until 
recently been more than offset by the appreciation of the 
Euro against Sterling (Ernst & Young 2009). 
5.5 Conclusions
This review shows that the cost of electricity generation 
can fall through time and as deployment rises. The review 
revealed considerable empirical evidence of cost 
reduction, in many technologies. It also revealed a detailed 
and sophisticated discourse related to the use of learning 
curves. Analysts are seeking to improve the predictive 
value of learning curve analysis, and interrogating the 
other facts that drive cost reduction. Our understanding 
of learning as a phenomenon is becoming more 
sophisticated. The literature appears to pay less attention 
to the methodological issues associated with engineering 
assessment, but does not challenge its usefulness. Overall, 
it is clear that engineering and learning/market based 
approaches offer complementarities and are best seen as 
partners in the quest to better understand cost reduction 
potential. Both need to be treated with caution, their use 
carefully qualified, with the central methodological and 
empirical uncertainties made plain.
Fuel, commodity prices and supply chain issues can have large 
impacts. The technology case studies reveal a substantial 
disconnect between cost projections and out turns in 
the mid-2000s period and onwards. A general trend 
upwards (PV is the exception to this rule) during the 2000s 
was not anticipated at all. Gas price increases were not 
foreseen, neither were commodity price movements and 
other exogenous factors which overwhelmed downward 
cost trends previously seen in several technologies and 
anticipated in others.
Despite uncertainties, recent studies of energy technology 
costs show improved ‘appraisal realism’.  The scope of cost 
estimates (for example what is and is not included) and 
the assumptions regarding other key variables (such as 
the discount rate) tend to be well documented in recent 
analyses. Many recent studies explicitly take account of a 
variety of factors able to drive costs in the wrong direction. 
Nonetheless, many contemporary forecasts anticipate a 
return to cost reductions over the forthcoming years and 
decades even where costs/estimates of costs have risen. 
In part this reflects an expectation that factors such as 
commodity price movements or supply chain constraints 
will ease and underlying learning effects will lead to cost 
reduction, particularly through capital cost reduction and 
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efficiency/performance improvement (the cost of fossil 
fuels remains uncertain and many projections expect 
them to stay high relative to historic norms).
The case studies also reveal a widely divergent picture of 
cost trends between the principal technologies reviewed for 
this report. The trend for PV has been most resolutely 
downward, albeit from the highest base. Wind technologies 
and CCGT have also seen consistent and substantial cost 
reductions, although the cost of both turned upwards, 
for different reasons, during the mid and late 2000s. The 
literature on nuclear provides a great deal of insight into 
why costs have tended to rise rather than fall, at least 
in the European and US context. CCS remains largely 
hypothetical at the time of writing, though the literature 
demonstrates increasing attention to detailed plant design. 
The offshore wind case study provides a variety of insights 
both methodological and empirical. In this instance 
exogenous factors over-rode learning, but the potential 
for learning in the early stages was also overstated and 
endogenous factors were not fully factored in. 
One size does not fit all. Technology specifics are paramount 
to cost reduction prospects. Forecasters need to be alert to 
the specific characteristics and thematic distinctions of 
the different technologies and their particular physical, 
commercial, and regulatory environments. For this reason 
the use of ‘proxy’ learning imported from other sectors 
(even similar ones) needs to be treated with caution. The 
review also suggests that modularity, scope for mass 
production, and scope for technological innovation make 
on-going cost reduction more likely. Inherent complexity, 
a significant need to realise project-level economies of and 
the need for substantial regulatory complexity make cost 
reductions more difficult to realise. 
Some of the uncertainties revealed by the case studies are 
exogenous, inherently unpredictable and may exhibit high 
volatility. Yet these risks are difficult to anticipate, quantify 
and predict rather than being impossible to image. They 
are ‘known unknowns’ and may be investigated and 
mitigated by the use of numerical ranges and scenario 
analysis. A key lesson from this is that ‘sideswipes’ are 
perhaps inevitable, and can overwhelm cost projections 
even in the best of analytical worlds, albeit perhaps 
temporarily. 
Other cost drivers are endogenous, more ‘known’ and 
therefore lend themselves more readily to future projection. 
It is, for example, reasonable to expect cost reductions 
over time to accrue from returns to adoption such as 
learning effects, on-going innovation, scale effects, and 
standardisation. It is also possible to anticipate and 
manage factors such as short term bottlenecks and supply 
chain constraints. This has important implications for 
policy design such as time horizons and sequencing.
Initial roll-out of a technology may result in short-term supply 
chain bottlenecks, ‘teething trouble’ and difficulty realising 
anticipated cost reductions – in the short term costs may 
rise before they can fall. There is historical precedent for 
technologies deployed in the power sector to demonstrate 
cost increases during early commercialisation before 
supply chains and learning from experience are firmly 
established. The offshore wind case study notes the 
tendency for the earlier cost forecasts in that sector to 
focus on cost potential, rather than on the pragmatic 
challenges of scaling up a supply chain, and avoiding 
bottlenecks. 
Market growth is a necessary but not necessarily sufficient 
condition for learning and cost reduction. The review reveals 
the multi-dimensional nature of both projecting future 
costs and creating the conditions for costs to fall. The 
potential for spill-overs literature on learning by research 
indicates that continued attention to RD&D is an essential 
accompaniment to market enablement. Regulatory 
constraints also need to be addressed and policy may also 
be able to facilitate cost reduction through supporting the 
skills base and ensuring effective sequencing of projects. 
Overall, this review reveals a large dataset on technology 
costs (past, present and future) and a rich and complex 
literature that discusses the factors that affect cost trends 
over time. Our understanding of cost reduction forecasting 
is undoubtedly improving through time, in part through 
learning from significant failures to anticipate changes to cost 
trends in the recent past.  
We know with confidence that costs can fall, and that given 
the right conditions ‘learning’ can make this happen. The 
role of policy in driving cost reduction comes through very 
clearly in several of the case studies. However it is less 
straightforward to be confident about the extent to which they 
will fall in a particular period in time, and policy can have 
multiple impacts, for example regulatory complexity can also 
militate against cost reduction. Cost reduction projections are 
difficult and challenging and often proved wrong. Perhaps 
the key challenge is in representing and communicating 
uncertainty – what is known, not known and unsure in an 
uncertain world – to decision makers seeking certainty. 
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